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Abstract 
This thesis explores how cooperation between International Non-Governmental Organisations 
(INGOs) and local youth associations influence the development of civil society in Malawi. 
The aim is to contribute to greater understanding of how a particular historical, political and 
economic context shapes the way aid-funded development interventions play out.  
 
There is a significant focus within development aid on the importance of civil society for 
democracy and development, and resources are channelled towards INGOs with the aim of 
them contributing to “strengthening” local civil society. The literature is however critical and 
inconclusive when it comes to the impact of such efforts (Riddell, 2007), and there is debate 
as to whether the idea of “civil society” is relevant in a developing country context (Whaites, 
2000). Further, there is a lack of research on the role of youth within development and civil 
society, despite the fact that the global numbers of youth have reached its highest in history, 
and most of them live in developing countries (World Bank, 2006, pp. 4–5). This shows the 
need for more research into efforts to strengthen civil society in developing countries, and the 
role of youth within these efforts.  
 
This study is applying a qualitative methodology, using Plan Malawi and a set of local youth 
associations they work with as a case study. The data generated through interviews and focus 
group discussions are analysed through a theoretically informed thematic analysis, focusing 
on how to understand civil society in Africa and Malawi, and civil society as an arena for 
participation, the promotion of accountability, and the creation of social capital.  
 
The analysis shows that efforts to strengthen local civil society through aid may be limited or 
even undermined by aid itself, because of the mechanisms inherent in the aid system, and how 
aid influences the motivations of actors within civil society. This can be seen in four distinct 
ways. Firstly, aid may lead to the strengthening of particular actors within civil society 
according to criteria set by donors, and also reinforce their dependence on aid. Secondly, 
youth participation initiatives risk becoming forms of manipulation, due to the cultural, 
historical, political and economic context. Thirdly, efforts to enhance accountability through 
aid may be undermined by the overwhelming focus on accountability towards donors. Finally, 
competition for aid may hinder cooperation and trust within civil society, hence undermining 
the creation of social capital.  
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Preface 
When I first visited Malawi in 2011, I was struck by its contrasts. A green, fertile and 
beautiful county with outstandingly friendly and helpful people, but at the same time stuck in 
desperate poverty, with a much-ignored history of severe political repression, and a young 
population deeply frustrated by the lack of opportunities. I left with an urge to come back, 
learn more about the country and its people, and also to take a deeper look at how the 
numerous efforts by development agencies are affecting Malawian society.   
 
Having worked in various development and human rights organisations for the past seven 
years, I have often felt frustrated by the lack of opportunity to take a step back and reflect on 
how what we attempt to do plays out in practice. The “development profession” with well-
meaning organisations and donors is full of buzzwords that go in and out of fashion, and 
assumptions are made about how processes work without necessarily understanding the 
context in which they take place. Further, I found that the evaluations and other research 
conducted by development actors tend to focus quite narrowly on whether the programs and 
projects lead to the intended results. This can lead to a “tunnel-vision”, where unintended 
effects not directly related to the planned results are not captured, although they might have 
an important impact on people’s lives. Here, I was inspired by Eggen’s work on Malawi, 
which focuses on unforeseen effects of aid in terms of influencing the state in Malawi (Eggen, 
2011, p. 8). Reading his research convinced me to adopt an open and exploratory approach, in 
an attempt to avoid the tunnel vision of aid-agencies. By exploring how aid influences the 
development of civil society in Malawi, this research hopes to compliment Eggen’s work.   
 
It also struck me that there seemed to be a significant gap between the academic research on 
development, and the approaches and practices of development organisations. Part of my 
motivation to conduct this research was therefore to be able to take a step back from the 
“profession”, to explore the practices of development organisations in a particular context in 
light of development theory, and to do it through an open and exploratory approach, which 
enabled me to capture issues that are often not captured in the reports by aid agencies.  
 
This research focuses on partnerships between youth organisations and international 
development organisations in Malawi, using Plan International and a set of its partners as a 
case study. I have worked in Plan Norway, part of the child rights and development 
 v 
organisation Plan International, since 2009. Plan Norway has been very supportive throughout 
this process, recognizing the need for a better understanding of how cooperation with local 
actors aiming to “strengthen civil society” actually work in practice, and being open to 
recommendations on how Plan’s work can be improved.  
 
Doing research on an organisation I am a part of has led to both challenges and opportunities. 
On the one hand, I have had great access to information and informants within the 
organisation, partners and other stakeholders, and an extensive prior knowledge of the 
organisation. On the other hand, I have been concerned about a lack of clarity of roles and 
loyalty ties, which may have shaped what information was shared with me as well as the way 
in which I analysed it. I did however find this research a great opportunity to confront my 
own biases and pre-conceptions. Finally, I found it motivating to know that my research can 
directly inform my work afterwards, and also be read and used by the rest of the organisation 
- and by that hopefully contribute to development work which is more appreciative of context, 
and more informed by the existing academic literature.  	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1. Introduction 
 “Civil society strengthening” is a widely used term amongst development practitioners. It 
plays an important part in Norwegian development aid, as well as in the strategies and aims of 
major development actors. In particular, there is a focus on the role of International Non-
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) in terms of strengthening the capacity of local 
organisations in developing countries, and vast amounts of funding is channelled towards this 
aim (Riddell, 2007, l. 4609–18). The academic literature is however critical and inconclusive 
when it comes to the need for as well as the effect of efforts to strengthen civil society, and 
there is surprisingly little evidence of their impact (Riddell, 2007, l. 4638–49)1. Further, there 
are claims that these INGOs impose western notions of a civil society which do not make 
sense in a developing country context (Whaites, 2000, pp. 124–127). There is therefore a need 
for more empirical research on how these attempts to “strengthen civil society” work in 
particular developing-country contexts.  
 
It is particularly interesting to explore this with a focus on youth organisations, because they 
are often not seen as actors and agents within civil society in their own right, but rather as 
objects and targets of development interventions. This is despite the fact that the world is 
currently in a “youth bulge”, with 1.5 billion people between 12-24, the highest number in 
history. Most of them, 1.3 billion, live in developing countries (World Bank, 2006, pp. 4–5).  
Within the development literature, children and young people are often viewed as a “source of 
trouble or in trouble”, either excessively vulnerable or potentially causing disruption (Roche, 
1996, p. 477).  This comes out strongly in the research on how the current “youth bulge” is 
associated with violence – research shows that large groups of youth relative to the adult 
population increases the risk of domestic armed conflict, terrorism and violent demonstrations 
(Urdal, 2006, pp. 623–4).  Overall, youth are often seen as a threat to, rather than a part of, 
civil society (Ginwright & James, 2002, pp. 27–9).  
 
The focus on youth as actors within civil society has also been lacking from the side of donors 
and development agencies. For example, Norad places great importance on the value of civil 
society organisations, and aims to contribute to their strengthening. However, youth 
organisations are only mentioned once in their strategy document outlining principles for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Riddel (2007) refers to an e-book, hence instead of page numbers it is referred to line number (l.). 
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support to civil society organisations (Norad, 2009, pp. 11–12). A recent study seeking to 
explore the “wider effects” of Norwegian support to civil society in four countries including 
Malawi, did not explore the role of youth organisations, and youth organisations were not part 
of the workshops or data collection (Aboum et al., 2012, pp. 105–109). The role of youth and 
the importance of youth engagement is however also an emerging theme. The World 
Development Report 2007 focused particularly on youth (World Bank, 2006), and a new 
white paper from Norway on development and inequality discusses the importance of youth 
participation and youth organisations within civil society throughout the paper (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). This shows the need for more academic 
research on this theme, to ensure that development interventions are guided by research and 
analysis as opposed to just good intentions.  
 
Malawi is a particularly interesting history within which to explore the role of youth within 
civil society. As will be discussed in chapter 2, Malawi has an extremely young population, as 
well as a history of manipulating youth for the political advantage of adults. Further, it is an 
extremely poor and aid-dependent country, where economic incentives and the prospect of 
accessing aid play an important part of people’s motivation to do anything at all, including 
joining groups and organisations.  
 
The overall research question of this thesis is: How does cooperation between International 
Non-Governmental Organisations and local youth associations influence the development of 
civil society in Malawi?  By “local youth associations”, I refer to Malawian organisations or 
networks of various degree of formality, who aim to improve the situation of youth, and 
involve youth in their activities. Although “youth” as a social category is debated, it is here 
referred to simply as the age category 15-25, which is explained further in chapter 4 on 
methodology. By International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) I refer to non-
profit organisations that are global in reach, and operate in a range of different countries. The 
fact that they are “international” does not imply that staff are “international”, it refers simply 
to the organisation being part of a larger international entity legally as well as financially. In 
poor countries such as Malawi, INGOs tend to focus particularly on supporting development 
interventions including efforts to support the realisation of human rights, and funding is 
generated in other countries (usually, in more developed countries) for this purpose. Often, 
aid is given to INGOs with the particular aim of strengthening local organisations in 
developing countries (Riddell, 2007, l. 4609–18).  
 3 
 
The research question is explored by using Plan Malawi and a set of local youth organisations 
and networks they work with as a case study.  Plan Malawi is the Malawian branch of the 
international child rights and development organisation Plan International, and have clearly 
stated aims of strengthening civil society as well as empowering youth and children to 
participate in decision-making (Plan Malawi, 2012, pp. 12–13, 18–19). In order to achieve 
this they work cooperate with formalized “youth organisations” that tend to be quite 
professionalised and based in urban areas, as well as more informal and less professionalised 
“youth networks” that are often based in rural areas.  For simplicity, the term “youth 
association” is used as a catch-all term to describe organisations, networks, and other types of 
youth groups, whereas when “organisation” or “network” is used they refer specifically to that 
type of association. Both are included within this case study, because this allows an 
exploration of different ways in which different types of youth are involved in civil society in 
Malawi, and how cooperation between local actors and INGOs may differ based on the level 
of professionalization of the local association. In chapter 5, all organisations and networks 
included in this case study are presented and described.  
 
The starting point for investigating this research question was to explore on a very practical 
level how it influences the local youth associations to work with and receive support from 
Plan, as well as how Plan and the youth associations view civil society in Malawi and their 
role within it. This was done by using a qualitative methodology, with the primary methods of 
data collection being semi-structured interviews with members and staff of youth 
organisations and Plan Malawi, and focus group discussions with youth network members.  
The methodology, as well as the process of and challenges related to data collection, are 
discussed in chapter 4.  
 
The initial categorization and systematization of the findings was generated from the data 
itself, without bringing in concepts from the theory on civil society. These empirical findings 
on how the partnerships with Plan influenced the youth associations, and their views on civil 
society and their role within it, are presented in chapter 6. In the analysis, a deductive, 
theoretically informed thematic analysis is applied, bringing in key themes and concepts from 
the literature on civil society and development (discussed in chapter 3) in order to analyse the 
findings from a theoretical perspective. The analysis is focusing particularly on how to 
understand civil society in Africa and Malawi, and civil society as an arena for participation, 
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the promotion of accountability, and the creation and maintenance of social capital, whilst 
also taking into account the particular historical and political context in Malawi. This thematic 
analysis serves a dual purpose. Firstly, analysing the empirical findings in the light of these 
concepts provides a deeper understanding of the particular case study, the cooperation 
between Plan Malawi and local youth associations. Secondly, relating the empirical findings 
to these themes and concepts from the literature allows us to suggest some analytical 
generalizations regarding how aid influences civil society in developing countries. This 
analysis is presented in chapter seven, whereas chapter 8 presents the conclusions of this 
thesis. 
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2. Study area: Malawi 	  
This thesis is exploring how cooperation between INGOs and local youth associations 
influence the development of civil society in Malawi. An important starting point for this 
exploration is to get a better understanding of the particular context this cooperation takes 
place in. This chapter will therefore provide an overview of the key characteristics of Malawi 
today, as well as important historical and political developments in Malawi since the colonial 
period. Within this, there will be a focus on the role of external actors in shaping development 
processes including civil society in Malawi, as well as the role of youth.  
2.1 Key characteristics of Malawi today  
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita Gross National Income 
(GNI) of $7742 (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2013, p. 146). Almost 
three quarters of the population - 73,9 % - live below the global poverty line of $1,25 per day 
(World Bank, 2004). The UNDP Human Development Index, which includes indicators based 
on education and health in addition to living standards, ranks Malawi within the 20 countries 
with lowest human development in the world, as nr. 170 out of 186 (UNDP, 2013, p. 146). 
 
The economy is typically agricultural. 80% of the population live in rural areas, and 90% of 
export revenue is from agricultural products. Agricultural exports at present include tobacco, 
tea, sugar, cotton, coffee and peanuts. Other agricultural products include corn, cassava, 
pulses, macadamia nuts and cattle (CIA Factbook, n.d.). The country is land-locked, and the 
high cost of transport adds to the price of imports (Cammack, 2011, p. 4). In 2012, the most 
important imports were petroleum oils, chemical fertilizers and cement (Mzale, 2013, p. 10). 
The prices of these imports are directly related to the cost of basic necessities such as food 
and transport. The recent devaluation of the local currency, the kwacha, and the flotation of 
the currency towards the dollar has therefore dramatically increased cost of living, which led 
to the strike of civil servants 20th of February 2013 (The Nation, 2013a, p. 1). 
 
As one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, Malawi has a population of more 
than 15 million on 118 484 square kilometres, which amounts to 130 people per square 
kilometre (BBC, 2013b). In addition to high population density which puts increased pressure 
on land, the country faces a range of challenges related to food insecurity, environmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Measured in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
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degradation, unemployment and HIV/AIDS (Banik, 2010, p. 35).  The country has a very 
young population, 65,3 % of the population is below 25 years of age (CIA Factbook, n.d.).  
 
Malawi is also heavily aid-dependent (Banik, 2010, p. 24; Eggen, 2011, p. 21). Since 1980, 
official Overseas Development Aid has made up between 10% and 40% of annual GNI, 
usually ranging between 20-25% (World Bank, 2004). This will be discussed further in 
section 2.4 below.   
2.2 Colonialism, Independence and Dictatorship 
The first known European to venture into Malawi was David Livingstone in 1859. He 
established a Christian mission in the country, and was of the firm belief that the three C’s of 
Christianity, Commerce and Colonialism could save the country from its current chaotic state 
of ethnic conflict fuelled by the Arab and Portuguese slave trade which dominated the 
continent (Briggs, 2010, p. 9). What is now called Malawi first became a British colony as 
part of British Central African Protectorate, which in 1907 was divided into Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) (Briggs, 2010, p. 11).  
 
The fight for independence from colonial rule was first coordinated by the Nyasaland African 
Congress (NAC), set up in 1943. In 1958, the US- and UK- educated Malawian doctor 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda returned to Malawi to become president of NAC. He became a 
figurehead for the independence movement, and initiated a series of protests and riots. By 
1959 the NAC was banned, and Banda and his supporters arrested. A new party, the Malawi 
Congress Party was formed, with Banda as president from his release in 1960. Following a 
referendum, the hand-over process from the British started, and on the 6th of July 1964 
Nyasaland became Malawi, a fully independent nation (Briggs, 2010, pp. 14–16).  
 
Despite the optimism and idealism amongst the many who fought for independence, it soon 
became clear that Banda’s form of rule was everything but democratic. Three weeks after 
independence he announced at the Organisation of African Unity that Malawi had “one party, 
one leader, one government, and no nonsense about it”. Shortly after, he dismissed several of 
his ministers, and this became the start of 30 years of a brutal dictatorship (Briggs, 2010, p. 
16). There were no elections, independent organisations were not allowed, opponents and 
others that were seen as threats were removed from power, put in prison or simply 
“accidentalized” – killed in a supposed accident (Briggs, 2010; Eidhammer, 2005; Mapanje, 
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2002). The well-known Malawian poet and former political prisoner Jack Mapanje describes 
the culture as one of “ruthlessness, repression, torture, fear, jealousy, rivalry, irresponsibility 
and lack of accountability" (Mapanje, 2002, p. 183). Conservative estimates suggest that  
250 000 Malawians were detained without trial during the Banda era (Briggs, 2010, p. 16).  
 
Banda built his dictatorship on what he called the four “cornerstones”, which included unity, 
obedience, discipline and loyalty. Some claim these values are not just reflecting Banda’s 
authoritarian orientation, but also traditional, Malawian values (Booth, Cammack, Harrigan, 
Kanyongolo, & Ngwira, 2006, p. 20) Others, however, challenge this and use the example of 
the young leaders during the fight for independence in the 1950’s as an example of how 
Malawians are not necessarily obedient and loyal (Eidhammer, 2005, p. 15).  
 
Youth played a central role in operationalizing Banda’s dictatorship, through the Malawi 
Young Pioneers (MYP), an elite wing of the League of Malawi Youth, the youth division of 
the Malawi Congress Party. The aim at the time was to mobilise youth, especially those who 
had left school, to participate in the development of their country. This idea appealed to many 
donor countries, who provided support to setting up the organisation (Phiri, 2000). The MYP 
did however become another security and intelligence branch of the government, modelled 
after the National Service Brigade of Israel, and trained in the use of firearms, martial arts and 
battle tactics with the help of Israel, Taiwan and South Africa (Phiri, 2000). The MYP had 
spies, agents and informants in every village, reporting directly to those in power 
(Eidhammer, 2005, p. 80; Mapanje, 2002, p. 183). 
 
The end to Banda’s rule came in the early 1990’s, as a result of a combination of domestic 
and international factors. When it comes to domestic factors, the self-titled “life president” 
Banda was getting old and fragile. It is claimed that in reality, the affairs of the country were 
controlled by his mistress Cecilia Kadzamira – “Mama Cecilia”, her uncle John Tembo and 
others in her family, “the self-styled royal family”, which occupied pretty much every 
possible position of power and privilege (Mapanje, 2002, p. 181). Although Banda had 
appointed Tembo as his successor, the latter lacked Banda’s popular support amongst the 
grass roots (Briggs, 2010, p. 18). There was also growing unrest and dissatisfaction with the 
government, and an intensifying domestic demand for freedom from oppression (Eggen, 
2011, pp. 46–47). Particularly important were the protests from the churches, most notably in 
the government-critical “Lenten letter” from the catholic church which was read in churches 
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throughout the country as well as faxed to the BBC on 3rd March 1992 (Briggs, 2010, p. 18; 
VonDoepp, 2002, p. 123). The churches played an important role as a mobilizer as well as a 
channel through which opposition could be voiced, as no other forms of independent civil 
society associations were allowed (Anders, 2002, p. 44; Eidhammer, 2005, pp. 38, 79). In 
terms of international factors, there was a marked change in the geopolitical environment as 
the cold war was coming to an end. Western powers who had ignored Banda’s human rights 
abuses and happily provided aid to support his “pro-western” politics now threatened to 
withdraw support and goodwill (Briggs, 2010, p. 18; Mapanje, 2002, p. 184). In addition, the 
political changes within South-Africa, who had been an important ally for Malawi during the 
Apartheid-regime, lead to a further weakening of Banda’s regime (Eggen, 2011, pp. 46–47).  
 
A referendum on multi-party elections was held in 1993, in which an overwhelming majority 
voted for change. Multi-party election took place in 1994, where the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) won with their presidential candidate Bakili Muluzu, hence putting a formal end to 
three decades of Banda’s rule.  Muluzu also won in 1999, and attempted (unsuccessfully) in 
2002 to change the constitution to allow for a third term. Also here, the churches played an 
important role in protesting against the suggested change (Briggs, 2010, pp. 19–20; Englund, 
2006, pp. 17–18). 
2.3 The “new” Malawi – change and continuity under multi-party 
democracy 
The formal structures and systems put in place during the transition from Banda’s 
authoritarian rule towards multi-party democracy formally established a political environment 
very different from the dictatorship. It included a constitution based on Human Rights, an 
independent judiciary and parliament, regular elections and various watchdog bodies 
(Cammack, 2011, p. 2). As pointed out by Eggen, aid donors were influential in terms of 
supporting as well as shaping the emerging democracy (Eggen, 2011, pp. 46–47). One 
important challenge was however that the understanding of what democracy means in 
practice, and the capacity to engage in democracy through organisations, debating and politics 
was limited amongst the general population in Malawi (Eidhammer, 2005, p. 88).  
  
Importantly, no truth and reconciliation commission was established, and there was no other 
process of documenting the abuses and injustices that had taken place during the dictatorship. 
In the words of Mapanje, “it seemed that there was a general conspiracy for total silence; it 
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felt as if Banda and his minions had bewitched the entire country into eternal silence about 
how people suffered” (Mapanje, 2002, pp. 178–9). Banda, his mistress Mama Cecilia and 
John Tembo were put on trial for the murder of three cabinet minsters and one Member of 
Parliament (MP) who were allegedly “accidentalized”, but were acquitted of all charges 
(Briggs, 2010, p. 19). This can be seen as one form of continuity from the old regime to the 
new – simply that those in power were not held accountable for their actions, and could 
continue in positions of power and privilege. For example, John Tembo was the presidential 
candidate of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in the 2009 elections, backed by the then 
former president Muluzu (Briggs, 2010, p. 19).   
 
Another form of continuity can bee seen in the way in which youth were used to control and 
frighten opponents. Although the Malawi Young Pioneers were disarmed by the army during 
“operation Bwenzani” in 1993 (Phiri, 2000), politicians in power have continued using youth 
to their political advantage. This can be seen for example in the way the UDF Young 
Democrats have been used for the intimidation of those who belong to other political parties 
or are accused of “insulting” the president, including allegedly attacking newspaper 
journalists and clergymen (Briggs, 2010, p. 19; Englund, 2002, p. 13). Englund argues that in 
both cases, youth are manipulated by elders, and “physical violence was integral to young 
people’s political role” (Englund, 2006, p. 80).  
 
A third type of continuity, it is argued, is the politics of patronage. Many post-colonial states 
in Africa have been characterized as ‘neopatrimonial’. This term captures a dual or hybrid 
character of the state. On the one hand, the state-resources, such as positions, finances, 
networks and services, are being controlled by patrons, powerful individuals who use them in 
order to provide for particular groups and serve their interests and connections. On the other 
hand, the state is officially governed by formal laws and policies as well as established 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures (Booth et al., 2006, p. 9). This  
“neopatrimonial logic” represents a continuity from the Banda era, and implies the 
centralization of power into the hands of “big men”, and a general tendency of exchanging 
benefits for votes (Cammack, 2011, p. 2) In this manner, politicians as well as civil servants 
see the state as a resource for patronage and self-enrichment, resulting in a state “unable to 
enforce the rule of law and to implement public policies” (Anders, 2002, p. 48).  
 
One interesting change that was brought about with the transition to multi-party democracy, 
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according to Eggen, was a shift of power away from the state and towards the chiefs, 
traditional authority figures in the communities. This was partly due to the demand from large 
institutional donors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank of reducing 
the state bureaucracy, which weakened the state vis-à-vis the chiefs. In addition, the donor 
preference for community ownership and participatory approaches lead to a more prominent 
role being given to chiefs, as authority figures within their communities as well as 
“gatekeepers” who allow access to communities and community members. Chiefs therefore 
became heavily involved in development interventions. The chiefs have also become an 
institutionalised part of the state by being given the role as “District Commissioner”, but 
without institutionalised forms of vertical accountability such as elections. (Eggen, 2011, pp. 
25, 30–31, 43–46). This has implications for how democracy and accountability functions, 
which will be explored further in section 3.3.4 on development and accountability in Malawi.  
  
Another important change that was brought about with the end of the dictatorship, was that 
civil society started to flourish. One reason was simply that it was now allowed to start and 
join organisations, which it had not been during the Banda era (Anders, 2002, p. 44; 
Eidhammer, 2005, pp. 38, 79).  Another important reason was support from donors, who 
emphasised the importance of civil society organisations for the consolidation of democracy 
(Booth et al., 2006, p. 16). The influx of funds from donors towards civil society did however 
lead to a number of challenges. Firstly, Englund argues that Malawian civil society became 
modelled on donor priorities and objectives rather than reflecting the concerns of the poor 
(Englund, 2006, p. 196). Secondly, local civil society organisations were overwhelmed with 
resources, sometimes without having representativeness or the capacity to deliver. (Booth et 
al., 2006, p. 16). However, there are also some positive examples of collaboration within civil 
society in this period. These include the umbrella organisation of the churches and faith 
organisations, the Public Affairs Committee, the process of opposition parties monitoring the 
Electoral Commission, and various initiatives to monitor development performance (Booth et 
al., 2006, p. 16). The development of civil society in Malawi is of particular relevance to this 
thesis, and is explored further in sections 3.3.1-3.3.5.  
2.4 Malawi in the new Millennium – political chaos and popular frustration. 
Muluzu’s successor Bingu Wa Mutharika won the 2004 election as a UDF representative, but 
resigned from the party the year after to form his own Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
(Briggs, 2010, pp. 19–20). With this party he also won the 2009 elections, and remained 
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president until he passed away in April 2012, when vice president Joyce Banda took over and 
became Malawi’s first female president (BBC, 2013b).  
 
Joyce Banda was a rather controversial figure within the DPP, as she had previously been 
expelled from the party by the president, and had started her own party. Some parts of the 
government would rather see the late president’s brother taking over, and the information 
minister, Ms Kailati, even held a press conference stating that Banda did not have the right to 
take over, despite this being clearly stated in the constitution (BBC, 2013c). In March 2013, 
ten people were arrested on suspicion of planning a “coup” in the wake of Bingu’s death, 
including government ministers and Bingu’s brother (BBC, 2013a). 
 
During Bingu’s rule, the country saw a rise in popular frustration combined with the 
government moving towards more restrictive policies and practices towards actors within 
civil society. (Aboum et al., 2012, p. 9; Trócaire, 2012) This came to a climax in 2011. It was 
sparked off by one important event in February, when a lecturer at a university used an 
example from the Arab Spring uprising in Tunisia in his civil rights class, and was called into 
questioning by the police and encouraged to take a leave of absence. This started a process of 
teacher boycotts, injunctions, court cases, the dismissal of professors and university union 
leaders and demonstrations by staff and students (Cammack, 2011, p. 8). In the months to 
follow, several NGO leaders experienced attacks and death threats. Local council elections, 
which were overdue since 2005, were postponed until 2014. The British High Commissioner 
was deported due to the leakage of a document in which he described the situation and stated 
that the president Muthiarika was “becoming ever more autocratic and intolerant of criticism” 
(Cammack, 2011, pp. 8–9).  
 
The situation reached its highest level of tension when demonstrations were held in the main 
cities on the 20th of July. In the days leading up to the demonstrations, pickup trucks with 
youth carrying machetes were driving around, apparently intimidating people on behalf of the 
ruling DPP. The government ordered independent radio broadcasts to stop, roadblocks were 
set up and judges attempted to ban protests outside designated areas. A two-day clash 
between protestors and police ensued, where hundreds were arrested, protestors were shot by 
police and twenty people died (Cammack, 2011, pp. 9–10).  In the months to follow, vigils 
planned by activists were called off in fear of further bloodshed or “deregistering” of the 
involved NGOs (Cammack, 2011, p. 11). Although Joyce Banda started an investigation into 
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the events and also sacked the Chief of Police for mishandling the situation upon her take-
over, nobody has yet been charged with the responsibility for the deaths (BBC, 2013c; Sharra, 
2013).  
 
Popular frustration was also fuelled by economic despair. Although Bingu’s first period of 
rule, 2004-2009, saw an increase in economic growth, this slowed dramatically down after 
2009, and there was a severe shortage of foreign exchange, fuel and electricity (Cammack, 
2011, p. 3). With Joyce Banda’s take-over, she made attempts at “cleaning up” the economy 
by devaluating the local currency, and making the exchange rate float against the dollar. This 
was seen as necessary in order to restore faith in the economy and ensure support from the 
International Monetary Fund (BBC, 2013b). Although this might be a necessary move for the 
long-term stability of the economy, it made living conditions worse for most people, as it 
dramatically increased the price of basic necessities such as fuel and maize (The Nation, 
2013b, 2013c). This increased cost of living was the motivation behind the strike on the 20th 
of February 2013, when 100 000 public workers demanded a 67% wage increase (The Nation, 
2013a). Fuelling the public’s frustration was the fact that the dominating discussion in 
parliament at the time was a demand from MPs to receive a monthly fuel allowance dating 
back to 2009, which would amount to 10 Million Kwacha per MP - approximately $25 000  
(Nyasa Times, 2013).  
 
Since the transition to multi-party democracy in 1994, donors have continued to play an 
important role, due to the high level of aid-dependence of the state (Eidhammer, 2005, p. 
143). The aid-dependence and limited capacity of the state has led to donors “increasingly 
stepping into the government’s shoes” in terms of making government policy, which leads to 
problems of lack of ownership as well as challenges due to donor inconsistencies across time 
and between different donors (Booth et al., 2006, pp. x–xi). Further, donors have a tendency 
of setting up their own project teams and recruiting skilled Malawians, which further reduces 
the state capacity as well as leading to parallel systems of policy-making (Eidhammer, 2005, 
p. 147).  
2.5 Summary  
This overview of the political situation and history in Malawi points out some key elements 
that are of particular relevance to this thesis. Firstly, the way in which youth participation has 
been manipulated by adults for political purposes is of crucial importance when analysing 
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how youth participation initiated by other actors play out. Secondly, the political chaos and 
confusion that has been the norm since multi-party democracy, where MPs and government 
ministers leave parties and start new ones, publicly go against their own constitution and seem 
to focus primarily on ensuring their own allowances, leads to a lack of faith in the political 
system. This might be compounded by the way in which political leaders have not been held 
accountable for repression and brutalities after the dictatorship as well as after recent events 
such as the July 2011 demonstrations. Combined with the changing role of chiefs vis-à-vis the 
elected state representatives as well as the neo-patrimonial system of governance, this has 
implications for how democracy and accountability is understood, and what opportunities 
people in Malawi have to hold those in power accountable. Thirdly, the situation of economic 
despair and popular frustration, and therefore the powerful role of various aid donors in 
shaping the state as well as Malawian civil society is crucial for understanding how civil 
society has developed in Malawi since multi-party democracy.  
 
The development of civil society in Malawi as well as the opportunities of agencies within 
civil society to hold those with power accountable can be better understood by exploring it 
further in light of the theory on civil society and development in Africa, which is discussed in 
the literature review below.  
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3. Literature review and theoretical framework  
The first part of this literature review will introduce the concept of “civil society”, and show 
how it has developed in western political thought as an important component of democracy. 
The role of civil society will be further discussed by exploring three key themes which stand 
out as particularly important in the literature on civil society; namely civil society as an arena 
for participation, civil society and the promotion of accountability, and civil society and the 
creation and maintenance of social capital.  
 
The second part of this literature review will focus on the relevance of these concepts in 
relation to development and aid in Africa and Malawi. This part will start by discussing the 
role of civil society in development, and go on to explore the applicability of the concept of 
“civil society” in an African context. Further, the literature on participation, accountability 
and social capital will be revisited, whilst focusing on the developing context, the African 
context, and the influence of aid on civil society.  
 
The three key themes of participation, accountability and social capital are selected not just 
because of their prominence in the literature, but also because I see these as underlying 
assumptions when development actors such as Plan develop programs aiming to support civil 
society organisations – working with actors in civil society is seen as a good thing, because 
they believe it will contribute to greater exercise of participation, promotion of accountability, 
and enhanced social capital. In this thesis, these themes are explored with a particular focus 
on youth associations. Throughout this literature review, literature on youth engagement will 
therefore be referred to and included, where available.  
3.1 Introducing civil society  
The question of “what civil society is” can only be fully understood within a particular 
context, but a useful starting point is to seek a basic definition.  The concept itself has deep 
roots within western political thought, dating back to Aristotle’s concept of “politike 
koinonia”, political society/community, a term referring to a “public ethical-political 
community of free and equal citizens under a legally defined system of rule” (Cohen & Arato, 
1992, p. 84). The definition as well as the understanding of the role and function of civil 
society has evolved with history, and it is now generally understood as a “sphere of social 
interaction between economy and state“. It consists of  “the sphere of associations (especially 
voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication” (Cohen & 
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Arato, 1992, p. ix).  Bratton also adds “norms of community cooperation” to the definition of 
civil society (Bratton, 1994, p. 2).   
 
A challenge when attempting to navigate through different definitions of civil society is that 
the way in which descriptive definitions – what civil society is, as a sphere or an arena for 
human activity – and prescriptive and normative definitions – what civil society should do, 
what role it should play – often are used interchangeably (Orvis, 2001, p. 21). Cohen & 
Arato’s definition above defines civil society by what it is not – it is not the household, the 
state, political society in the sense of government institutions, or the market economy. This 
does not imply that civil society refers to everything else. In the words of Cohen and Arato, 
civil society “represents only a dimension of the sociological world of norms, roles, practices, 
relationships, competencies and forms of dependence or a particular angle of looking at this 
world from the point of view of conscious association building and associational life” (Cohen 
& Arato, 1992, p. x). Explained simply, civil society is about collective activity for particular 
purposes. As collective activity is central within the definition of civil society, academic 
literature often focuses on formal associations and organisations such as Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) (Mitlin, Hickey, & Bebbington, 2007), but small, informal groups are 
also an important part of civil society (Fine & Harrington, 2004).  
 
When it comes to the role civil society does – or should – play, it has historically been seen as 
important for bringing about and maintaining democracy. It has been viewed as a “terrain of 
democratization, of democratic institution-building”, especially in relation to the democratic 
movements of Western Europe in the 18th and 19th century, and the struggles for democracy 
against an authoritarian state in Eastern Europe in the late 1980’s (Cohen & Arato, 1992, pp. 
15–16). It has also gained significant attention from academics, aid donors and international 
organisations due to its role in economic and political development, which will be discussed 
further in section 3.3.1.  There also are critical views of the role of civil society in 
democracies, focusing on how organisations are not necessarily democratic, and therefore do 
not necessarily contribute positively to democracy (Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010, pp. 3–4).  
3.2 Exploring the role of civil society  
The role and function of civil society in terms of promoting and maintaining democracy (or 
not) can be better understood by breaking down the relationship between democracy and civil 
society into three distinct components: the exercise of participation, the promotion of 
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accountability, and the creation and maintenance of social capital. As will be shown in the 
discussion below, these three themes are distinct, yet interlinked, and each shed different light 
on the role of civil society in democracies.  
3.2.1 Civil society as an arena for participation 
Participation is seen as important within democratic societies for two distinct reasons. Firstly 
it has inherent value, as the ability to participate in decisions that affect your life is a key 
component of all major international human rights conventions3. This view is further 
expanded by Sen’s Capability Approach and Nussbaum’s Human Development Approach, 
where freedom, engagement, affiliation – the ability to engage in social interaction and have 
the freedom and supportive institutions to do so – is seen as essential components of the 
development of any society (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33–34).  
 
Participation, especially within policy-making, is also seen as important because of its 
instrumental value. By being members of associations within civil society, people learn to 
cooperate with each other for common purposes, and can participate in policy-making 
(Bratton, 1994, p. 11). Such participation can contribute to better policy outcomes that are 
more relevant to people’s needs. Groups of citizens are important sources of information, 
when it comes to impacts of policies as well as realistic and desirable alternatives 
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2010). Further, it can enhance democratic governance by increasing 
“support, legitimacy, transparency and responsiveness of a particular policy” (Brinkerhoff & 
Crosby, 2002, pp. 55–56). Empirical research from Catalonia in Spain show that participatory 
policy processes are more effective and meaningful when organized civil society is involved 
throughout the process. However, it also showed that most participatory processes were only 
loosely connected to processes of policy-making, thereby having a limited impact on policy 
processes overall (Font & Galais, 2011, pp. 945–46).   
 
A lot of the literature on participation focuses primarily on its benefits, participation within 
associations is seen as positive, and the main threat is apathy and lack of engagement 
(Chambers & Kopstein, 2001, p. 842). However, there are also challenges and limitations 
related to participation. Successful participation requires skills and capacity, and always 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3See The Universal Decralation of Human Rights (art.18-21), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art.12-
17), the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (art.18, 19, 21, 22), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (art. 7), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities (art. 7, 9, 21, 29). 
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entails a cost – in terms of time, resources, effort or even risk (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002, 
pp. 61–62). Consequently, those with resources, power and knowledge can turn participatory 
processes to their advantage, whereas the excluded and marginalized often are unable to do so 
(Young, 1989, p. 258). Further, participatory processes may favour those who are organised, 
as opposed to those who have weaker links to actors within civil society or the state (Coelho 
& Von Lieres, 2010, p. 17). It is however also claimed that the limitations and challenges 
related to participation are results of badly designed participatory procedures, rather than 
limitations of participation in itself (Ackerman, 2007, p. 41).  
 
Literature on participation and civil society generally focus on adult society. Youth and 
children tend to be described in the literature as “citizens of the future” rather than as actual 
social actors in their own right, with “a legitimate voice and valuable perspective” (Roche, 
1996, p. 479).  This is often based on assumptions that they are incapable of rational, “adult” 
decision-making (Matthews, Limb, & Taylor, 1999, p. 136). Participation in associations or 
groups therefore becomes a way of training them to become part of civil society in the future, 
as opposed to effective vehicles for participating in society now. However, there is a process 
of more acceptance in western countries of how children and young people have the right to 
be involved in decisions that affect them (Sinclair, 2006, pp. 106–7). 
 
Exclusion of young people from associations within civil society, and lack of collaboration 
between younger and older generations, can be seen as a result of the “continued cultivation 
of distorted, negative images of youth [which] creates a barrier to this collaboration” (Youniss 
et al., 2003, p. 138).  This is supported by research from the US, which shows how fear of 
youth, as well as lack of contact between youth and adults within a community can lead to 
negative attitudes and misperceptions both ways, contributing to isolation of youth in the 
community (Jarrett, Sullivan, & Watkins, 2004, p. 42). Some research points to youth 
participation and violence, in particular Urdal’s research which shows how large groups of 
youth relative to the adult population increases the risk of domestic armed conflict, terrorism 
and violent demonstrations, especially if youth are motivated by economic hardship (Urdal, 
2006, pp. 623–4). The literature also shows some evidence of positive effects of child and 
youth participation within civil society. Associations such as children’s councils lead to 
enhanced knowledge of rights and social issues, and provides policy-makers with valuable 
information to inform policy (Alparone & Rissotto, 2001, p. 425). In some places, it has 
resulted in “better services; personal development of young people; and enhanced citizenship 
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and social inclusion” (Sinclair, 2006, p. 115). 
 
The concept of “citizenship” is important within the literature on participation. Within 
western political thought, the concept of citizenship is related to the “social contract” between 
citizens and the state – “a set of rights and responsibilities bestowed by a state on its citizens” 
(Gaventa, 2002, p. 2). New, pluralistic approaches to citizenship have shifted from such a 
state-centric towards a more actor-oriented approach, where “citizenship is attained through 
the agency of citizens themselves” (Gaventa, 2002, p. 2). Here, citizenship goes beyond legal 
rights and election of representatives, it implies an ability of people to participate, build 
coalitions and “play a watchdog role” towards the state (Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010, pp. 2–
3).  When citizens are mobilized and organised within civil society, they can press for 
enhanced state responsiveness (Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010, pp. 15–16). This brings us to the 
issue of accountability, which is discussed in the next section.  
3.2.2 Civil society and the promotion of accountability 
Civil society is an important avenue for the promotion of accountability, as people often get 
organised together for purposes of advocacy, awareness-raising, and trying to influence the 
government (Riddell, 2007, l. 4020–30). Thus, a participatory civil society is a part of the 
“checks and balances” of government action (Woolcock, 1998, pp. 157–8) and contributes 
towards more accountable policy processes (Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010, p. 18).  
 
Accountability is generally referred to as “ holding actors responsible for their actions” 
(Newell & Bellour, 2002, p. 1). The ability to hold political decision-makers to account is an 
essential part of democracy, and goes beyond simply electing representatives to make 
decisions. It also implies that the “policy-making process is accountable to citizens through 
transparent procedures that seek to incorporate public input” (Ackerman, 2007, pp. 31–32).  
The concept gained renewed attention with the democratization debates in the aftermath of 
the cold war, where “open and participative political processes are seen to be a key check on 
the exercise of totalitarian power” (Newell & Bellour, 2002, p. 3). Conversely, when little 
attention is paid to government accountability beyond the electoral process, this risks leading 
to popular disengagement, distrust towards state and officials, and general disillusionment 
with the democratic process (Ackerman, 2007, pp. 31–32).  
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Different types of accountability are important within democracies.  Ackerman distinguishes 
between “policy-making accountability”, which requires policy-making processes that are 
transparent to the public and open for participation and oversight, and “performance 
accountability”, which refers to the more technical process of how people within the 
government and state apparatus are “responsible to their principals through systems of 
monitoring and oversight” (Ackerman, 2007, pp. 31–32). A similar distinction is made by 
Newell and Bellour, although with a slightly different choice of terminology. Instead of 
“policy-making accountability”, they use the term “political accountability” to describe the 
obligation of officials to continuously justify their conduct to the public. And rather than 
“performance accountability”, they refer to “managerial accountability” to describe the more 
technocratic procedures and systems within the state apparatus for those who have been 
delegated authority (Newell & Bellour, 2002, pp. 7–9).  
 
Mechanisms to ensure accountability can be organized by decision-makers as top-down 
processes involving citizens, or as horizontal accountability mechanisms within the state 
apparatus itself. It can also involve bottom-up, vertical strategies demanded from below, often 
by civil society groups (Newell & Bellour, 2002, pp. 5–7). Irrespective of how the process is 
initiated and organised, power is central to the concept of accountability. In the words of 
Newell and Bellour: “the right to demand and the capacity and willingness to respond to calls 
for accountability assumes relations of power” (Newell & Bellour, 2002, p. 1).  
 
The debates on accountability have in the past focused primarily on the accountability of the 
state towards its citizens. There is however increasing focus on the accountability of private 
as well as non-governmental actors, such as transnational corporations and non-governmental 
organisations within civil society (Newell & Bellour, 2002, pp. 3,11, 19–23). One challenge 
related to the role of organisations in civil society when it comes to promoting political 
accountability is their own representativity, as well as the mechanisms by which they are held 
to account (Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010, pp. 3–4). 
3.2.3. Civil society and social capital.  
The literature on social capital compliments the literature on participation and accountability 
when it comes to the function and role of civil society, as well as what positive effects this 
may bring to society overall. The concept itself describes attributes of human relationships 
which enable people to overcome collective action problems (Ostrom & Ahn, 2010, p. xiv; 
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Putnam, 1993, p. 37).  In other words, it seeks to explain what makes people cooperate. Social 
capital is thus a feature of civil society, and civil society is an arena within which social 
capital is created and maintained. 
 
The first systematic conceptualization of the concept was done by Coleman in 1988, who saw 
it as a distinct type of capital parallel to financial capital, physical capital and human capital, 
but “embodied in relations among persons” (Coleman, 1988, pp. 118–9). It was further 
developed by academics from a range of disciplines, and became widely known with 
Putnam’s study of politics in Italy, showing how the performance of regional government and 
other institutions were heavily influenced by the level and history of civic engagement in the 
region (Ostrom & Ahn, 2010, p. xi; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993, p. 36).  
 
Putnam defines social capital as the “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” 
(Putnam et al., 1993, p. 167). Ostrom & Ahn’s definition is rather similar, focusing on the 
three components of trustworthiness, networks, and formal and informal rules and institutions. 
These components are believed to enhance trust, and thereby enabling collective action.  Trust 
is here seen as an outcome of social capital, not a form of social capital in itself (Ostrom & 
Ahn, 2010, pp. xiv–xvi). Fukuyama, on the other hand, sees both trust and networks as being 
caused by social capital, and defines social capital itself simply as “an instantiated informal 
norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals” (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 3).  
 
These differences in definition are partly due to the authors using slightly different 
terminology to describe the similar phenomena. For example, the way Putnam describes 
“norms” is very similar to how Ostrom & Ahn describes “formal and informal rules and 
institutions”; they both seek to describe culturally and historically developed ways of 
behaving towards each other in a society, focusing particularly on reciprocity. However, 
Ostrom’s definition is wider, including also formal rules and institutions which influence 
behaviour such as written laws and court decisions (Ostrom & Ahn, 2010, pp. xxii–xxiv; 
Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 171–3). The different definitions are also due to the difficulty of 
separating what constitutes social capital from the outcomes of social capital, given the self-
reinforcing nature of social capital. Trust, cooperation and norms are mutually reinforcing as 
well as self-reinforcing, and can therefore be seen both as features and outcomes of social 
capital (Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 170–177).  Consequently, when it comes to defining the 
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relationship between civil society and social capital, civil society in the form of networks of 
engagement is a feature of social capital, but also an outcome of it, as networks, norms and 
trust all contribute towards a stronger and more vibrant civil society, which again reinforce 
the features of social capital. In the same way, weak social capital breeds a weak civil society.  
 
The differences in definition discussed above are not of consequence to this thesis, as the aim 
is not to measure different components of social capital, but to use the concept of social 
capital in order to better understand how aid-funded cooperation between international and 
local actors influence the development of civil society. For the purpose of this analysis, I 
choose to use Putnam’s definition above of social capital as “trust, norms and networks”, as it 
combines clarity and comprehensiveness.  
 
Putnam draws attention to how different types of networks play different roles in terms of 
contributing to social capital. Horizontal networks bring together people of similar levels of 
status and power, and are therefore seen as more effective means of facilitating cooperation, 
fostering norms of reciprocity and improving information flow. Vertical networks, on the 
other hand, bringing together people of different levels of power and status, “cannot sustain 
social trust and cooperation”, because information flows are less reliable and norms of 
reciprocity are less likely to work. Patron-client relationships, characterized by high levels of 
dependency, are given as examples of social relationships that undermine, rather than 
strengthen, social capital. Putnam does however recognize that in the real world, “almost all 
networks are mixes of the horizontal and the vertical”. (Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 173–5) 
 
Another important point Putnam brings out is the difference between “strong ties”, which link 
members within a particular, smaller group, and “weak ties” which cut across social cleavages 
by linking members from different groups and therefore are more important in order to create 
social capital and facilitate collective action (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 175). “Strong ties” can 
strengthen in-group solidarity in a way which leads to greater out-group hostility (Fukuyama, 
2001, p. 8), which may for example result in stronger ethnic division (Fine & Harrington, 
2004, p. 352). Strong ties within small groups may also have negative effects on society, for 
example in the case of criminal gangs (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, pp. 229–30). Chambers 
& Kopstein take this idea further, arguing that the creation of social capital is dependent on 
what type of “civility” which dominates within associations, using the term “bad civil 
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society” to describe organisations or groups where the norms and values within the group do 
not apply to those outside the group (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001, pp. 838–41).  
 
Putnam provides a strong argument for how and why an active civil society characterized by 
horizontal networks, trust and norms of cooperation enhances economic performance as well 
as strengthening democratic government. He is also clear about the direction of causality – 
these communities have become successful because of an active civil society with high levels 
of social capital, not the other way around (Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 176, 182; Putnam, 1993, 
p. 37). Because of these benefits, social capital becomes attractive for policy-makers. 
However, it is not easily created. The norms, networks and levels of trust which constitute 
social capital have historical roots, and cannot simply be engineered through policy (Putnam 
et al., 1993, pp. 181–83). There are also claims that states can have a negative impact on 
social capital by not providing space for people to take initiative and cooperate. In the words 
of Fukuyama, “if the state gets into the business of organising everything, people will become 
dependent on it and loose their spontaneous ability to work with one another” (Fukuyama, 
2000, p. 15). Skocpol, on the other hand, claims that the policies of governments can 
positively influence social capital, as the features of social capital are shaped by people’s 
experiences with government institutions and policies (Skocpol, 2008, pp. 117–18).  
 
The concept of “synergy” also focuses on the relationship between civil society and the state, 
and argues that what is important for the economic and political development of a society is 
not merely the level of social capital within civil society, but also the ability of civil society 
and government to cooperate well in a virtuous cycle (Evans, 1996, pp. 1119–21). To achieve 
such synergy, it is important to have a clear division of labour – “complementarity” – as well 
as ties of trust, commitment and loyalty – “embeddedness” (Evans, 1996, p. 1120). In other 
words, the the features of social capital such as trust, norms and networks need to extend to 
public officials and decision-makers in order to result in positive outcomes for society.  
Ostrom takes this argument further, arguing that a divide between state and civil society is a 
“conceptual trap arising from overly rigid disciplinary walls surrounding the study of human 
institutions” Her approach to break this divide is to introduce the concept of “coproduction” , 
which refers to the joint production of public goods by the state and groups of citizens 
(Ostrom, 1996, p. 1073).  
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This thesis focuses particularly on youth engagement. Little academic research is done on 
youth and social capital, although references are made to the importance of education as a 
channel through which to pass on and generate social capital (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 15). The 
existing empirical research shows that youth engagement in groups leads to individuals 
having an enhanced willingness to contribute to the community, they become  “morally 
committed to and behaviourally engaged in building civil society” (Lerner, Dowling, & 
Anderson, 2003, pp. 178–9). Further, youth participation in voluntary activities together with 
adults has been shown to have positive effects in terms of generating social capital – the youth 
gained information, support, and advice, levels of trust were strengthened, and youth became 
more integrated into the community (Jarrett et al., 2004, pp. 50–53).  
3.3 Civil society and development in Africa 
As discussed above, the idea of civil society as a distinct sphere of society, as well as the 
concepts used to explore its role such as participation, accountability and social capital, have 
been developed within a tradition of western political thought. This section will explore the 
relevance of these concepts as well as the role of civil society within a development context, 
with a particular focus on Africa and Malawi.  
3.3.1 The role of civil society in development  
The idea of “development” itself is a highly contested concept, related to ideas of progress, 
improvement and modernity. Historically, the focus has been primarily on the generation of 
wealth through industrialization and achieving mass consumption, with development 
measured primarily as per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Adams, 2009, pp. 8–9). 
The development discourse often casted doubt on the appropriateness of democracy for 
developing countries – it was seen as necessary to first have a period of authoritarian politics 
to ensure economic growth before democracy could be enjoyed (Mkandawire, 2010, pp. 
1151–52), and there was little focus on the human rights system (Uvin, 2007, p. 597).   
 
With the end of the cold war from 1990 onwards, democracy and human rights entered the 
development discourse, due to the shift in geopolitical interests combined with an increasing 
awareness of the problem of lack of government accountability and a realisation of the need 
for a more holistic definition of development going beyond economic growth (Mkandawire, 
2010, p. 1152; Uvin, 2007, p. 597).  
 
This broader definition of development, which includes also issues of governance, democracy 
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and culture, as well as a more comprehensive understanding of human well-being, is clearly 
pronounced with the first UNDP Human Development Report in 1990. Here, “development” 
was seen as a process of “enlarging people’s choices”. A purely income-based approach to 
development was deemed too narrow, and development was defined as “the expansion of 
people’s freedoms to live long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they have 
reason to value; and to engage actively in shaping development equitably and sustainably on a 
shared planet” (UNDP, 2010, p. 2) Within this definition of development, with its focus on 
freedom, engagement and participation, is the recognition of the need for a sphere within 
which such participation and freedom can be exercised, supported and nurtured – in other 
words, civil society. Civil society thus becomes a feature of a developed society in itself. 
There are also critical views on the relationship between civil society and development, 
arguing that the effects of civil society might be exaggerated or at least more complex, and 
that the “euphoria and romanticism” that has characterized the discourse on civil society and 
development has “clouded” the potentially negative effects civil society actors might have on 
development as well as democracy (Ikelegbe, 2001, p. 5).  
 
The arguments outlined in sections 3.1 – 3.2.3 above show how civil society may play an 
important role in developing and sustaining democracy, in particular by being an arena for 
participation, the promotion of accountability, and the creation of social capital. As 
democracy is now seen as a component of development itself, it is useful to see how these 
concepts apply in the context of developing countries in Africa, and what the empirical 
research reveals. A useful starting point, however, is the relevance of the concepts of civil 
society itself in an African context.  
3.3.2 African civil society? 
The concept “civil society” has developed within a western context, and has focused heavily 
on organized, voluntary associations. It has been argued that this concept has little relevance 
in an African context, where there is a lack of the western-type, formalized voluntary 
organisations but where traditional networks play an important role (Eggen, 2011, p. 13; 
Orvis, 2001, pp. 19–20). Other, such as Lewis, states that “relevance” of the theoretical 
concept is simply not the right question to ask, as he argues that in reality, civil society is a 
part of societies in Africa as anywhere else, but we must be cautious in terms of how we 
understand the concept in different contexts (Lewis, 2002, p. 574).  
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Groups and associations have formed an important part of African history (Orvis, 2001, pp. 
22–3). During the colonial period, rapid urbanization gave rise to the formation of new 
associations in urban centres (Woods, 1992, p. 86). In the struggle for independence, groups 
and organisations played an important part, often involving students and youth (Obadare, 
2005, p. 269). In the words of Hyden, "Civil society grew and flourished because of the 
widespread dislike of colonialism" (Hyden, 2010, p. 250). After independence, however, 
independent civil society organisations were either co-opted or banned in a lot of African 
countries (Hyden, 2010, p. 250). Malawi is a good example, as discussed in chapter 3, where 
any form of independent organisation or association was banned during the 30 years of 
Banda’s dictatorship. The civic organisations found new inspiration in the democratization 
wave during the 1990’s (Bratton, 1994, p. 6), and there was great expectations of civil society 
organisations to play “transformative roles” in African states (VonDoepp, 2002, p. 123). 
Although the growth of independent and indigenous civil society organizations was limited by 
low economic growth (Moss, Pettersson, & Van de Walle, 2006, p. 18), there was a renewed 
interests in the role of civil society in promoting democracy and human rights from donors 
and aid agencies, and significant resources channelled towards civil society in emerging 
democracies in Africa (Mkandawire, 2010, pp. 1149–50). It is argued that donors saw civil 
society as allies for various purposes, including the promotion of a free market economy and 
improving governance (Pinkney, 2003, p. 101). This has led to civil society actors in Africa 
such as NGOs being highly dependent on foreign funds, which weakens the ability of civil 
society for autonomous action (Hyden, 2010, p. 253), and may also reverse the direction of 
accountability from members towards donors, and reduce the credibility of local civil society 
actors as authentic spokespersons (Bratton, 1994, pp. 7–8).  
 
Where as the role of donors is an important external influence on the development of civil 
society in Africa, there are also crucial internal factors shaping civil society in Africa, such as 
traditional institutions, kinship ties, and ethnicity.  Membership of such social groups is not 
based on voluntarism, people are born into them (Hyden, 2010, pp. 253–54). Although it is 
recognized that traditional social groups such as tribes, clans and village associations have 
shared norms which facilitate cooperation, this tends to be seen as a liability rather than an 
asset (Fukuyama, 2000, pp. 4–5). This is related to the “radius of trust” of social groups, and 
will be explored further in section 3.3.5 on social capital and development. Traditional 
institutions also bring with it different understandings of accountability, which is discussed in 
section 3.3.4 on development and accountability. Overall, there are questions related to the 
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role of civil society in promoting democracy in Africa, as large parts of civil society in Africa 
seem detached from concerns related to democracy, and may even carry out activities that are 
considered “uncivil” (Pinkney, 2003, pp. 100–103).  
 
In section 3.1, civil society is defined as a “sphere of social interaction between economy and 
state“, made up of “associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and 
forms of public communication” (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. ix), as well as “norms of 
community cooperation” (Bratton, 1994, p. 2). Based on this definition, traditional social 
groups and values are more usefully seen as features of, rather than threats to, civil society in 
Africa (Orvis, 2001, p. 21). Irrespective of whether groups and values are seen as having 
positive or negative effects on democracy and development, they are still seen as part of civil 
society.  To summarize, civil society is highly present and relevant in Africa, and includes a 
wide range of very different actors. It includes traditional social groups and religious groups, 
who may represent different values than what is often considered typical in “western” civil 
societies. They also include more “modern” non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
other types of associations that are often supported through international aid, which one could 
argue have been ‘imported’ by donors and INGOs and are maintained through aid. Within the 
different parts of civil society, the dominant civic norms may be different to the norms 
generally associated with civil society in western countries, which shows the importance of 
analysing civil society within a particular historical and cultural context, rather than assume 
general benign effects on democracy and development irrespective of context. The 
appreciation of the context in which civil society operates must include a focus on the role of 
external influences in shaping civil society, such as donors and aid, and internal factors such 
as history and cultural characteristics. Clearly, based on these factors, there might be 
important differences between a typical “western” and a typical “African” civil society. On 
the other hand, it is important to be aware of how there are also important differences within 
Africa as well as within the “west”, so understanding the particular country context is crucial.   
 
When it comes to the participation of youth within civil society in Africa, youth are to a lesser 
extent than adults participating in community meetings and other associations, according to 
the Afrobarometer Survey4 (Chikwanha & Masunungure, 2004, pp. 13–15). The survey also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The Afrobarometer Survey is an African-led series of national public attitude surveys on democracy and 
governance in Africa. See	  http://www.afrobarometer.org/.  	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shows that youth in Africa have less trust in public institutions and political decision-makers 
at local as well as national level than adults in the same countries. Contrary to what Urdal’s 
research on the “youth bulge” and violence referred to in section 3.3.1 suggests, youth are not 
found to be more likely to participate in protests than adults in Africa (Chikwanha & 
Masunungure, 2004, pp. 13–15).  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, civil society organisations in Malawi started to flourish after the 
transition to multi-party democracy in 1994. In the previous 30 years of authoritarian rule, 
independent organisations and associations had not been allowed, so the only organized form 
of civil society who exercised pressure on the government were the churches (Anders, 2002, 
p. 44; Eidhammer, 2005, pp. 38, 79). In addition to the change in domestic political 
environment, the renewed interest from donors in the role of civil society organisations in the 
promotion of democracy and development led to financial support being channelled towards 
Malawian civil society. As a result, Malawian civil society became overwhelmed with 
resources, often beyond the capacity of the receiving organisations to deliver, and also leading 
to the creation of “briefcase NGOs” – set up with the purpose of accessing funding, but 
lacking legitimacy and representativeness (Booth et al., 2006, p. 16). It also led to high levels 
of competition for resources amongst local organisations (Banik, 2010, p. 46). Malawian 
NGOs are also often focusing on creating links to international organisations rather than local 
grassroots organisations and networks (Banik, 2010, pp. 45–46). Englund argues that the role 
of donors building civil society in Malawi led to a civil society modelled on donor priorities, 
not necessarily reflecting the concerns of the poor (Englund, 2006, p. 196).  
 
Another challenge related to the aid-funding of civil society is that donors often fund 
organisations who work on human rights issues, but these issues might be perceived 
differently amongst the grassroots than by NGOs. It is argued that in Malawi, “human rights” 
is often seen by the grassroots and the poor as something that contradicts and threatens 
traditional culture, whereas official agencies and donor-funded Human Rights-NGOs see 
tradition and culture as obstacles to the realization of human rights (Banik, 2010, p. 41; 
Ribohn, 2002, pp. 166–67). This may also explain the lack of vertical links to the grassroots 
of some of the foreign-funded civil society organisations in Malawi.   
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3.3.3 Participation and development  
As discussed in section 3.2.1, participation is a key element of democracy. This is highly 
relevant in a developing country context. Participation has inherent value, as a human rights 
principle and a component of development in itself; it is therefore relevant for development 
goals as well as development processes. It also has instrumental value, as it can contribute to 
democratic governance and better policy-making (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002, pp. 55–56). 
 
Participation received further attention due to the discourse on the Human Rights Based 
Approach to Development. During the early 2000s, several development agencies built 
further on the approach in the Human Development Reports of seeing human rights and 
development as intertwined processes, and introduced the Human Rights Based Approach to 
Development (from here on, referred to as the “rights-based approach5”) (Banik, 2010, p. 34; 
Uvin, 2007, pp. 601–02). The rights-based approach also became dominant within the aid 
sector in Malawi, and a range of development policies as well as the constitution include clear 
references to human rights (Banik, 2010, pp. 35, 41–43). This approach leads to both a new 
way to define goals in development, based on claims, duties and mechanisms, and an 
increased focus on the way in which development processes in themselves respect human 
rights (Uvin, 2007, pp. 602–603). Participation is an important principle of the rights-based 
approach, as a right in itself and a means to realise other rights, and people are  “recognized as 
key actors in their own development, rather than passive recipients of commodities and 
services” (Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), 2006, pp. 36–37).  
In the words of Uvin, the rights-based approach implies an “absolute requirement of 
participation” from the side of the development agencies. In practice, this refers to 
information provision which is accessible to the local population, bringing a variety of groups 
into the process, and that they are open and transparent (Uvin, 2007, p. 604) 
  
Some argue that participation is particularly important and beneficial in developing countries. 
For example, Ackerman argues that bottom-up participatory mechanisms may be very 
beneficial in order to strengthen democracy in poor countries with weak institutions 
(Ackerman, 2007, p. 44). Others, such as Englund, are more critical to the way in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Strictly speaking, there is an important difference between a ’Human Rights-Based Approach’ and a ’rights-
based approach’, as the latter can cover any types of rights, where as the former is based on on “the international 
normative system of rights and the obligations undertaken by (most) states, which makes possible a growing 
international consensus on the content of the rights and the corresponding respon- sibility of the duty-holders” 
(Eide, 2006, p. 250).  Still, the term ”rights-based approach” is generally used by development practicioners and 
organiastions to refer to the ”human rights-based approach”, so this is also used in this thesis.  
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participation has been promoted within development, and sees it as a way of making the poor 
responsible for their own poverty, and shifting focus away from the power relations which 
cause poverty (Englund, 2006, p. 197). Either way, many of the challenges and limitations 
related to participation are enhanced in a developing country context. Effective participation 
requires capacity in terms of knowing how processes work, how to get a message across and 
how to identify and utilize opportunities (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002, pp. 77–78). This may 
be more challenging in a context where people have low levels of education and literacy. 
Participation also requires resources from those participating, in terms of time, effort and even 
money, for example for transportation or in terms of lost income from employment 
(Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002, pp. 61–61). This becomes an important challenge in poor 
countries, and may result in those with less resources being left out of participatory processes. 
Pinkney argues that here, international NGOs can have a positive impact, as they can “give 
voice to indigenous groups that previously had little impact" (Pinkney, 2003, p. 98). 
However, it is also argued that aid itself is not conducive to participation, even when it aims 
to enhance it, because aid itself represents a decline in ownership (Moss et al., 2006, pp. 15–
16).   
 
Another challenge related to participation is related to general challenges when it comes to 
human rights – they tend to be talked about more than implemented (Banik, 2010, p. 39). In 
countries such as Malawi, this may be due to the challenges outlined above related to the 
requirements for capacity and resources, from the citizens as well as the government. It may 
also be related to the way in which the idea of human rights, including the right to 
participation, in itself is seen as abstracted from local realities. As discussed in section 3.3.2, 
it may even be seen as a threat and a contrast to culture and tradition by many Malawians 
(Banik, 2010, p. 41; Ribohn, 2002, pp. 166–67), despite the way in which they are included 
within the constitution as well as in key policy papers of the government (Banik, 2010, pp. 
41–43) 
3.3.4 Accountability and development  
The opportunities people have to participate in decision-making are closely related to their 
ability to hold those with power accountable through bottom-up, vertical mechanisms as 
discussed in section 3.2.2. Civil society is an avenue for the promotion of accountability, as 
people often get organised together for purposes of advocacy, awareness-raising, and trying to 
influence the government (Riddell, 2007, l. 4020–30). 
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With the increased focus on democracy and human rights within development from the 1990s 
onwards, there was also an enhanced focus on the problem of lack of government 
accountability in developing countries (Mkandawire, 2010, p. 1152; Uvin, 2007, p. 597). A 
“crisis of governance”, including weak accountability mechanisms, were by many seen as a 
major cause of Africa's developmental problems (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, pp. 258–9).  The 
internal factors contributing to these weak accountability mechanisms include the lack of 
transparency, lack of free and fair elections, and political affiliation of voters based on ethnic 
and geographic loyalties (Mkandawire, 2010, pp. 1149–50).  
 
Accountability is also central within the rights-based approach to development, which became 
a dominant paradigm within aid agencies and development organisations from 2000 onwards 
(Uvin, 2007, pp. 601–602). In the words of Uvin:  
The move from needs to rights, and from charity to duties, also implies an increased 
focus on accountability. Indeed, at the heart of any rights-based approach to 
development are concerns with mechanisms of accountability, for this is precisely 
what distinguishes charity from claims (Uvin, 2007, p. 602). 
A rights-based approach emphasises how citizens are right-holders, entitled to the realisation 
of human rights, whereas governments who have agreed to follow human rights conventions 
are the primary duty-bearers, they are obliged to protect, respect and contribute to the 
fulfilment of human rights (Banik, 2010, pp. 38, 39; OHCHR, 2006, pp. 15–18). Within this 
system, organisations and networks within civil society have an important role to play in 
terms of holding the government to account to fulfil their obligations. This is formalized 
within the United Nations system of reporting on the various human rights conventions, 
where civil society organisations regularly submit reports on how the state fulfils its 
obligations as well as direct complaints on human rights violations to the relevant treaty 
bodies (OHCHR, 2008, pp. 31, 153).  
 
Against this background, aid donors often fund civil society groups with the aim of 
contributing to greater accountability and with it, the realisation of human rights (Jenkins, 
2001, p. 3). The success of bottom-up efforts to promote accountability does however rely on 
the capacity of government to respond, and this is a particular challenge in a developing 
country context. As pointed out by Pinkney, the liberal democratic model in which civil 
society is assigned an important role assumes a strong state as well as a strong civil society, 
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which mutually reinforce each other. One important challenge in Africa is that states often are 
weak, with limited resources to address demands and needs (Pinkney, 2003, pp. 88–90).  
Whaites argues that the main problem in a lot of developing countries is in fact the relative 
weakness of the state compared to actors within civil society (Whaites, 2000, pp. 130–34). 
Further, Eggen points out how aid interventions can have the effect of weakening the state 
further, by focusing on how aid has strengthened the role of local chiefs vis-à-vis the state in 
Malawi (Eggen, 2011, pp. 43–4). In addition, relationships between the state and civil society 
may be quite different in developing countries. For example non-governmental organisations 
in Africa are required to register and be approved by the government, hence the civil society 
groups gain legitimacy from the state, as opposed to the other way around (Pinkney, 2003, pp. 
211–212). 
 
Although a lot of aid is channelled towards democratization and enhancing government 
accountability (Mkandawire, 2010, p. 1150), aid also brings with it specific challenges related 
to government accountability. In addition to the internal constraints on accountability 
mentioned above, Mkandawire argues that aid itself is a constraint upon accountability. He 
states that aid dependence makes states accountable to foreign states and citizens, and makes 
them more likely to respond to donor demands than to the demands of their own citizens. This 
contributes to undermining democratic accountability, and thereby undermining the aims of 
aid itself in terms of contributing to enhanced accountability (Mkandawire, 2010, pp. 1149–
1158; Moss et al., 2006, p. 14). Further, when governments initiate consultations with the 
public and NGOs, this is done “not in the spirit of accountability but rather as a response to 
donor requirements for such meetings or to pre-empt donor’s insistence on consultancy with 
designated portions of “civil society”” (Mkandawire, 2010, p. 1162). It is even argued that aid 
itself helps the government “escape” accountability from their own citizens, as donors often 
fund and implement projects that the government fail to undertake, thereby easing popular 
frustration as well as freeing up government resources (Moss et al., 2006, p. 18). 
 
In addition to the constraints on accountability arising from aid itself, Banik argues that in 
Malawi, there are particular challenges related to the political environment. He finds civil 
society organisations limited by a “self-regulating mechanism of self-censorship”, which 
prevent them from challenging the government due to fear (Banik, 2010, p. 46). This does not 
seem unlikely, considering the history of political repression in Malawi as well as the recent 
violence and civil unrest in 2011, as discussed in chapter 2.  
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There is increasing focus on the accountability of private and non-governmental actors 
(Newell & Bellour, 2002, pp. 3,11, 19–23). In this context, aid brings with it particular 
accountability challenges and limitations for foreign-funded civil society organisations. 
Firstly, aid contributes to a re-structuring of civil society, by influencing the culture and 
management style of NGOs as well as leading to the authority of NGOs being given by donor 
countries as opposed to being derived from an anchoring in domestic civil society. This also 
makes it easier for governments to dismiss claims from civil society organisations on the basis 
of them being “agents for foreign interest” (Newell & Bellour, 2002, pp. 15–16). Secondly, 
aid has led to the establishment of “briefcase NGOs”, with the sole purpose of accessing 
funds, who lack representativity and legitimacy, and hence undermine local civil society 
(Mkandawire, 2010, pp. 1162–3). Thirdly, foreign aid tends to shift accountability of the 
organisations upwards, away from local constituents and towards donors (Bano, 2008, p. 
2002; Bratton, 1994, pp. 7–8; Vakil, 1997, p. 2062). There is little incentive to build up 
membership and autonomy, which would enhance downwards accountability, as funding is 
already provided through aid (Moss et al., 2006, p. 18). And although donors often speak 
about the importance of downward accountability, it is argued that their main focus in reality 
is on narrower concepts of project evaluation, monitoring and accountancy (Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996, pp. 267–8; Mkandawire, 2010, p. 1156; Newell & Bellour, 2002, p. 17).  
INGOs and foreign-funded, large NGOs in particular are seen as having dubious 
accountability (Mercer, 2003, p. 755), acting as “pseudo-democratic representatives of the 
poor” (Mitlin et al., 2007, pp. 1708–9) without legitimacy or support  (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996, p. 966). Also NGOs with genuine support and legitimacy from the public will face the 
challenge of different directions of accountability. Whether or not the organisations 
emphasise accountability towards donors or local stakeholders is related to power. As the 
donors ultimately control the resources, following donor requirements tends to take 
precedence over local concerns (Newell & Bellour, 2002, p. 11).  
 
Particularly in Africa, it is argued that dependency on foreign funding leads to reduced 
accountability of the government as well as the credibility of local civil society (Bratton, 
1994, pp. 7–8; Moss et al., 2006, p. 15) Even if supporting civil society organisations can 
enhance accountability, foreign-funded advocacy groups within civil society might not desire 
the policies that aid agencies seek to promote (Jenkins, 2001, p. 12). If this leads to aid 
agencies supporting only those elements within civil society with which they agree, this leads 
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to further challenges with regards to the legitimacy and accountability for those organisations. 
It may also restrict which types of issues the groups address - as “whoever is paying your bills 
often has the power to silence your voice” (Ginwright & James, 2002, p. 42).  
3.3.5 Social capital and development 
As discussed in section 3.2.3, social capital plays an important role in maintaining democracy. 
As democracy is seen as an important component of development (UNDP, 2010), social 
capital becomes equally relevant in development processes. Social capital describes what 
makes people cooperate, and consists of the “features of social organisation, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 167). Social capital can therefore be seen as a feature of civil 
society, in the form of networks of engagement. Social capital is also an outcome of civil 
society, as networks, norms and trust all contribute towards a stronger and more vibrant civil 
society. The literature on “synergy” and “coproduction” sheds further light on the importance 
of trust and norms of cooperation not just within civil society, but also between civil society 
and the government, for development to be successful (Evans, 1996, pp. 1119–21; Ostrom, 
1996, p. 1073).   
 
It is also argued that social capital, as any capital, is not necessarily used for positive 
purposes. Organisations or groups may have norms and values that only apply to their own 
group, so whether or not social capital is created is not just a result of membership in 
associations, but also the type of “civility” which dominates within them (Chambers & 
Kopstein, 2001, pp. 838–41). Putnam does not focus on the type of civility, but distinguishes 
between “strong ties”, which connect people from small, tight groups such as kinship groups, 
and “weak ties”, which connect members from different, small groups. Weak ties are seen as 
more important for the creation of social capital (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 175). Strong ties, on 
the other hand, may lead to in-group solidarity being strengthened in a way which leads to 
greater out-group hostility (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 8), which can contribute to  stronger ethnic 
divisions (Fine & Harrington, 2004, p. 352). Fukuyama explains this by introducing the 
concept “radius of trust”. If a group has strong ties of trust, but the radius of trust does not 
extend beyond the group itself, the ties do not contribute positively to social capital. He 
further argues that most form of traditional social groups have a “narrow radius of trust” 
(Fukuyama, 2000, pp. 4–5).  
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The importance of weak ties as well as a broad radius of trust is particularly relevant when 
discussing civil society in Africa, because as argued in section 3.3.2, associations and groups 
here are often based on ethnic and kinship ties. As an example, empirical research from 
Nigeria shows that ethnic groups within civil society have acted violently and disruptively, in 
a manner “inimical to the democratic project itself” (Ikelegbe, 2001, p. 21). Putnam’s 
research also shows that social capital is mainly created through horizontal networks, whereas 
vertical networks, such as for example patron-client networks, do not necessarily have a 
positive effect. This is because client-client relationships become characterized by 
competition, and the patron-client relationship by exploitation (from the side of the patron) 
and shirking (from the side of the client) (Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 173–75). Again, this is 
highly relevant in Malawi, as patron-client relationships are dominant and influence 
relationships to government decision-makers, state institutions as well as civil society 
organisations (Booth et al., 2006, pp. 9, 59).   
 
Based on his study of the performance of regional governments in Italy, Putnam provides a 
strong argument for how social capital contributes to economic development as well as to the 
consolidation of democracy (Putnam et al., 1993). This makes social capital attractive for aid 
donors and policy-makers, for example western NGOs and foundations have actively tried to 
foster civil society and social capital in developing countries (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 16).  
However, as discussed in section 3.2.3– social capital cannot simply be created through 
policies. Norms, networks and levels of trust have important historical roots, and are therefore 
highly dependent on history and context (Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 181–83). It is therefore 
being challenged within the literature to what extent aid can contribute to the creation of 
social capital, because of the historical context, but also because of the problems arising from 
aid itself. Firstly, concerns are raised of how aid agencies support mainly local elites who are 
good at writing grants proposals (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 18), as well as contributing to the 
flourishing of the aforementioned “briefcase NGOs”, designed for the enrichment of its 
founders (Mkandawire, 2010, pp. 1162–3). Secondly, even when NGOs are set up with 
genuine aims, there are concerns regarding the lack of domestic “rootedness” of foreign-
funded NGOs and therefore the limited ability to sustain collective action (Hyden, 1997, p. 
19).  Thirdly, the imbalance of power and resources between funders and recipients is an 
important challenge (Mercer, 2003, p. 748), as this may influence not only the motivation to 
join and set up organisations, but also the strategic choices organisations make regarding what 
to focus on.  
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Little empirical research is done on the impact of aid on social capital. In one of the few 
pieces of empirical research on the subject, focusing on aid in Pakistan, rather negative 
conclusions are drawn. The study suggests a causal relationship where development aid leads 
to a shift towards material motivations and aspirations of the leaders of local organisations, 
which leads to lower performance of the organisation, and a lower ability to mobilize 
members (Bano, 2008, p. 2310). The study thus shows that in order to understand the 
processes of social capital creation and how they are influenced by development aid, we do 
not only need to take history, culture and context into account as suggested by Putnam and 
Fukuyama above, but also understand better individual behaviour and motivation to join 
organisations at micro-level, and how this is influenced by aid. This theme of individual 
behaviour and motivation is also reflected in VonDoepp’s study of the role of local-level 
clergy as civil society activists in Malawi. He concludes that material factors such as the 
desire for material and social advances for themselves and their families are highly influential 
on the clergy’s willingness to play a role in local civil society. This is relevant for any other 
organisations in civil society as well, as it shows how representatives of civil society have 
their behaviour shaped by material and social factors (VonDoepp, 2002, pp. 133–38). 
3.4 Theoretical Framework 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how cooperation between INGOs and local associations 
influence the development of civil society in Malawi. This section aims to summarize the 
theories and concepts from the literature that are used to analyse the empirical data.   
 
This thesis uses a broad definition of civil society, as a “sphere of social interaction between 
economy and state“. This sphere consists of formal and informal associations, often based on 
voluntarism, norms of cooperation, and different forms of public communication such as the 
media (Bratton, 1994, p. 2, Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. ix). Civil society is understood as an 
important component of democracy, although this does not imply that all elements of civil 
society are necessarily democratic in nature or contribute positively to democracy (Coelho & 
Von Lieres, 2010, pp. 3–4). As a comprehensive definition of development in line with the 
UNDP Human Development Report is adopted, which includes democracy (UNDP, 2010), 
civil society is also seen as having an important (although not necessarily always positive) 
role to play in development.  
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When it comes to the relevance of the concept “civil society” in an African context, this thesis 
adopts the standpoint that civil society, as a sphere of society, is as relevant in Africa as 
anywhere else. However, it needs to be understood based on its particular context. Cultural 
factors, such as traditional institutions and social groups including tribes, clans and village 
associations are important as they continue to be a part of civil society in Africa today 
(Fukuyama, 2000). Further, civil society has evolved within a historical context of 
colonialism, the struggles of independence, the post-colonial authoritarian states and the wave 
of democratization in the 1990’s with the corresponding renewed interest in human rights and 
civil society from aid donors (Bratton, 1994, p. 94; Hyden, 2010, p. 250; Obadare, 2005, p. 
269; Uvin, 2007, pp. 599–600; Woods, 1992, p. 86). Thus, civil society in Africa needs to be 
understood as shaped by external influences, such as the influence of aid donors, and internal 
influences, such as culture and tradition. This thesis will analyse the empirical data with a 
particularly focus on the influence of aid and aid-funded INGOs on civil society. Within this 
analysis, the concepts of participation, accountability and social capital will be used to better 
understand the different ways in which cooperation between aid-funded INGOs and local 
youth associations influence the development civil society in Malawi.  
 
Civil society as an arena for participation is highly relevant in a development context. This is 
because participation has inherent value as a human rights principle and component of 
development (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33–34), and instrumental value as it contributes to better 
policy-making and can improve democratic governance  (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010) 
(Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002, pp. 55–56). Participation does however have costs and 
limitations, as it requires capacity, time and resources, (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002, pp. 61–
62), and these costs and limitations may be greater in a developing country context. Further, 
aid itself may reduce ownership and therefore not be conducive to participation (Moss et al., 
2006, pp. 15–16).  Given this context, the empirical data on how INGOs facilitate 
participation within civil society will be analysed with a particular focus on the challenges to 
participation that may arise in a resource-constrained environment, as well as the challenges 
arising from aid itself.  
 
The promotion of accountability is another important role civil society plays in democracy 
and development. A simple view of accountability as “holding actors responsible for their 
actions” (Newell & Bellour, 2002, p. 1) is adopted, and this thesis will focus particularly on 
how cooperation between INGOs and local associations facilitate and influence bottom-up, 
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vertical processes of citizens attempting to hold the government to account (Newell & 
Bellour, 2002, pp. 5–7), in other words, attempts by citizens to bring about greater political 
accountability (Newell & Bellour, 2002, pp. 7–9), or what Ackermann calls “policy 
accountability (Ackerman, 2007, pp. 31–32). The concept of accountability is also relevant in 
terms of the accountability of civil society organisations and INGOs (Newell & Bellour, 
2002, pp. 3,11, 19–23). In this thesis, the empirical data related to how cooperation between 
INGOs and local youth organisations aim to enhance accountability of government actors will 
be analysed with a focus on accountability challenges arising from the partnership between 
INGOs and youth associations in Malawi in itself. Here, it is particularly important to note 
how aid influences representativity and legitimacy, the emphasis on accountability towards 
donors rather than citizens, and how aid in itself influences choice of focus as well as 
motivations and aspirations of those who join and set up local organisations (Bano, 2008; 
Bratton, 1994; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Mitlin et al., 2007; Mkandawire, 2010). 
 
The concept of social capital is essential for understanding of the role civil society plays in 
democracy as well as development. In this thesis, Putnam’s definition of social capital is 
adopted, where social capital is defined as “features of social organisation, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 167). Social capital may play a positive or negative role in 
development, depending on whether groups are characterized by “strong ties” or “weak ties” 
(Putnam et al., 1993, p. 175), and whether the “radius of trust” extends to people beyond the 
group, or only within the group itself (Fukuyama, 2000, pp. 4–5). NGOs and foundations 
often aim to foster the creation of social capital, but this is problematic, both because of how 
social capital is dependent on historical context (Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 181–83), and 
because of challenges related to how aid itself influences sustainability and choices of 
organisations as well as the motivations for people to join and set up local organisations 
(Bano, 2008; Fukuyama, 2000; Hyden, 1997; Mercer, 2003; Mkandawire, 2010). The 
empirical data related to how the cooperation between INGOs and local youth organizations 
facilitate the creation of social capital will be analysed with a particular focus on how aid 
funding influence the motivations of people to join and set up organisations, as well as how 
this influences trust, related to the perceived legitimacy and credibility of local organisations.  
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4. Methodology  
This chapter describes and justifies the methodology used in this study. It describes the choice 
of research strategy and research design, sampling, methods of data collection and data 
analysis. Finally, it will discuss issues related to my dual role as a researcher and Plan staff, as 
well as ethical considerations. Throughout the chapter, there will be discussions on various 
challenges encountered during the research process.  
4.1 A qualitative research strategy with case study research design 
The key purpose of this research is to explore cooperation between an INGO and youth 
associations, and how this influences the development of civil society in Malawi. On a 
practical level, this means going into depth in terms of understanding how the relationship 
between these actors work, and how it influences the youth organisations and networks in 
different ways to cooperate with an INGO. In terms of epistemology, an interpretivist 
standpoint is therefore adopted, because the researcher needs to adopt a research strategy and 
methodology which “respects the difference between people and the objects of the natural 
sciences” (Bryman, 2008, p. 16).  
 
When it comes to ontology, a constructivist standpoint is adopted, which understands the 
social world and social entities as created by and dependent upon the actions of human beings 
(Bryman, 2008:18-19). As opposed to objectivism, which sees “organizations as having a 
reality that is external to the individuals who inhabit it”, constructivism sees organizations and 
behaviour within them as products of social action, in a constant state of revision (Bryman, 
2008:18-19).6  
 
Based on these considerations, a qualitative research strategy is seen as the most appropriate. 
This allows for an exploration of how elements of social reality, in this case, organisations 
and networks, are created and interpreted by the individuals inside and outside of the entity 
itself.  
 
Plan’s cooperation with youth associations in Malawi is used as a case study. The case study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Note that constructivism, when referred to within social research methods, may have two distinct meanings. 
The first interpretation is used here, which is that of seeing social phenomena as produced through interaction. 
The second interpretation is that often used by those influenced by post-modernism, where constructivism means 
that knowledge is viewed as indeterminate, and the research itself is viewed as a construction (Bryman, 2008, p. 
19). 
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approach is chosen because it is a good approach to “understand complex social phenomena” 
(Yin, 1994, p. 3). I see it as an exploratory case study, rather than an explanatory or 
descriptive case study (Yin, 1994, p. 3), because the purpose is simply to explore and better 
understand how cooperation with INGOs influence youth organisations and networks and 
how they view civil society and their role within it, and by that suggest some conclusions 
regarding how aid channelled through INGOS influence the development of civil society in 
Malawi.  
 
A concern has been raised that case studies do not allow for generalization beyond the 
particular case studied, considering that the purpose is to optimize the understanding of one 
particular case, as opposed to generalization (Stake, 2003, p. 135). Yin does however clarify 
how the purpose is not statistical generalization, but analytical generalization. By linking the 
findings of a particular case to the wider theory, one is able to make, or at least suggest, 
analytical generalizations based on a case study (Yin, 1994, p. 30).  
4.2 Sampling 
Using Plan Malawi as a starting point was an obvious choice, considering that Plan Norway, 
who funds several projects in Malawi through Plan Malawi, saw a need for this research and 
supported me to carry it out with the aim of learning more about the programs they support. It 
is also a highly suitable choice for this theme, as Plan Malawi’s strategic plan outlines how 
they aim to contribute to youth empowerment and the strengthening of civil society (Plan 
Malawi, 2012, pp. 18, 24–25). Plan Malawi has a range of different youth associations they 
cooperate with, including youth clubs, youth networks and youth organisations. The youth 
clubs are informally structured, based in a particular community or school, and often set up 
and supported by Plan. The youth networks are somewhat more formal, having one or two 
members from different youth clubs within a particular geographical area, also being set up 
and supported by Plan. The youth organisations are formally registered NGOs, often with 
quite a high level of professionalization, some paid staff, and so on. Most of them have not 
been set up by Plan, but work on specific programmes in partnership with Plan, where they 
also receive funding. This research is based on data collected from youth organisations, youth 
networks and Plan. Particular youth clubs were not part of the data collection, but they were 
represented through the youth networks. The selection of which organisations and networks to 
focus on, as well as which individuals were interviewed within each, was based on a mixture 
of purposive and convenience sampling. 
 40 
 
Together with Plan Malawi, I selected amongst their partners five large and well-established 
youth organisations based in different urban areas, some of which Plan were working in 
partnership with now, and some they had worked with previously. Within these organisations, 
I aimed to interview at least one person in a leadership position, and one person working 
directly on programme implementation. We also selected three youth networks in rural areas, 
all of which were supported by Plan. In addition, I identified key Plan staff responsible for the 
partnerships with youth, both in the local field offices (Programme Area Office, PA) and in 
the national coordinating office (Country Office, CO).  
 
One challenge in terms of selecting youth organisations was that youth7 is defined in an 
inconsistent manner in Malawi. Malawi’s Youth Policy, which is still a draft not fully 
approved by Parliament, defines youth as anyone between 14-25 years of age, but recognizes 
that the definition is also linked to social and economic circumstances (Malawi Ministry of 
Youth, Sports and Culture, n.d.). Plan uses the age bracket 15-25 (Zuurmond, 2011, p. 7). The 
African Youth Charter, which is also ratified by Malawi, does however define youth as within 
the 15-35 age bracket (African Union, 2006, p. 3). I therefore found that a lot of organisations 
defined themselves as “youth organisations”, despite staff, volunteers and members being in 
their late twenties and thirties. I decided to consider organisations as youth organisations or 
networks simply if they defined themselves as such, and were involving youth below the age 
of 25 in their work, as this was in line with the definition used by Plan.   
 
The sampling was purposive in the sense that I tried to identify a range of different types of 
organisations and networks with different levels of expertise, in different geographical areas, 
in order to get a comprehensive understanding of the complexities of these different 
partnerships. The aim was not to create a representative sample, but rather, to select a sample 
that would give me the broadest and most comprehensive understanding.  I also purposely 
identified which individuals within these organisations and networks could give me the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There is wide debate when it comes to how to define ”youth” as a social category.  It generally refers to the 
fluid transition from childhood to adulthood, from dependence to independence.  At what age this takes place is 
highly dependent on context. For simplicity as well as statistical consistency, simple age categories are however 
often used to define youth, for example the UN defines youth as persons between ages of 15 and 24 years 
(UNESCO, n.d.). This  thesis uses simply an age category, because the puprose of this thesis is not to explore in 
depth the role of youth in Malawi, but rather to explore one particular category of civil society organisations in 
Malawi who work with and for a particular age group.   	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relevant information. The sampling was however also based on convenience, in the sense that 
I aimed to maximize time spent on data collection as opposed to time spent travelling, 
especially considering that some of the main roads were closed due to floods. In practice, this 
meant that there was a certain selection bias towards the central and southern region in my 
data collection, and that I sometimes interviewed different people than those I had previously 
identified, based on availability. This might have affected the quality of my data, but based on 
available reports from Plan about their work in different areas of Malawi I did not have the 
impression that the results would be very different in the northern region.  
 
A set of key informants outside of Plan and the youth organisations and networks were also 
identified and interviewed, from government and other NGOs and human rights institutions. I 
did not include these interviews in the data collection as such, but rather used them in order to 
get background information, to discuss my first findings and analysis, and to get their 
reflections. In this sense, these informants became more of a “reality check” on my part, to 
see if my interpretations of the Malawian context were misguided, and to get a better 
understanding of the context Plan, the organisations and networks were operating in.   
4.3 Methods of data collection 
The primary method of data collection was interviews and focus group discussion with youth 
organisations, networks and Plan staff. In addition, I reviewed a range of relevant documents, 
in particular evaluation reports from and annual reports from the youth organisations and Plan 
where available, but this was mainly for triangulation purposes, to compare the information I 
got from interviews and focus group discussions and see if there were misunderstandings or 
inconsistencies.  
4.3.1 Interviews 
Interviews is a widely used method of data collection in qualitative research, and has the 
advantage of flexibility as well as being able to combine breadth and focus (Bryman, 2008, 
pp. 436, 438). For this reason, I found semi-structured, one-to-one interviews a very useful 
method for data collection, and used this method with almost all the youth organisations and 
Plan staff. I had prepared a check-list with questions as a reminder to myself throughout the 
interview, but I found that the conversation flowed better the less structured and formal I 
made it. The less formal it was, the more the interviewees raised issues that were highly 
relevant, but that I had not previously thought to ask. The check-list was however useful in 
order to ensure the conversation did not go to far off track, and to make sure all conversations 
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covered common topics, to allow some level of comparability. At times, I found that some of 
my questions became too abstract, especially those regarding the role of civil society 
organisations. Then, I found it helpful to use Thagaard’s advice of using concrete events as a 
starting point for discussion (Thagaard, 2003, p. 89).  
 
Most of my interviews were one-to-one, but I also did a few group interviews, simply for 
purposes of convenience. The group interviews were very informative, but some were also 
more challenging. In two of the group interviews, the group included staff from different 
levels of the hierarchy of the organisation. Then, I found that people spoke less freely and 
were less willing to identify challenges and anything that could reflect badly on their own 
organisation.  This was however not a problem in the group interview where people in the 
group came from the same level within the organisation.   
 
All interviews were carried out in English. I had considered using a translator, but found this 
was not necessary, as they all spoke English well. All interviews were either transcribed on a 
laptop simultaneously, or written up by hand and typed up immediately after the interviews. I 
attempted using a sound recorder, but I quickly found that this seemed to inhibit how freely 
people spoke. Most interviews were carried out in their own offices, but in a separate room, as 
I wanted to ensure the location was one where they felt at home and comfortable, but also felt 
free to talk. Some interviews were however taken in a hotel or a café where that was more 
practical in terms of travel and time.  
 
My main worry before the research started was whether people would feel restricted speaking 
to me, saying what they thought I wanted to hear, and not daring to voice criticism. The 
information shared in an interview is always influenced by the relation between the researcher 
and the informers (Thagaard, 2003, p. 98), and after all, they were aware that I was staff of 
Plan Norway, which fund some of their activities. In a few cases, people seemed reluctant to 
describe challenges or things not working so well. However, in most interviews, I found the 
opposite was true – both in the youth organisations and within Plan, they seemed to genuinely 
appreciate that somebody came to hear their views and document their responses, so that 
challenges might be addressed. I took great care at the start of the interview to explain the 
purpose of the research as well as my own personal commitment and interest in the topic. 
This seemed to facilitate good contact between the interviewees and myself, and made the 
conversation flow naturally as they could identify with my areas of interest. I also tried to 
 43 
follow Thagaard’s advice of having any challenging or critical questions during the middle of 
the interview (Thagaard, 2003, p. 94), which might also have contributed to people feeling 
comfortable expressing criticism, frustration and challenges. 
4.3.2 Focus Group Discussions 
Another key method of data collection was focus group discussion, which I used with the 
youth networks. Here, I would bring each network together into a 3-4 hour session, discussing 
their motivations, achievements and challenges as a network, as well as the ”good” and ”bad” 
things about working with Plan. I chose to have focus group discussions with the youth 
networks for several reasons. Firstly, for convenience reasons, both for the youth involved 
and myself. Most of them are based in rural areas, and I did not have enough information 
about them to purposefully select whom to interview, so it was simply easier for everyone to 
meet together. Secondly, focus groups are useful for shared reflection and analysis, a process 
that can also be beneficial and provide learning to the group. Based on the feedback from the 
groups, they seemed to appreciate this opportunity to reflect together and hear each other’s 
views. I tried to play as passive a role as possible, simply facilitating the process by providing 
them with questions, dividing them into groups, explaining things if they were unclear and so 
on, and I found that this way of providing them with a lot of space to talk led to free and 
lively discussions, which often raised issues that came as a surprise to me.  
 
Language was more of a barrier in the focus group discussions with the youth networks. Their 
English was good and clear, but they seemed less confident speaking it in front of a big group. 
This was solved by having smaller group discussions where they discussed amongst 
themselves in their own language, and then presented the key points to each other and me in 
English afterwards. The main communication challenge was the way in which we would use 
the same word in English, but mean different things. For example, the word “motivation” was 
used a lot, and it took me some time to understand that they referred to actually being given 
something as an incentive (money, food, etc.) in order to become motivated. I therefore made 
sure I asked questions in many different ways, and asked follow-up questions to encourage 
them to explain what they meant in very practical terms and by using concrete examples. I did 
not take detailed transcripts of their group discussions (which were in their own language), 
but transcribed the plenary discussions in English, and captured their most important points 
from the group discussions as well as my own observations of group interaction.  
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One challenge I was aware might arise was the influence of Plan staff within the focus group 
discussions. One member of Plan staff was present in each of them, firstly because it was a 
child protection requirement, and secondly in order to help me with translation if necessary.  
And indeed, in one case, the presence of Plan staff seemed to make people feel restricted, 
especially when they did not respond well to criticism being raised. This did seem very 
personality-dependent, however, and only became a considerable problem in one focus group 
discussion, where the Plan staff was very dominating and vocal, and several times interrupted 
the discussions and presentations in order to “explain” what the youth meant, or “clear up 
misunderstandings”.  In the two other focus group discussions, the plan staff took a very 
passive role, and made it clear to the youth that they wanted them to speak freely, and were 
interested in hearing what they had to say. Here, it did not seem as if the presence of Plan 
staff restricted the youth, and I did not notice any difference at the times when the Plan staff 
left the room. On the one hand, the Plan staff presence could be seen as a limitation of my 
data collection, as people might not have spoken as freely as they otherwise would. On the 
other hand, this can be seen as part of the data collection in itself, as focus groups are good 
opportunities to not only discuss issues, but also observe the interaction within the group 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 475).  I found it particularly interesting to observe the effect the Plan staff 
had on the groups, and these observations also became a part of my data collection, providing 
more depth to my understanding of the partnerships between Plan and youth networks.  
 
One practical challenge I faced was that it as difficult to control how many people 
participated in each focus group. Although I initially asked for a maximum of 10 people for 
each focus group, two of the discussions involved more than 20 participants. This was a 
challenge, simply because there was not much time for everyone to speak. In addition, the 
Focus Group Discussions raised the curiosity of the community; at times we had to change 
location to avoid noisy crowds of “audience” who made the focus group participants feel shy.  
 
An important limitation of my data collection was that I did not have the time to do individual 
interviews with the youth network members who were part of the focus group discussions. 
Individual interviews with them would provide an interesting basis of comparison against 
responses from the focus groups, and would have made me able to go into more depth on 
particular issues. 
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4.3.3 Document Analysis 
There is a lot of documentation both within Plan as well as the youth organisations.  I focused 
primarily on strategy documents, annual reports and evaluations where these were available. 
This were mainly used in order to provide context, as well as to compare my findings from 
the interviews and focus group discussions to the documents for purposes of triangulation. In 
other words, the documents were not analysed in depth, but more used to compare specific 
information. 
 
When assessing the documents, it has been important to me to keep in mind Scott’s criteria 
for assessing the quality and usefulness of documents; namely authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (Bryman, 2008, p. 516) The criteria of credibility is 
particularly important, especially when it comes to assessing documents of organisations. In 
my experience, organisations as well as external evaluators can have a tendency to downplay 
criticism and inflate positive findings, as they are eager to please their respective funders. But 
as pointed out by Bryman, “documents can be interesting precisely because of the biases they 
reveal” (2008:521).  
 
Malawian daily newspapers were also used, I read at least one paper per day during the four 
weeks I was conducting the fieldwork. This was not as part of the data collection as such, but 
was used as background data for chapter two on Malawi.  
 
4.4 Data Analysis  
According to Goodwin, interpreting and analysing qualitative data roughly consists of three 
stages, the data need to be  “described, classified and then connected” (Goodwin, 2006, p. 
43). During the description process, I started by adding words, initial codes, describing the 
key themes to sections of the transcripts I found most interesting and informative. The process 
of coding is described by Coffey and Atkinson as “a way of relating our data out our ideas 
about those data” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 27), and I found this a very helpful way of 
systematizing my data, making them more concentrated and manageable. However, I also 
found, as suggested by Coffey and Atkinson, that the coding process at the same time 
“complicated” the data, in the sense of opening up new ways of interpreting the data, and 
thereby expand the data (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 30).  After going through all the 
transcripts for focus group discussions as well as interviews several times and revising the 
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codes, I classified these codes into different categories, based on which part of my research 
questions I thought they would best answer. Then, I tried to narrow the data set further, by 
focusing on the codes and categories that were most directly relevant to my research question. 
Finally, I pulled out key quotes and parts of text related to each specific code and category, 
and explored connections and patterns.  
 
I chose not to use the theoretical framework as a starting point for my coding and analysis, 
because I wanted to generate concepts based on the data itself. Naturally, the data collected is 
to some extent influenced by my pre-conceived ideas through the interview guides as well as 
how my own knowledge and experience shaped the interview setting and the focus group 
discussions. Still, I wanted to minimize the way my preconceptions shaped my initial 
approach to the data, and therefore started exploring the data collected through an inductive 
process inspired by grounded theory, which used data as a starting point for the development 
of codes, concepts and theories (Bryman, 2008, p. 541).  Although often presented as a rather 
rigid system of analysis, Charmaz points out how simplified versions of grounded theory can 
provide effective tools to be used by researchers from a range of perspectives (Charmaz, 
2003, p. 256). At the last stage of analysis, I shifted towards the more deductive approach of a 
theoretically informed thematic analysis, where I brought in key concepts and theory from the 
existing literature, and analysed the findings from my research through the lens of these key 
concept. By relating the findings from my case study to theoretical concepts, I was able to 
suggest some analytical generalizations beyond the particular case study of Plan Malawi’s 
partnerships with youth organisations and networks, which contributes to our overall 
understanding of how aid influences civil society in developing countries. 
4.5 My dual role as researcher and Plan staff 
An important concern for me was how my perspectives as a Plan employee might influence 
both my data collection and data analysis, as I might have pre-conceived ideas of what I 
should look for and what I would find, and people might feel restricted talking to me. In terms 
of data collection, it turned out to be much less of a problem than I expected, as discussed in 
section 4.3.1 above. In fact, I found that being an “insider” was helpful, particularly when 
talking to Plan staff I got the impression that they spoke more openly to me about challenges 
and controversial issues than they might have done to an outsider.  
 
Still, it is very likely that my research is shaped by my experience working for Plan, as well as 
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by my experience working for other organisations and my time as a youth activist. In order to 
help me distance myself from my “Plan-background”, I explored a range of academic 
literature on the topic, and consciously avoided reading evaluations and reports made or 
funded by development organisations and donors until after the initial data collection and 
analysis was done. In addition, I found that an open, exploratory approach where I did not 
have a clear hypothesis from the start was helpful in order to avoid the research being 
restricted by my own perspectives as a Plan employee. I was also aware of how evaluations 
and research by aid organisations to tend focus on whether development interventions meet 
expected results, and therefore fail to capture unforeseen and unintended effects (Eggen, 
2011, p. 8). Having an exploratory approach was helpful both in terms of getting away from 
my own biases and preconceptions, and in order to capture also unintended effects of Plan’s 
cooperation with youth organisations and networks, which are highly relevant for 
understanding better how this influences the development of civil society in Malawi.  
4.6 Ethical consideration 
Key concerns regarding ethics in research are broken down by Diener and Crandall (1978) 
into harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 118). I did not come into situations where these ethical issues arose in a 
significant way, however I did find it difficult to ensure that the participants were well 
informed in advance. This was because the information prior to my visit was given them by 
my contacts in Plan, and I could not control how much and what information was given. I did 
however take great care to inform them openly at the start of every interview and focus group 
discussion about the process and the purpose of the research.  
 
Regarding harm to participants, there is always some risk involved in participating in case 
study research. The people sharing their views may risk “exposure and embarrassment, as 
well as a loss of standing, employment and self-esteem” (Stake, 2003, p. 154). This is also 
true in this research, considering that if very negative views were shared, this might backfire 
on the people sharing these views. After all, the organisations are small, and it was no secret 
who I interviewed within each organisation. I took care to minimize the risks by presenting 
the findings in a way so the specific organisation could not be identified. I shared a draft of 
the findings with everyone I could get in touch with over email, allowing them an opportunity 
to respond if they did not feel comfortable with some of the information conveyed, they way 
in was conveyed, or simply to clarify if there was something I had misunderstood.  
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Another relevant ethical concern is related to doing funded research in general, as Plan was 
financially supporting this research. This raises issues regarding how this might influence the 
research, as they have vested interests in the process (Bryman, 2008, p. 131). Also, there 
might be a potential conflict of ownership and publishing of the end-product, especially if the 
findings do not please the funder (Cheek, 2003, pp. 97–98). This did not become a problem 
during this research, as Plan was open to my suggestions as a researcher and willing to 
publish any findings with the aim of contributing to better development work.  
 
The most important concern regarding ethics for me as a researcher was simply to do my best 
to ensure that I produced research that was useful and relevant to academics as well as 
development professionals and those engaged in civil society organisations, and that the 
participants found it an interesting and positive learning experience to be part of the process. 
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5. Overview of organisations and networks in this case study 
As explained in chapter 4 above, this thesis uses a qualitative research strategy with a case 
study research design. This case study focuses on Plan Malawi as an INGO, and their 
cooperation with local youth associations. These associations include both youth 
organisations and youth networks. “Organisations” here refers to formalised organisations 
who are registered as such with the Malawi NGO board, whereas “networks8” refer to more 
informal structures of youth, made up of representatives of locally organized “youth clubs”. 
This chapter provides some key background information about Plan as well as the youth 
organisations and networks involved in this case study, which is important in order to 
understand the context in which this research has taken place.  
5.1 Plan Malawi 
Plan Malawi was set up in 1994, and now implements activities directly benefiting around  
29 000 children in 95 communities in Malawi (Plan International, 2013a). It is part of the 
international child rights and development organisation Plan International, which implements 
development projects in 50 countries across the world (Plan International, 2013b). In this 
sense, Plan Malawi is an International NGO in Malawi, because it is a part of Plan 
International, and all its funding is generated by fundraising offices in developing countries, 
such as Plan Norway, and channelled through Plan International to Plan Malawi.  
 
Plan Malawi’s current strategic plan aims to invest US$ 48,1 million in the period 2012-2016. 
This money is coming partly from sponsorship funds (individual sponsors in developed 
countries who pay a monthly fixed amount) and partly from grants from institutional donors, 
development agencies and corporates (Plan Malawi, 2012, p. 3). The key issues addressed in 
Plan Malawi’s programmes include child and maternal health, water and sanitation, 
education, violence against children and child and youth participation (Plan Malawi, 2012, p. 
3). Plan Malawi have stated aims of contributing to strengthening civil society organisations 
as well as empowering youth and children to participate in decision-making (Plan Malawi, 
2012, pp. 18, 24, 25). Plan’s definition of children is based on the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, where children are seen as below 18 years of age, whereas the definition 
of “youth” is the 15-25 age category (Zuurmond, 2011, p. 7).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The term ”network” is in Malawi used to describe many different types of networks, with different degrees of 
formality. For examle, the Malawi Youth Human Rights Network is a network where all the members are 
registered youth NGOs. In this thesis, ”youth networks” refer strictly to the youth networks Plan work closely 
with, which are quite informal, and made up of several community-level youth clubs.  
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Plan Malawi has one Country Office (CO), which is the national head office. Most of the 
programme implementation is managed from four “Programme Area Offices” (PAs), in 
Lilongwe, Mulanje, Kasungu and Mzuzu, apart from some national-level programmes which 
are managed from the CO (Plan Malawi, 2012) (for geographical location, please see map 
below). Despite Plan Malawi being a part of an international organisation, the vast majority of 
staff are Malawians.  
 
In 2003, Plan changed its approach to development work from a needs-based approach 
focusing on service delivery and direct programme implementation, to a rights-based 
approach working through partnerships and focusing on advocacy and capacity-building in 
addition to service delivery in close partnership with the government (Zuurmond, 2011, p. 5). 
As discussed in section 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, this was a common move amongst many aid agencies 
and international development organisations at the time (Banik, 2010, p. 34; Uvin, 2007, pp. 
601–02). Plan’s right-based approach to programming is called Child-Centred Community 
Development (CCCD), and is based on general rights-based principles outlined by the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (2006), but with an added 
emphasis on children, reflecting Plan’s purpose as an organisation. CCCD is made up of the 
following principles:  
• Children at the centre 
• Guided by human rights principles and standards 
• Responsibility and accountability 
• Inclusion and non-discrimination 
• Gender equality 
• Participation 
(Zuurmond, 2011, p. 20) 
 
Through my data collection, I found that this shift from direct implementation and service-
delivery to working through local partner organisations and having less service-delivery was 
very important in terms of influencing the way Plan works with partners such as youth 
organisations, as well as how communities view both Plan and partners. This is discussed the 
following chapters on findings and analysis.  
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5.2 Map of Malawi  
 
In this map of Malawi, you can 
see the capitol city Lilongwe and 
the major cities of Zomba, 
Blantyre, Nkohotakota, Mzimba 
and Chilumba. Plan’s Country 
Office is in Lilongwe, and you can 
also see the four Programme Area 
Offices (in this map they are 
referred to as Programme Units, as 
this is the term used in other Plan 
Offices).  
 
 
 
(Plan International, 2013a) 
5.3 Youth organisations 
A set of youth organisations that Plan currently or previously work in partnership with were 
selected for this case study. As discussed in section 4.2, the inconsistent way in which youth 
are defined in Malawi was a challenge when selecting organisations. I therefore included 
organisations who saw themselves as youth organisations, and involved youth within the 15-
25 age category in their work, as this is the age definition used by Plan (Zuurmond, 2011, p. 
7). Below is some key information about each organisation.  
5.3.1 Centre for Youth and Children’s Affairs (CEYCA).  
This organisation is based in the capitol Lilongwe, was set up in 1995 and registered in 1997 
as a youth-oriented NGO. It’s mission is to “promote the rights and active participation of 
children and young people through advocacy, facilitation, networking, research, education, 
and documentation” (Centre for Youth and Children’s Affairs (CEYCA), 2011, p. 8).  
 
According to the information revealed in the interviews, the organization currently has 19 
paid members of staff, in addition to a range of community volunteers. CEYCA has worked 
Figure 1: Map of Malawi 
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with Plan since 2007 and as a formalized partner since 2008, and funding from Plan amounts 
to about 1/3 of their total funding. In particular, Plan funds the activities related to child and 
youth participation, protection and community-based monitoring. They also receive some 
funding from Action Aid, HIVOS, Ipas, and Stop Aids Now (CEYCA, 2011). 
5.3.2 Active Youth Initiative for Social Enhancement (AYISE). 
AYISE was founded in 1995, and officially registered in 1997. It is based in the southern city 
of Blantyre, Malawi’s second largest city, and is a voluntary member organisation as well as a 
professional NGO with employed staff (Active Youth Initiative for Social Enhancement 
(AYISE), 2013). During the interview, I was told they had 27 paid, full-time staff, including 
support staff such as guards at their youth centre.  
 
The organisation aims to ”encourage and enable Malawian youth to contribute positively to 
the social, economic and political development of their country”. It works on a wide range of 
different issues, including HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation, human rights and 
democracy, youth participation, environment, peace-building and conflict resolution, and 
promotion of livelihood security. The organisation also focuses on talent promotion and 
career guidance, promotion of volunteerism and philanthropy, and facilitates youth exchanges 
(AYISE, 2013).  
 
AYISE has been and still is supported by a wide range of donors. This includes institutional 
donors such as USAID and CIDA, international agencies such as UNICEF and ILO, and a 
range of other organisations and institutions within human rights and development. AYISE is 
currently not working in partnership with Plan, but they were previously one of Plan’s 
partners for child protection and child participation work. Unfortunately, I was not able to get 
their annual reports or strategic plan, and did not get responses to my follow-up questions via 
email about the size of the organisation and their funding levels from different donors.  
5.3.3 Eye of the Child  
Eye of the Child was established in Blantyre in 1995 and registered in 1998 as a human rights 
organisation with the aim of “promoting the respect and protection of children rights in 
Malawi” (Eye of the Child, 2012, p. 3).  In order to fulfil this aim, the organisation carries out 
research and develops resources; provides training and capacity building to children, 
community members, police and other stakeholders; and advocate on various child rights and 
child protection issues. It also engages in litigation and law reform. Key prioritised issues 
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include child labour, child trafficking and child marriages (Eye of the Child, 2012). 
 
Based on the information revealed in the interview, the organisation currently has 14 staff, 
two of which are funded directly by Plan Malawi, and Plan Malawi accounts for about 15% of 
their funding. Plan started cooperating with Eye of the Child in 2010. Other funders include 
range of INGOs and charity foundations in addition to Plan, including Firelight Foundation, 
the Tides Foundation, Norwegian Church Aid and Action Aid (Eye of the Child, 2012, p. 35). 
5.3.4 Youth Net and Counselling (YONECO) 
YONECO was formed in Zomba, a relatively large city in the south and Malawi’s first 
capitol. It was set up in 1997, and registered in 1999 as an NGO addressing social justice and 
reproductive health issues affecting youth, women and children. They do this by promoting 
life skills, leadership and entrepreneurship development, conducting civic education on a 
range of issues, encouraging participation in democratic and socio-economic processes, and 
providing social and economic support to those who experience violence and abuse or living 
with HIV/AIDS (Youth Net and Councelling (YONECO), 2013).  
 
At the time of interview in March 2013, YONECO had about 92 paid staff, but this was set to 
increase to 102 the following month. The organisation is working across Malawi, and is 
funded by a range of donors, including a range of United Nations (UN) agencies, international 
organisations such as Save the Children, Interact Worldwide, Norwegian Church Aid and 
Family Health International, as well as some national bodies such as the National Aids 
Commission and the NGO Gender Coordination Network (YONECO, 2012, p. 28). 
According to information from the interview and email, Plan contributed to just above 15% of 
YONECO’s annual budget in 2012. They wave worked with Plan for five years.  
5.3.5 Timveni Child and Youth Media Organisation 
”Timveni”, which means ”hear us out”, was initially set up by Plan Malawi in 2006, as a child 
and youth radio station.  It is based in Lilongwe. The reporters as well as the audience are 
youth and children, and according to what I was told in the interview, the programs have a 
wide following. In the programs, various issues are raised that are of concern to children and 
youth, and often controversial issues are discussed such as child abuse, child marriage and 
HIV and AIDS.  
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In 2011, Timveni became an independent organisation with the aim of engaging with children 
and youth through programs and activities, in order to promote and facilitate their active 
participation. They do this by having children and youth as their reporters, actively 
contributing by developing and running the programs. Timveni also aims to raise awareness 
on issues affecting children and youth amongst the general public, including exposing 
particular violations of the rights of children and youth. For this purpose, they also use social 
media such as Facebook actively to promote their shows as well as the issues they raise, as 
can be seen in the screenshot 
shown in figure 2 (Timveni 
Meida, n.d.). Through their 
operations, they hope to help 
children and youth develop their 
talents and skills, particularly 
related to media (Timveni Child 
and Youth Media Organisation, 
2012, p. 9). The organisation has 
recently been granted a TV 
licence (eufrika.org, 2012).  
 
At the time of the interview, the organisation was still heavily dependent on Plan financially. 
They have small funding from other sources, but most of the funding is from Plan Malawi, 
who fund all their 13 paid staff as well as their rent. With a newly developed business plan 
and the TV licence, they hope to generate income by also producing commercial programmes 
and including advertising (Timveni Child and Youth Media Organisation, 2012).  
 
Timveni was an interesting organisation to include in this research, as they are a hybrid 
organisation that is both doing media production for radio and TV as well as activities at 
community-level related to child and youth participation. As emphasised in chapter 3, media 
organisations are an important part of civil society, as a form of public communication 
(Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. ix). In Malawi, public and community radio are particularly 
important parts of civil society, as they have a broad reach including the rural poor (Booth et 
al., 2006, p. 16).  
Figure 2: Screenshot from Timveni Media’s Facebook 
page, 23rd of May 2013  
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5.4  Youth Networks  
Three youth networks were focused on for this research. As explained in section 4.2, they are 
networks in the sense that they have members from a range of smaller, more informal youth 
clubs within a specific geographical area. The youth clubs as well as the youth networks focus 
on various issues the youth are concerned about, as well as specific activities they may be 
supported by Plan to carry out. One network, the National Network on Climate Change, was 
the only one focusing on one particular issue, and also the only one based in Lilongwe. The 
other two, in the rural areas of Mulanje and Kasungu, were focusing on a range of different 
issues affecting youth.  
 
According to what I was told in the interviews , all three networks have been set up at the 
initiative of and with the support of Plan, and all relatively recently. Depending on the area, 
Plan’s support of youth networks started some time between 2009 and 2011. Plan’s main aim 
is to empower the youth to participate in local governance and decision-making, as well as 
enhancing their livelihood opportunities. The type of support received is however quite 
different to that of the youth organisations above. Plan is more actively involved in the 
activities, and funding is only provided in small amounts for specific activities, not for larger 
projects. As will be discussed in chapter 6, this is also because the youth networks are not 
formally registered and are not seen as having capacity to handle larger amounts of funding or 
more complex projects.   
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6.  Presentation of findings 
In this chapter, the key findings are presented and discussed. As explained in section 4.4, at 
the initial stage of analysis I was using an inductive approach inspired by grounded theory, 
where I distanced myself from the literature and did not use the theoretical framework. This 
was because I wanted to approach and systematize the empirical data without having too 
many pre-conceived ideas of what I would find. The findings are here presented according to 
the main codes and categories that came out of this process, whereas the theory is brought in 
to the analysis in chapter seven. The first part of the findings is related to how cooperating 
with Plan influences the youth associations, whereas the second part is focusing on the views 
on civil society, and how Plan and the youth associations see their role within it.  
6.1  How cooperating with Plan influences youth organisations and 
networks. 
A lot of the empirical data was centred on how cooperating with Plan influenced the youth 
organisations and networks. Here, I found that the influence took five distinct forms, which 
include the selection and implementation of goals and activities, organisational capacity, 
sustainability and continuity, motivation, and relationships with stakeholders. This first part of 
the findings is presented according to these five ways in which youth organisations were 
influenced by their cooperation with Plan.  
6.1.1 Selection and implementation of goals and activities 
The common goal of the youth organisations as well as the youth networks was to promote 
the participation of youth – in local decision-making and governance, within schools, and at 
national level. As expressed by the staff of one organisation: “We help them to start 
participating actively in decision making, in activities that have meaning to their lives”. 
Therefore, there was a focus on creating spaces for this participation to take place, both in a 
physical sense by setting up youth centres and other places to meet, and in a political sense by 
opening avenues for youth participation within existing decision-making structures. One of 
the youth networks explained: ”We have managed to negotiate with the chiefs that we should 
be included in development planning activities.  Youth are now participating in decision 
making activities in development such as Village Development Councils and Area 
Development Councils”.  
 
In addition, the youth organisations had aims of human rights monitoring, ensuring 
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government accountability, strengthening local child protection systems and providing 
various services of relevance to youth such as vocational training and health services. The 
youth networks, on the other hand, were more focused on their own empowerment as groups, 
how they could improve their own situation through being part of a group, and taking a more 
active part in the development of as well as the decision-making within their communities. 
They were also focusing on improving livelihoods, as one youth group explained: “We have 
been trained in different vocational skills, for example tin smithing, tailoring, carpentry and 
HIV testing and counselling. Many have jobs or are self-employed. Through youth clubs we 
also have been doing piggery farming”. 
 
When asked about the partnership with Plan, the initial response was that the partnership 
helped them to achieve what they aim to achieve – “it helps us achieve our vision”, and also, 
that “they [Plan] do not promote their own role, they support others”. This was also confirmed 
by Plan staff, who said they were ”trying to find out from them what could be their choice. 
What is it that they want to do – how do they want to see their youth group tomorrow. We are 
supporting them to come up with ideas”. As our discussions continued, it was however 
expressed a concern that Plan have their own agenda, both in terms of which themes to 
support and what geographical areas to work within. One of the youth networks stated:  
We only receive support from Plan to work in Plan’s areas. Plan should allow its 
partners to work independently. We would like to work on many issues – child 
protection, HIV/AIDS, and youth empowerment (…) but Plan only funds the activities 
already in their plans. They are strict to their catchment areas. 
This was expressed as a challenge by all the organisations and networks, stating that there was 
”favouritism” in selecting geographical focus areas where activities were supported. Several 
of the formal organisations also expressed great frustrations with what they called ”micro-
management” from Plan’s side, that they did not feel trusted to implement activities as they 
saw best, but had to submit extremely detailed plans and log frames9 for approval every three 
months in order to get the agreed-upon funding for activities.  One of the organisations felt 
that Plan staff were “not in good faith, Plan wants to be our bosses, to be in control”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ”Logframes” are short for Logical Framworks, which is a much used tool in development planning. It focuses 
particularly on the on the intervention logic - the relationship between planned activities, results and 
measurement of progress. The logical framework matrix (the logframe) is essentially a grid in which this logic is 
presented, showing how planned activities deliver outputs, which lead to outcomes, that ultimately contribute 
towards an overarching goal, and also showing how each stage will be measured and verified. The approach is 
also often criticized on the grounds that it fails to capture unintended and unforeseen effects and consequences 
(Hummelbrunner, 2010, pp. 1–7) . 
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These challenges were to some extent recognized by Plan staff as well. Although some 
insisted that Plan merely helps the youth associations achieve their own agendas and 
objectives, others shared the concerns raised: “It is hard for us [Plan] to give them [youth 
organisations and networks] money to implement their own plans. Most of the time, it is us 
giving them the money and asking them to implement the plans we have”. Some Plan staff 
also claimed that the youth organisations and networks understood this this situation, and 
therefore attempted to be “masters of everything” in order to be able to shift their focus and 
“do activities based on what Plan will support”. Here, however, it must be mentioned that 
some of the youth organisations expressed their commitment to their own vision, and stated 
that they would rather have less funding from Plan than change their activities based on 
Plan’s priorities. Some Plan staff also recognized the problem of micro-management, saying 
that “sometimes our Community Development Facilitators feel they should manage the 
money, they should tell them [youth organisations and networks] what to do. Our 
coordinators need to understand how to work in partnership”.  
 
Further, Plan staff also mentioned being frustrated by how they would get grants funding only 
for certain activities, and therefore could not always support the youth in what they thought 
was more important. Plan does have some flexibility through the sponsorship funds, and in all 
three Programme Areas visited, Plan was using these funds to support youth networks, often 
after grants had ended, or whilst supporting them to apply for grants related to their focus 
area. One Plan staff explained: 
Formerly – there was a youth network which was under a governance project. That 
project was funded by UKNO [Plan’s office in the UK] – when the project phased out, 
we did not have the money for the programme. It was thought – we needed to 
continue. It is now funded by sponsorship funds. 
 
Some Plan staff were concerned that NGOs in Malawi had a tendency of bringing youth 
together for the purposes of particular projects, but not really doing this “in tandem with the 
needs of youth”.  In relation to this, it was expressed how it was much easier for organisations 
to reach out to youth when they are organised in groups. Many Plan staff at local level 
mentioned how “useful” it was to work with the youth networks, saying that “the youth will 
assist us in implementing various programmes”. This was particularly mentioned in relation 
to Plan’s sponsorship activities. One local Plan staff said: “They are the ones who support us 
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on sponsorship activities, [the youth] are becoming very useful to Plan. Really, really!”. In 
these activities, youth assist with the administration such as collecting photos of children and 
distributing letters and information. Officially, this is done through volunteering, but in 
reality, the allowance provided becomes a significant source of income for the youth.  
 
This section has presented the findings related to how cooperating with Plan influences the 
aims and activities of youth organisations. Overall, the youth organisations and networks aim 
to promote the participation of youth, enhance democratic governance and influence the 
decision-makers on important issues, contribute positively to their communities by providing 
services within health and protection, and improve the livelihood opportunities of youth. 
Cooperating with Plan is influencing them by shaping what issues they work on, as well as in 
which geographical areas they do so, as Plan is thematically and geographically restricted, 
especially when interventions are being funded through grants. This was seen as a challenge 
by youth organisations, networks as well as Plan staff. Plan does try to meet this challenge by 
using funds from sponsorship, which are restricted by geographic area but not by theme, to 
support the youth organisations to work on the issues they find most important. 
6.1.2 Organisational capacity 
“Capacity-building” is a major buzz-word of development agencies, and this to some extent 
influenced our discussion on this theme.  The words “capacity” and “capacity-building” were 
used extensively by the youth organisations, networks and Plan staff, and it was consistently 
mentioned with reference to the organisations and networks lacking or needing capacity, and 
Plan having a role in terms of enhancing their capacity. One Plan staff explained:  
We are not just giving resources, but raising capacity on finance, on project 
implementation (…) Those skills are used not just for implementing our projects, but 
also to work with others.  We are looking at the different capacities of different 
organisations (…) What YONECO is lacking might not be the same as CEYCA. We 
develop tailor-made programs that can suit the gaps in capacities of each individual 
organisation. 
 
A challenge here was that “capacity” was used as a catch-phrase to mean anything from 
administration staff, buildings, motorbikes, leadership skills, financial management skills, 
ability to generate resources, and so on. Through our discussions, I attempted to make them 
break it down to explain exactly what kind of capacity they were referring to, and what 
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specifically Plan was doing to enhance it. The three main types of capacity they focused on 
can be classified as material resources, skills and experience, and the ability to meet donor 
requirements. 
 
Material resources 
Consistently, the first type of capacity that was mentioned by the youth organisations and 
networks was always that of material resources – in terms of material resources they had, 
resources they lacked, and what they thought Plan should provide for them.  
 
Within this, mobility was a recurring theme, it was mentioned how it is difficult to get around 
without cars, motorbikes or bicycles, that it was difficult for staff to go places or for youth to 
come and meet up. For all organisations and groups, Plan had provided some support for this, 
whether it was through actual means of transport or by providing transport allowances for 
meetings and activities. The youth organisations explained: “They provided us with transport 
– a motorbike”, and ”They refund our transportation whenever we are having a meeting with 
them”. Yet, they all mentioned that there was a need for more support to enhance their 
mobility. One youth group, which had previously been granted some bicycles, explained that 
these were no longer available or in good condition, so they requested new ones.  
 
Having a space to carry out their activities was also seen as an important part of their capacity 
as an organisation: “They should provide us with materials such as construction of youth 
offices, entertainments centres, they should provide transport and allowances as we are 
working. During rainy season, the places for meeting are leaking”. Most organisations and 
youth networks were using rented spaces, often fully or partly paid for by Plan, and expressed 
the need to be given funding for their own building. One youth organisation and one youth 
club (who were members of one of the youth networks) had been supported to own buildings, 
where they could also rent out rooms and generate income. Based on my observations from 
visiting the buildings and discussing with the youth involved, I got the impression that the 
organisation was managing this well and used it to ensure long-term sustainability, whereas 
the youth club was unable to manage this resource and left the building deteriorating.  
 
The youth network in particular mentioned their lack of places to meet, as well as lack of 
other types of material resources, such as computers, stationary, information material, games 
and sports equipment. They also mentioned equipment needed for various livelihood activities 
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such as pig farming and agriculture, reflecting their main focus of economically empowering 
their own members. After some discussion, it also came out that Plan had previously 
supported various livelihood activities such as a piggery, but the youth club had not 
maintained these well so the project was not continued.  
 
One challenge pointed out by all youth organisations and Plan staff was that even when Plan 
has agreed to provide financial support for specific activities, the money is often disbursed 
much later than what was planned for: “The main problem is late disbursements, which 
causes delays”. This was seen as partly related to delays from donors, but primarily because 
of Plan’s own system of liquidations, where they require specific documentation, approval at 
different levels of the organisational hierarchy, and the involvement of the national-level 
accountant in the Plan office. One Plan staff explained: 
We have the delayed disbursements of funds. Every organisation presents it (…) I 
agree – seriously. That is because of the liquidation processes.  Money should be 
given in January. In March they are not there yet – have to wait for our accountant to 
go to each organisations and do the liquidation. It is a whole massive system, 
involving the program coordinator, the manager, the writing of reports, and so on. 
There are many hiccups along the way (…) When there are different projects funded 
from different countries, all projects need to do liquidations separately.  
There was agreement that these systems cause delays, which severely compromise effective 
implementation of activities, because even when money is disbursed late, it still has to be 
spent by the same date. According to youth organisations as well as Plan staff, this leads to 
“crash implementation”, with a focus on spending a lot of money within a short space of time, 
rather than on the quality and effectiveness of the activities implemented. This was by the 
youth organisations seen as undermining their aims to empower the youth: “It is a challenge 
with INGOs - if the financial year is closing, and you have not spent, you just have to throw 
money around (…) this is the opposite of empowerment!”. 
 
Skills and experience of staff, volunteers and members 
One type of capacity mentioned was the knowledge and experience of the staff, members and 
volunteers connected to the organisations and networks. The organisations all complained that 
they did not have enough paid staff, and wanted Plan to provide more support for 
administration: “We lack skilled staff in key positions, We are too few in numbers, have to be 
all over”.  One organisation explained that in the present situation, it was ”difficult to be 
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effective, it becomes rushed and very hectic“.  Further, they stated that good work requires 
good people, and if Plan is not willing to pay for that, staff will either have to do their Plan-
supported work from other budgets, or they will not have sufficient staff to implement well: 
“you need good people to provide good services - and that costs money (…) People are doing 
Plan’s work on from other budgets”. Several organisations solved this by working with 
community volunteers: “We have community-level volunteers. (…)  They are engaged and 
trained to implement programmes (…) then we do not need so much staff to implement. It 
lessens labour”. One organisation had even developed a database of volunteers with specific 
skills they could use for particular purposes. 
 
The youth networks were expressing frustration with the low capacity of their members, they 
would like to know more about pretty much everything: “We want to learn about various 
types of organisational management – fundraising, finance management, mobilization, 
communication, and so on”. They also wanted to learn more about how to write proposals, 
and how to engage with government at local level.  Some youth networks were concerned that 
Plan only allowed some of their members to attend such trainings, and wish they were 
provided for everyone.  
 
When Plan staff discussed capacity and capacity gaps of the organisations and networks, they 
were focusing heavily on the level of professionalization of the organisation. It was discussed 
how Plan is trying to support the youth networks to become more formalised organisations, 
“standalone organisations”, who are registered with the NGO board, have policies in place, 
have a board to make important decisions, have bank accounts, and so on. Once the networks 
or groups are formalized in this sense, it was explained how they can submit their own 
proposals and seek funding from other agencies:  
We train the youth network member – so at the end of the day, they become local 
NGOs – they will be doing the employment of other people, they will monitor the 
activities in the area. As a local NGO – they might have ways of soliciting funds from 
different organisations.  
Plan also explained how they provide training to the youth networks on basic organisational 
skills such as leadership, facilitation and conflict resolution. For the youth organisation, they 
try to develop more specific, “tailor-made programs that can suit the gaps and capacities of 
each organisation”.  
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Ability to meet donor requirements 
Another important component of capacity, which a lot of my discussion with the youth 
organisations and Plan staff focused on, was the ability to meet donor requirements. By 
”donor requirements”, they referred to any conditions from various agencies and 
organisations from which they received funds, including Plan, related to reporting, accounting 
and so on. The youth networks were less concerned with this, naturally, as they receive much 
smaller amounts of funding and therefore are not required to report in the same way.  
  
Irrespectively of how well projects are implemented, Plan staff emphasized that the most 
important requirement from donors is to receive well-written reports in the expected format: 
“They [youth organisations] have to provide quality report. If they are not, we cannot 
subgrant them again. Some partners are not documenting enough (…) we need to have 
evidence when there is improved performance”. A concern was expressed by youth 
organisations as well as Plan staff that those organisations writing good reports are not 
necessarily the best at project implementation, and vice versa: “Sometimes, people have 
implemented a project so well, but can not write a report reflecting what they have done. 
Donors think money is wasted”. Especially, I was told that the volunteers involved may do a 
great job in the community, but do not always know which data to collect and how to 
document their activities and achievements sufficiently. Related to donor requirements, there 
was also a concern with capacity on financial reporting and accounting. The youth 
organisations do not always have dedicated full-time staff for this purpose, and said that staff 
were not skilled enough to meet the requirements from donors: “We are failing to match the 
demands of the institutions. We need more professionalised staff”. 
 
Plan staff pointed to donor requirements to as the main reason for not supporting youth 
networks to a greater extent. Although they saw great potential for scaling up the activities of 
the networks and working with them on a larger projects, they felt restricted by their lack of 
capacity to meet donor requirements: ”We have not had the courage to support youth groups 
directly to see how they will manage. It could lead to problems for us with our donors. It 
might backfire because money will not be well managed”. Prior to engaging in partnership 
with any organisation, Plan goes through a due diligence check, in order to check their 
capacity to implement projects and meet donor requirements for reporting and financial 
management.  Several youth organisations and Plan staff identified this process as a hindrance 
to real capacity building of youth organisations, because it makes Plan engage in partnerships 
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with more professionalized organisations who already have high capacity and other donors, 
and in practice excluding the smaller organisations who may be less professional and may 
benefit more from support and capacity-building. As one youth organisation said: “Plan’s due 
diligence system – some organisations have been dropped as a result of that process. The 
question is – who will build their capacity?”. Plan staff also recognized this challenge:  
Most of the NGOs we work with have some capacity. But we need to target those who 
do not have it. (…) Plan should have more funds to build capacity of existing partners, 
and support those we are not working with. Through due diligence, we are excluding 
some partners. 
Smaller organisations may also be more in touch with the needs and concerns of youth in their 
communities. Plan staff mentioned that the professionalised youth organisations that receive 
funding are based in the big cities, whereas most of the youth live in the rural areas, and this 
is also where most of the activities in the partnerships are being implemented. This was also 
recognized by the youth networks: “Plan should change their approach to partnership - not 
only work with established partners who are far away [in the city], they should work with the 
youth organisations who are there [in the rural areas]”. 
 
Summary of findings related to organisational capacity 
This section has presented the findings related to how cooperating with Plan influences the 
organisational capacity of youth organisations. Enhancing the capacity of local organisations 
was seen as an important aim of the partnership itself from Plan’s side. Three key themes 
dominated the discussions on organisational capacity: material resources, the skills and 
experience of staff and members, and the ability to meet donor requirements.  
 
It was clear from the organisations that working with Plan enhanced their capacity in terms of 
material resources; they received funding for equipment, office rent, salaries and transport. 
All the youth organisations and networks did however also complain that the funding was not 
sufficient, that they needed more funding in order to implement their activities well. An 
important challenge that was mentioned was also the systems by which Plan provides 
funding; it was seen both by youth organisations and Plan staff as causing unnecessary delays, 
which made implementation difficult. When it came to the capacity of staff and members, it 
was recognized by the youth organisations that Plan provided them important support such as 
trainings to enhance the capacity of staff. But also here, the organisations and networks 
claimed the support was not sufficient, they needed more. The organisations further claimed 
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that they did not receive enough funding to have skilled staff to implement the projects where 
they cooperate with Plan. An important focus for Plan was with regards to the 
professionalization of the organisation, which was seen as one important step for them to 
become more independent of Plan and being able to raise resources themselves. Finally, the 
ability to meet donor requirements was seen as an important element of organisational 
capacity, by Plan as well as youth organisations. The youth organisations need to be able to 
report and document according to the requirements of the donors from where Plan Malawi 
generates its grants-based funding. This leads to a selection of youth organisations to 
cooperate with that already have quite a high level of capacity, because working with 
organisations with low capacity involves a risk that they might not be able to meet the 
requirements. This results in a lot of Plan’s capacity building efforts being focused on youth 
organisations who are already quite strong, and who are based in the urban areas, although 
smaller and weaker organisations based in rural areas might be more representative of the 
concerns of youth.  
6.1.3 Sustainability and continuity 
One major concern for the organisations as well as the networks was the high turnover of staff 
and/or members. The organisations reported that they would continue to recruit and train new 
staff, who were then “poached” by INGOs and donors who can offer much higher salaries. 
Several youth organisations saw this as an important challenge: “Finance officers we do not 
have for much more than a year. We recruit them, train them, then they leave after they are 
qualified”. Another organisation said: ”we have lost two key members of staff, they are with 
international NGOs”.  
 
The youth networks, on the other hand, were concerned with how those who were trained and 
had coordinating roles in the networks were leaving to pursue further studies and 
employment, without passing on the necessary skills to the rest of the group. This was also 
mentioned by Plan staff:  
There are challenges. One of the leaders of the youth network was selected for future 
studies. So no leadership – it becomes a problem. Hard for members to come up and 
do activities. It was the same with the president of the network during the governance 
project. He was selected to the university - everything went back to square one. All the 
key people left. Picked up good jobs, went to universities, did some other courses. If 
more could be trained, it could be more sustainable. 
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One Plan staff working in a different area, expressed a similar challenge:  
Youth are vibrant and they have a lot of aspirations and ambitions in life. You find 
sometimes, you work with a group of youth, they are doing fine, you have trained 
them and invested in them – but because of their ambition they will feel they want to 
go to school elsewhere. Or they have picked another job. It is a challenge as opposed 
to adult structures. Youth are always looking for greener pastures. 
 
Neither of these sustainability challenges are surprising – youth organisations and networks 
are likely to have much higher turnover than other organisations purely because people 
naturally grow out of being youth, and young staff often leave their first job to pursue better 
opportunities and further challenges.  Interestingly, the opposite problem was also expressed 
by the youth organisations and Plan staff – that the founders of youth organisations often 
would refuse to leave, and would carry on being the executive director for decades, despite 
being further and further removed from the youth they are supposed to represent. One Plan 
staff explained: 
You have the “founders syndrome” – an individual takes the initial initiative, 
mobilizes board members, brings people together. Later, they become executive 
secretary or director – and try to own the institution. They can try to impose certain 
directions. (…) You can find the same within youth groups. 
In four of the youth organisations I interviewed, the founder still held a key leadership 
position, almost two decades after the organisation was set up. Another Plan staff elaborated 
on this challenge: “The founder facilitated the establishment 18 years ago – he is still 
executive director. Can nobody take over? That is where you need to empower others to take 
the leading role. It is affecting the growth and sustainability of the organisation”.  
 
Youth organisations and Plan staff also expressed a concern with the sustainability of funding.  
One organisation had Plan as their only funder, whereas others had a range of different 
donors. It was an important element of Plan’s capacity-building efforts to support 
organisations to expand and diversify their funding base to make them less dependent on 
Plan. As expressed by one Plan staff: 
A local NGO – might have ways of soliciting funds from different organisations. They 
might be working with Plan in one area, but might also be interested in using funds for 
something else. Should have skills to write proposals, so they can use other 
opportunities as well, not only depending on Plan 
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The youth networks expressed a wish to also get this type of support, and also to get more 
funding from Plan, so they could have money to do various things: “We wish for longer-term 
funding to support not only different activities but the network itself. Then we could also 
work on many other different things”. Most of the discussions on funding were focused on 
accessing funds through donors, or sometimes government. Although it was mentioned, few 
focused on opportunities for local generation of resources. Some had tried to have 
membership fees as a source of income, but this was discontinued because people simply did 
not have money to pay. 
 
Plan staff explained how they aim for the youth networks to become financially sustainable 
and independent: ”We will support them for 6 months – through sponsorship funds – in the 
transition. After, the youth clubs should contribute money towards the youth network”. I did 
not meet the different youth clubs, only their representatives through the youth networks. But 
Plan staff were concerned that the youth clubs were only active when Plan could provide 
funding, and afterwards, they simply would stop their activities: “When money is taken out of 
the equation – the likelihood of them coming is low. After the money ends, the group dies”.  
This casts some doubt on whether the youth clubs and youth networks will manage to sustain 
their activities without financial support from Plan. However, Plan staff explained that some 
youth clubs who had been supported to carry out livelihood and income generation activities 
tended to go on for some time after funding stopped. This reflects the motivations of group 
members, which will be discussed in section 6.1.4 below.  
 
This section has presented the findings related to how working with Plan influences the 
sustainability and continuity of the youth organisations and networks. Some of the most 
important sustainability challenges were related to high turnover of staff and key members, 
which is natural considering that these organisations are for young people. A particular 
challenge raised by the youth organisations was how staff who were trained, for example 
through Plan, would move on very quickly, often being “poached” by larger NGOs, INGOs or 
donor agencies. Youth organisations seemed to become a training- and recruitment ground for 
the aid industry in Malawi, which is an important challenge for the sustainability and 
continuity of local organisations. A problem opposite to high staff turnover was also 
mentioned, with founders who cling on to “their” organisations and stay in a powerful 
position for decades. 
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In order to enhance the sustainability and continuity of the organisations, Plan supports to 
seek funding from other sources, primarily from donors and INGOs. The youth networks also 
wanted such support, and would like to become less financially dependent on Plan. Plan also 
aims for the youth networks to be sustainable and to be self-financed by generating their own 
resources through the youth clubs, but this did not seem realistic based on the situation the 
youth networks as well as Plan staff described, where the youth clubs and networks were 
highly dependent on financial support from Plan to do anything at all.   
6.1.4 Motivation 
Some of my most interesting findings were related to people’s motivation to be involved with 
youth groups and youth organisations, and how these motivations were affected by the 
funding and support from Plan.  
 
Some of the organisations and youth networks members expressed their strong commitment 
to working for youth, in particular those who are excluded and vulnerable, they explained that 
they wanted to ”work for the poor”, and ”speak for the most excluded persons”. Some also 
spoke about passion for particular issues: ”We wanted to learn more about climate change, to 
do something about climate change”, or that they cared particularly about youth being given a 
voice: “young people do not know where to say their problems”. Some members had a more 
vague idea of “wanting to do something useful”. One of the staff of the youth organisations 
said that: ”we were never created because of the money – we were created because of the 
cause”. Plan staff also mentioned how important conviction of a joint cause was: ”What 
makes groups stick together is the need or the right that they want to address (…) If you don’t 
perceive that as an issue, you do not join. Most of the time, it appears they have common 
issues”. 
 
Another common reason, particularly for the youth network members, was the fact that they 
had very little else to do and few safe places to meet, so they joined in order to get friends and 
socialise. Consequently, if they have other activities to occupy them, they are less likely to 
continue attending: “people sometimes join volunteering because they have nothing better to 
do, they are idle. When they get something else to do, they stop coming”.  Some also said 
they joined the groups in order to avoid ending up in a bad situation – for example, to “avoid 
doing things that can make our lives miserable”, “refrain from bad behaviour”, and ”avoid 
prostitution”. I did however get the impression that this might have been said in order to 
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convince the Plan staff and myself that they were well-behaved youth, rather than because it 
was an important part of their actual motivation to join the group.  
 
Skills development and individual progress also came across as one important motivating 
factor for the youth involved in organisations and networks. As one staff of a youth 
organisation said: “they already see the need to develop their skills and competencies (…) 
They seek opportunities for progress as individuals”. Through being involved, they learn new 
things, develop new skills and competencies, and can show these in their communities and to 
their friends. The members of the youth networks said: “we can develop our minds”,  “we 
attain life and vocational skills”, and ”we can learn new skills, expose talent and skills to 
fellow friends”. Some might even get the opportunity to travel to other cities or countries by 
being part of a youth group linked with an international organisation such as Plan. A few of 
the members of networks and organisations had clear ambitions of working in in 
development- or human rights organisations, and were encouraged by the fact that they could 
see other previously trained youth being employed by organisations. As expressed by one of 
the youth organisations: ”Almost all youth trained have now moved up the ladder.” Plan staff 
confirmed this, saying that it “motivates them that others there have a job”. Some of the 
organisations and youth networks also had vocational training, business training and other 
types of livelihood activities as part of their activities.  
 
The most dominant reason for youth to become engaged, according to youth network 
member, youth organisations and Plan staff, was economic motivations. As discussed in 
chapter 2, most people in Malawi are extremely poor. Based on the interviews and focus 
group discussions, it became clear that being involved in activities with an INGO pretty much 
always involved some access to resources. One youth organisation saw this as a problem, 
saying that some members were motivated by money: ”they see young people, maybe 21, 
riding in cars. What motivates them is purely from money angle”. The youth in the networks 
were open and direct about seeing their involvement in the youth clubs and network as a 
possible source of livelihood. For example, one member of a youth network explained: “if we 
become a proper organisation, we can create our own jobs. (…) We can apply for funding, so 
we have some money for allowances. It will not be like a formal job, but we can still 
manage”. Other members of the youth networks expressed similar sentiments: “We can be 
linked to other organisations and institutions who can support us”, “I saw some other people 
benefiting from the activities and wanted to join”, and ”Some people also come because they 
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hope they will get some money for the activities”. People may even attend trainings in order 
to get the lunch and transport allowances provided, which they can use to contribute to their 
daily needs. Plan staff said that “people need a certain motivation – if we cannot give this, it 
limits quality of intervention. It can be something small – some airtime, transport allowance, 
refreshments”. Another Plan staff explained that many attend trainings thinking: “if I get 
something, I will get money to buy some soap”.  Even if they are not given money, the 
refreshments provided during meetings is a bit of a luxury, especially in the villages. For 
example, I heard one local government officer say to one of the youth networks as they 
discussed what further support they needed: “remember, you have been given so many things, 
snacks, many bottles of coke, you have drunk and drunk”.  
 
It became clear from interviews with youth organisations and Plan as well as my interviews 
with key informants in the government and other organisations that the habit of providing 
allowances is entrenched throughout the Malawian political system, and is common in 
government as well as in various organisations. Plan staff explained it as something that 
arrived with multi-party democracy in the mid-90’s: “The allowances syndrome - it becomes 
a challenge. With the emerging of democracy – government gave chiefs and village heads 
salaries and a little something. Many times people will want to get an allowance”. Most 
people I spoke to referred to this “allowance syndrome” as a great challenge, as it was seen as 
more or less impossible to get youth to meet without being able to provide some sort of 
financial motivation. One Plan staff explained:  
When you have a training you have to give people allowances. Partners are also giving 
allowances. When we work with government, we have to give them allowance. (…) 
Government have their own rates, Plan has their own, other organisations have their 
own rates (…) Meetings, review meetings, also qualify for allowance (…) for you to 
have that minister, it will cost you quite a lot. It goes down, down. Has to be addressed 
from the top level. We have to find a way to cope – (…)  cannot provide allowances 
all the time. Cannot manage it in the projects.  
Some Plan staff did however see allowances also as an opportunity to support youth in need:  
If there are any incentives within the programmes, the youth should benefit. How can 
they survive? If we have some incentives – we give it to the youth. That way they are 
more likely to participate. You know, the little motivation you give, the more you cope 
(…) the time they come here, they get transport allowance, meal allowance (…) For 
those who are poor – the little they get, they make use of it. They can buy notebooks, 
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or other school supplies.  
 
The flip-side of money being such an important motivation, is that if the youth have other 
ways of earning money, such as small businesses or employment, they are less likely to 
engage with the youth clubs and organisations. One of the youth networks saw it as a 
challenge that “some youth value their petty business more than the group”.  One youth 
organisation also mentioned how they found it more difficult to get members now, as people 
are aware that they have quite a lot of funding. Previously, people wanted to become 
members because they wanted to volunteer, but now, they said, “some people also come 
because they hope they will get some money for the activities” and they lose interest if they 
did not “get something”.  
 
Money is an important motivating factor for group membership, and I was also told that it is 
an important reason for why youth clubs, networks and organisations are set up in the first 
place. Through discussions with Plan staff and key informants in other NGOs and 
government, I was told that a wide range of youth groups, networks and organisations were 
set up in the early 2000’s, when the Global Fund gave a large grant to the National Aids 
Commission for awareness on HIV and AIDS amongst youth.  A lot of youth associations 
were formed in order to access these funds, and many of them still exist and engage with 
other NGOs and donors. This was seen as a challenge by the youth organisations, stating that 
“If you are a good writer, you can write and argue your case. That has killed youth work – 
gives youth a bad reputation. It becomes a livelihood option”. This was also confirmed by 
Plan staff: 
Projects are associated with some sort of income – some young people have that mind. 
People understand that when you are affiliated to a group, the chances are that you 
might get connected to other stuff. [They think] ‘If I attach myself to a group – the 
chance I will get something is very high’. Most young people who set up CBOs 
[community-based organisations] – have that mentality. It is for survival. Generating 
resources for themselves. 
 
This section has presented the findings related to how cooperating with Plan influences the 
motivations of youth to join and set up organisations and networks. The youth join 
organisations for a variety of reasons, including commitment to specific causes, an urge to 
contribute to their communities, wanting to learn new skills that can enhance their 
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employment opportunities, or simply wanting something to do. The most important 
motivation, however, was improving economic prospects. Being connected to an organisation 
or a network that is cooperating with INGOs with access to aid funds such as Plan, becomes a 
livelihood option, a way of accessing and generating resources (or attempting to). The money 
given as transport and food allowances for meetings, for example, becomes an important 
source of income when the youth are very poor. The “allowance syndrome” was described as 
entrenched within Malawi’s society, and common also amongst politicians at all levels; and 
this was seen as an important challenge. Further, many organisations are set up with the 
purpose of accessing aid, and this was seen as reducing the credibility and legitimacy of local 
civil society overall.  
6.1.5 Relationships with stakeholders 
The youth organisations and networks explained how they implement all projects and 
activities in close cooperation with local government. One youth organisation said that they 
had a “very good working relationship with government – we cannot go into the communities 
without the government”. In general, the local government officials were seen as supportive 
when it came to organisations helping with the delivery of services, and it was mentioned 
especially that the social welfare departments were very positive towards them.  
 
The communities in which programmes were implemented were also generally positive to the 
organisations and networks, according to the youth networks: “We get a positive response 
from the communities – they have seen what we do (…) the interventions that we use - they 
realise it benefits them”. One organisation reported that they had received negative responses 
from communities after they had exposed cases of sexual abuse involving the head-teacher of 
the school: “One experience in xxx [the name of the town], a girl spoke out about how a head-
teacher was approaching her for sexual favours. The school felt targeted, we received a 
negative welcome when we came back”. The same organisation also said that they had similar 
experiences in other areas:  
Sometimes when we travel, people fear that we will expose illicit behaviour (…) 
people try and avoid giving us the rights information (…) They can scare the children, 
and say to them ‘if you speak to these cameramen, they will not be here forever. 
Afterwards, you will be with us’. 
Members of the youth networks further explained how traditional leaders and other important 
members of the community could feel threatened by the youth, worried that they might lose 
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positions or status if they provide space for the youth: “The youth want to achieve positions, 
community members feel threatened, fear they will lose status”. 
 
The relationship between the community and the youth organisations and networks is also 
influences by the relationship between Plan and the communities, as well as Plan and the 
partner organisations. Here, one relevant issue that came up throughout the discussions was 
the transition made by Plan to rights-based programming, which involved a marked shift from 
service delivery to advocacy and capacity building, and from direct implementation to 
working in partnership with local organisations and networks (see section 5.1 about Plan’s 
transition, and sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 about the rights-based approach). Both Plan staff and 
youth organisations explained how this has created challenges in terms of expectations in the 
communities, and can lead to communities having less faith in Plan. One Plan staff explained: 
When implementing demand-driven programs, people saw Plan as very reliable, very 
caring, passionate about the welfare of their communities (…) with the transition to 
the rights-based approach, there is less service delivery, Plan is seen as less 
dependable. Sometimes they say that they think we channel resources to ourselves, 
that we take money from sponsored children. They do not see the resources trickling 
down directly.  
Plan’s change in approach, with different types of activities than before, and often 
implementing through other organisations instead of directly, was also seen as very confusing 
to the communities, especially where Plan had been working for a long time: 
In the sponsorship areas - much as we tell them about our approach, they expect a lot 
from us, they expect more from us (…) when working with a local NGO who is 
familiar with the area, have done different interventions, they go there in partnership 
with Plan – it creates two different worlds. It confuses them. People do not know what 
to expect (…) For example, maybe the organisation used to provide service delivery 
before. Now they are not doing it anymore. They are changing their approach. Shift 
from hardware to software, from buildings to empowerment. The community are not 
happy, and tell them ‘you people used to construct bridges, you used to provide school 
fees for our children’. 
In other words, when Plan then changed their approach, people in the communities were 
confused. The tangible benefits from Plan’s work they could observe in the past were now 
replaced with interventions where they could not so easily observe the benefits to themselves 
and the community in the short run. Some Plan staff also mentioned how this was not true in 
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all communities:  
Families in the past were used to direct benefits. Now, the strategy has been changed 
(…). We do advocacy on rights. Some communities are following, and are able to 
appreciate. It is our role as an organisation to say why we are changing, what is our 
focus.  
Several Plan staff explained how they thought the main problem was how this transition 
happened too quickly, staff were not fully on board, so it was perceived as forced upon them:  
Local staff – do not understand why we have CCCD and rights based approach, 
instead of giving things. Before, we used to do a lot of hand-outs. Some communities 
do not feel good.  It is the way we introduced it – it was just forced upon them. We did 
not do a proper shift into community-based focused from family-based focus. 
Others, both Plan staff and youth organisations, claimed that the problem was due to many 
local-level Plan staff having been in the organisation for a long time, and were not convinced 
by and committed to this new way of working in the communities. Having been used to 
directly implementing programmes with quick, visible impact, they were not satisfied with 
having to work with partner organisations, and especially not on more long-term programmes 
with less direct, visible results. One youth organisation said: “The transition from 
implementation to partnership may not be so well received by all staff. They used to do 
infrastructure, now they are doing advocacy, where the impact is not always seen so quickly”. 
Another youth organisation confirmed this: “the officers (in Plan) at local level assure us that 
they have a heart of partnership. But before, they used to implement and manage resources”.  
 
There seemed to be important differences between how the youth organisations perceived 
cooperation with staff in the local level offices (PAs) and the country level office (CO). The 
youth organisations explained that they often found the Plan staff in the PAs difficult to work 
with, they did not feel trusted to implement project and activities, and felt “micro-managed”. 
One youth organisations said: “We have to provide a log frame with venue, date, and other 
details every three months. It is micro-management  - no trust. (…) they are not in good faith, 
want to be our bosses, to be in control”. With national level staff, they did not express such 
challenges: ”We do not have issues with the CO – but with the PA”.  
 
Another problem mentioned was lack of coherence between information given from Plan staff 
at different levels. One youth organisation explained: 
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Individuals based in Plan say different things. For example, how much to give out for 
allowances. The conditions are different when we work with the CO and PAs (…) If 
we work at the CO level, we enjoy the partnership.  But individuals in PAs cause 
delay, frustrate the process. The problem can be about individuals as well as levels. 
The attitudes as well as the policies differ. 
Other youth organisations also claimed that the main challenge at the PA level was related to 
individuals: “We have these problems within international NGOs – programme directors are 
too far removed. The local staff develop mini-policies of who they should work with, and 
how. It is mini-policies of individuals - it is different at national and local level”.  
These incoherencies in terms of how Plan staff relate to the youth organisations at different 
levels was seen by the youth organisations as influencing their relationship with the 
community, because processes get delayed or changed without sufficient information, and as 
a result, community members get sceptical and lose faith in the organisation.  
 
This section has summarised the relationships between the youth organisations and networks 
and various stakeholders, and how this is influenced by their cooperation with Plan.  The 
organisations and networks overall reported good cooperation with government institutions. 
The relationships with the communities in which they were doing activities were also 
generally positive, especially when the community members saw benefits from their work. In 
some cases where controversial issues such as abuse of children had been raised, the 
relationship was more difficult. It was also found that the relationship to the community was 
heavily influenced by the community’s view of Plan. The transition in Plan to rights-based 
programming had in many communities led to confusion and a loss of faith in Plan as well as 
the youth organisations. This is because the communities, especially in those areas where Plan 
has sponsorship-funded activities, were used to seeing tangible benefits of Plan’s efforts, and 
found it difficult to see benefits of longer-term efforts to enhance capacity and influence the 
government. The challenges were related to how the transition was managed, as well as a lack 
of commitment from some Plan staff to this new way of working, especially in the PA level. 
The youth organisations and networks reported how they found this confusion in the 
communities, as well as the lack of commitment to real partnership from some Plan staff,  
significant challenges to the implementation of their work, and also influencing their 
relationships to the communities. 
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6.2 Views on Malawian civil society, youth organisations and INGOs 
Another important theme that arose from the empirical data was how youth organisations and 
Plan Malawi view civil society in Malawi in general, including their respective roles as local 
organisations or INGOs. An important element within this theme was also the attitudes 
towards youth in Malawi, as this was affecting the ability of the youth associations to fulfil 
their roles. This part of the findings is presented by sections describing each of these themes 
in turn: the role of local civil society organisations, the attitudes towards youth, the 
relationship between NGOs and government, and the role and perception of INGOs.  
6.2.1 Views on the role of youth organisations and local civil society organisations 
As discussed in section 6.1.1, all the youth organisations had as one of their aims to promote 
the participation of youth in decision-making at all levels, including enhancing the role of 
youth within civil society itself. All the youth organisations interviewed saw themselves as an 
important part of civil society in Malawi, as organisations speaking on behalf of “general 
people” and in particular youth, attempting to hold the government to account, raising 
awareness and contributing to development.  One of the staff of the youth organisations 
however changed his mind during the interview – first, he did not see youth as part of civil 
society, but then as he was explaining why, he found that they could be: 
Youth groups – are they part of civil society? I may not straight away say so. They are, 
in a way, because they are affected and they have issues. They may be seen as the 
groups that civil society speak for. They are not civil society so to speak, they are right 
holders on the worse side of the partnership (…) We have civil society, we have the 
oppressed, we have the oppressors (…) but then, youth could also speak on behalf of 
the oppressed. So we may see the youth groups as civil society organisations. 
When the youth organisations explained their role, there was a particular focus on 
”sensitization” of other youth and community members, ”reaching out” and ”preaching” to 
them with information.  
 
The youth organisations also pointed out challenges that hindered the youth organisations in 
fulfilling this role. One important challenge was related to lack of coordination and 
cooperation amongst civil society organisations. One of the youth organisations said:  
It is a problem – too many NGOs in Malawi. Too many CBOs [Community-Based 
Organisations], too many youth groups. The impact of civil society is low. If we were 
more organised, more coordinated  (…) we could do more. But there is not such good 
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partnerships, not so good coordination. The actual sitting down and sharing is not 
there (…) it looks like we are one, but on the ground, we are not together.  
When I asked why this was the case, I was told that “organisations are focusing more on 
getting funding than implementing their activities. They fear that cooperation might lead to 
the other organisations securing the same funding”. 
 
Plan staff expressed similar views on the role of youth organisations, they saw them as 
playing an important role in civil society by representing the concerns of youth, contributing 
to holding the government to account, and reaching out to other youth and community 
members with information and services. Plan staff also recognized the challenges of lack of 
cooperation and coordination: “The lack of coordination among them [local civil society] – it 
is the biggest challenge. They channel resources all over the place. Leads to messy 
partnerships and modes of delivery. It is not so well organised”. Plan staff also mentioned the 
challenge that many of the organisations did not really have credibility and legitimacy as 
youth organisations, and were set up purely with the purpose of accessing resources: 
Some youth organisations – they are in touch with youth mainly on paper.  They 
implement a small activity in a small village; make noise in a small forum. But they 
are not very much in touch (…) Most of the organisations (…) choose Lilongwe [the 
capitol] as their catchment area. But greater percentage of youth are in rural areas.  
(…) There is less faith in local organisations – most organisations are structured 
around – you know – making money, and this and that. That is a fact. 
Another Plan staff summarized it in a more nuanced way: ”Some youth groups are seen as 
just a way to make money. Some see youth groups as having the potential for great influence, 
youth can also be seen as agents of change”. 
 
To summarize, youth organisations generally see themselves as a part of civil society, 
speaking on behalf of youth and contributing to holding the government to account. They face 
some important challenges related to fulfilling this role, many of which are related to the 
general state of civil society in Malawi. It also was mentioned that there are too many 
organisations, competing for resources, which makes cooperation difficult and limits the 
impact of efforts from local civil society organisations. Further, there are issues related to the 
representativeness and legitimacy of some organisations, as most are based in urban areas, 
and many are set up with the purpose of making money.  
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6.2.2 Local civil society organisations and the government 
When it comes to the role of local civil society organisations vis-à-vis the government, there 
was some disagreement amongst the youth organisations as well as Plan staff. One youth 
organisation explained how they saw the local NGOs such as themselves as organisations 
who were both working together with and being a check on the government, as local NGOs 
“are in one way or another helping the government to implement projects and services, help in 
development (…) and also, help in making sure human rights are observed, help make the 
government in check and doing its duties”. Other youth organisations, however, said that 
disagreeing with the government could put the organisation and individuals within it at risk, 
although not fatal risk. One youth organisation said: “the government can threaten you – they 
can burn your house, but they can not kill you”. Another youth organisation stated that 
”politics in Malawi is a dangerous game (…) if the media start speaking out, they might have 
to close”. But they did also emphasise that they were not worried about raising issues, 
although careful about how to do it: “We have to be careful about the approach. For example 
when discussing corruption - instead of focusing on persons directly, we would discuss the 
budget, look at numbers, question who is supposed to be responsible”.  
 
Plan staff saw the main risk towards NGOs not as threats, but rather co-option from the 
government: “Organisations may be very strong – but once a person gets vocal, the 
government pulls them aside and corrupts them. Suddenly, they become totally silent”. Others 
claimed that NGOs in Malawi were strong, well respected, and could operate freely without 
interference. One youth organisation explained that ”Civil society is becoming visible and 
strong. Networks and individual organisations. They speak up, especially during elections”. 
Plan staff confirmed this, stating that the government should also support local NGOs:  
The environment is guided by the NGO act, guiding the formation of NGOs in the 
country. It is also supposed to help sustainability – the government is supposed to 
support local NGOs, but that does not happen. But the government generally does not 
interfere directly with the work of NGOs. They are well respected. 
 
So, the youth organisations see their role vis-à-vis the government as one of cooperation and 
partnership, as well as holding them accountable. There were some different views on the 
level of restriction from the side of the government – some claimed organisations in civil 
society were free to raise any issues, others claimed that organisations had to be very careful 
with the approach adopted.  Plan staff also mentioned the problem of local organisations 
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being co-opted by the government, as a way to silence them.  
 
6.2.3 Views on youth in Malawi 
An important theme that was raised by all respondents was the general attitude towards and 
perception of youth. It was claimed that youth are seen as idle and promiscuous, involved in 
drinking, behaving irresponsibly and making trouble. One youth organisation said: “They 
[youth] easily get into drug abuse, prostitution, and so on (…) young people are hanging 
around town doing nothing. (…) they just wait for someone to come and give them 
something. They are not visionary, not entrepreneurial”. This view of youth as being 
irresponsible, combined with traditional attitudes of not listening to young people, results in 
youth finding it difficult to be taken seriously. One youth organisation explained: “Due to 
traditional attitudes – young people have been subdued, their intellectual capacity is not 
recognized (…) young people are not recognized as able to make contribution (…) our 
tradition and culture does not recognize young people”. Another youth organisation 
confirmed this, saying that: ”Often, youth are scared to voice their concerns in the community 
around adults – unless they are told to speak (…) some young people can stand up – but not 
everybody. Youth do not have a voice”. This was also confirmed by Plan staff: ”traditional 
leaders say that – if youth say something, they will say ‘here is nothing you can tell us’”. 
Although Plan staff discussed the importance of challenging these traditional attitudes, 
observing the interactions between Plan staff and youth indicated that some Plan staff also 
had similar attitudes. Especially, the one focus group discussion described in section 4.3.2, 
where the Plan staff continuously interrupted youth in order to talk on their behalf and clear 
up “misunderstandings” which in reality were simply difference of opinion, showed that 
traditional attitudes can also be persistent within the organisations that seek to challenge them.  
 
An important element of the negative attitudes towards youth was that they were often 
involved in violence. According to one youth organisation, “the biggest challenge is how 
most adults perceive youth (…) Most adults think that youth are volatile, violent (…) they 
cannot contribute to development”. As discussed in chapter two, throughout Malawi’s history, 
youth have been involved in violence, either because they have been brainwashed or because 
they have been manipulated in other ways. This was the case during the Banda dictatorship, 
as well as during the multi-party era (Englund, 2002, p. 13, 2006, p. 80). This was mentioned 
as an important challenge by many of the organisations. One youth organisation said: ”youth 
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have been used and abused – politicians and those in power have used them for their own 
benefit. During multiparty democracy – parties used young people to harass opponents”. This 
was confirmed by one of the youth networks: ”in the past, political parties would use them to 
start fights. Because of that, people think they can not contribute to development now (…) the 
problem is our leaders – they manipulate youth. It is the politicians who are irresponsible. 
They try to woe us”. Plan staff also saw this as an important challenge:  
Youth may be made to demonstrate, strike, go into the streets – but when all is well, 
they are forgotten. They have been used to address the agenda of other political parties 
– they will go and throw stones at other political rallies. Youth can be easily seduced 
due to their financial stand, their lack of economic empowerment. 
Just as youth have been manipulated for political purposes, both youth organisations and Plan 
staff mentioned that youth have been manipulated by other actors, such as NGOs. The 
findings related to this are discussed below in section 6.2.4. 
 
Plan staff also mentioned that they thought youth could be perceived as a threat because of 
higher education levels than the rest of their community:  
Most people in committees – do not have same level of education as youth. Youth will 
talk about new innovation. Many adults – they don’t know. Youth look brighter, have 
higher levels of understanding. Fear of the unknown – sometimes they [youth] are 
very bright, adults fear they might take over. 
 
Based on the discussion with the youth organisations as well as with Plan, it is clear that the 
way in which youth are viewed in Malawi influence how youth organisations are perceived 
and their ability to achieve their aims. Youth are often viewed as lazy, promiscuous and 
potential troublemakers. Youth involvement in violence was seen as an important challenge, 
especially as this is often a result of being manipulated by political leaders, as has been the 
case throughout Malawi’s history. It was also found that according to traditional culture, the 
voices of youth are not recognized as worth listening to, which made it difficult for the youth 
to be heard and taken seriously. Finally, the higher education levels of youth combined with 
their relatively higher knowledge of new technologies led to some adults seeing them as a 
threat. Combined, these challenges were to a considerable degree influencing the way in 
which youth organisations were perceived, and therefore also their ability to carry out their 
activities and achieve their aims. However, as discussed in 6.1.1, the aims of the youth 
organisations and networks is exactly to challenge and change those negative perceptions, and 
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show how youth can contribute positively to society. 
6.2.4 How Plan and International NGOs are perceived  
The youth organisations’ perceptions of INGOs were rather similar. They explained how their 
role should be to support and strengthen local organisations, and that many of them attempted 
this. However, the youth organisations also said that the INGOs try to operate as local NGOs:  
The international organisations – most of them wear two faces. (…) They want to be 
local civil society organisations when it comes to how to spend resources -  they want 
to implement themselves rather than doing it through partners. Save The Children, 
ActionAid, Africare – all operate like local NGOs. They are supposed to do the 
technical support, the finance and so on. The role of the internationals should be to 
support local issues and local advocates. 
Some youth organisations also mentioned the sustainability challenges mentioned in section 
6.1.3, of INGOs building the capacity of local NGOs, but then staff moving on to the INGOs: 
”Organisation built their capacity – then they were poached. Organisations [INGOs] can 
provide 10 times the salary. In the local NGOs, you lose institutional memory, capacity, and 
so on”. Further, it was perceived by the youth organisations as if INGOs were not really 
willing to strengthen local NGOs to the point where they could actually compete: ”They 
[INGOs] have not built capacity for them [local NGOs] to stand on their own and even 
compete with them”.  
 
Plan staff saw their own role as one of supporting and strengthening local civil society, 
especially in terms of building their capacity and support processes of coordination. One Plan 
staff explained how this capacity building had been very successful:  
Most INGOs are giving out their money to local NGOs. International NGOs have 
helped to build the capacity of local NGOs of how to advocate, how to do resource 
mobilization - was very difficult in the past. There has been a shift - from INGOs 
implementing to sub-granting – has put civil society on the map, has built their 
capacity to implement projects and so on. 
They also explained how they see Plan as a part of national civil society, who sometimes 
steps up as a voice, and other times supports the local organisations to do so:  
Plan is a civil society organisation. Come forward when things are not going well for 
children, use their strength to influence. Plan would be referred to as a part of civil 
society. Works with other organisations, and plays a role independently. Sometimes, 
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Plan may choose to be out of discussion, to be not part of the activities of civil society 
(…) We depend on our partners, who are key in civil society. 
 
Some of the respondents, both within Plan and the youth organisations, stated that the 
community members rarely knew the difference between different types of organisations, and 
therefore did not perceive them differently.  One youth organisation said: “The grassroots – 
they do not know the difference between different CSOs (Civil Society Organisations) or 
between Plan and other organisations. They do not distinguish”. Most of the respondents, 
however, claimed that the community did know the difference, and some claimed that 
community members had more faith in the INGOs than in the local organisations. One Plan 
staff explained:  
INGOs are well respected, and seen as less corrupt. They complement government, are 
seen as development organisations (…) Local organisations – seen as less dependable, 
they do activities to create money for their own. People do not have confidence in 
them. Local NGOs are only seen to do work when they get money – when they don’t, 
they do not work (…) They are seen to drive expensive cars, personal ones. INGO 
staff never drives fancy personal cars.  
Interestingly, the youth organisations as well as Plan staff also said that the community had 
more faith in local organisations when it came to raising issues and concerns important to 
them: “they trust us [local NGOs] when it comes to talking of issues they think are important, 
but not to implement their needs”. This was also confirmed by Plan staff: ”When it comes to 
advocacy, people have more faith in the local NGOs.  They trust them to carry forward their 
agenda. They are seen as strategic, acting in good faith – people want to see them engaging 
much more”. 
 
The youth organisations also claimed that local organisations had more credibility in the eyes 
of the government, and can therefore have a greater influence and impact through those 
channels. Endorsing views and receiving criticism from INGOs was seen as embarrassing to 
the government, and it was claimed by youth organisations that they would be less likely to 
listen:  
For example Plan’s research – the child labour study – if local organisations had done 
it, it would have more credibility. The government just looks at the internationals and 
say ‘they have the money’ (…) It often takes longer for government to endorse 
advocacy from International NGOs – do not want INGOs to have the glory, even when 
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the issue is sensible. 
It was also mentioned that INGOs have to sign Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) 
with the government in order to be allowed to operate in Malawi, and it was claimed that 
these MOUs restrict what areas INGOs can address, especially when it comes to governance 
and political issues: “International NGOs form part of civil society but have to sign MOU 
with government, which restricts them. They cannot properly address governance and 
political issues”.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, youth have been manipulated by those with power throughout 
Malawi’s history, particularly within politics. And as described in in section 6.2.3 above, 
youth are particularly vulnerable to this manipulation and exploitation because they have 
limited financial resources. It was claimed by many of the youth organisations as well as Plan 
staff that also NGOs and INGOs manipulate youth for their own purposes in Malawi. One 
Plan staff mentioned that ”the NGO sector see it [youth] as a stream of funding”. One youth 
organisation further explained:  
The international NGOs – they are exploitative (…) They identify youth clubs – the 
clubs do not have negotiating power. The youth clubs are used as mobilizers - 
International NGOs find them handy. (…) They go voluntarily if they get bottles of 
Fanta – that is not volunteering. They buy them with bottles of Fanta.  
Another youth organisation elaborated:  
International NGOs have not worked very well to build the capacity of local youth 
NGOs for them to be independent. Sometimes they [INGOs] kind of use them [youth 
NGOs] (…) Most of them are not directly in touch with youth on the ground (…) 
Malawi has a controversial history – challenges are that youth are not empowered. 
Easily become vulnerable – can be used instead of being involved. We are happy to 
see young people to participate in politics, demonstrations, and so on – but it depends 
if they do it based on their own motivation. 
 
This section has presented the findings related to how Plan and INGOs are perceived. It was 
clear agreement between Plan staff and youth organisations that they role should be to 
strengthen and support the local actors in civil society. However, there was disagreement with 
regards to what extent this was actually happening. Several youth organisations claimed that 
INGOs as well as Plan also wanted to play the role of a local organisation, and were not 
building the capacity of local actors to the point where they could actually compete with 
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them. Plan also stated that they sometimes play an independent role as a local civil society 
actor, depending on the issue at hand, but that the local civil society organisations were most 
important. When it comes to perceptions from the community, most claimed that the 
community view INGOs and local organisations differently, and have more faith in INGOs 
when it comes to service delivery and resource management, but more faith in local 
organisations when it comes to raising issues on their behalf. Local organisations were also 
seen as having more credibility in the eyes of the government. Importantly, it was also 
mentioned by the youth organisations that they saw some INGOs, including Plan, as 
sometimes manipulating and “using” youth for their own purposes. Youth were seen as 
particularly vulnerable to being used in this way, due to the history of political manipulation 
as well as their lack of economic empowerment.  
6.3 Summary of empirical findings 
Being supported by Plan makes the youth organisations and networks able to do more, in 
terms of realising their aims of promoting the participation of youth, enhancing democratic 
governance and influencing the decision-makers, contributing to their communities and 
improve the livelihood opportunities of youth. However, it also influences what issues they 
work on, as well as in which geographical areas they work on them.  
 
Cooperating with Plan enhances their capacity as organisations, in terms of material 
resources, the skills and capacity of staff, and the ability to meet donor requirements. One 
important challenge is however that the organisations supported are already quite strong, and 
based in urban areas. Supporting weaker organisations in rural areas is seen as risky, as they 
might not be able to meet donor requirements, and they are therefore filtered out through 
Plan’s “due diligence” process. Another challenge was the systems by which the material 
support was being provided. A complicated system leads to delays, which again leads to 
uneven implementation of activities.  
 
The support from Plan poses risks in terms of continuity and sustainability. As staff and 
members of organisations and networks are supported and trained, they also become more 
attractive to other organisations, including aid agencies and INGOs, and may be “poached”. 
Also, the youth networks and some of the youth organisations rely heavily on Plan for 
support. The networks are fully dependent on Plan, but most of the youth organisations have a 
broader funding base. Plan also provides some support to enable organisations to seek support 
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from other agencies and organisations. There is however little focus on fundraising from local 
sources, so although the stronger organisations are able to access aid through various 
channels, they are still completely dependent on aid in order to function. From a long-term 
development perspective, this is clearly problematic, in terms of the ability of local civil 
society organisations to stand on their own feet.  
 
Material support is closely linked to the motivation of youth to join and set up organisations 
and networks. A strong motivation of youth to join networks was to improve their own 
position, both in terms of getting some financial allowances, and to improve their skills to 
make them more likely to get good jobs in the future. It seemed as if the “aid industry” is a 
highly attractive employer within Malawi, and an important likely source of income one way 
or another. The motivation for financial improvement was expressed less explicitly by the 
youth organisations, but I did not get the impression that it was any less important. The 
prospect of financial support provided by Plan, especially when in the form of allowances or 
salaries, thus heavily influences people’s motivations to become involved with organisations 
and networks as well as the motivation for setting them up in the first place. Based on the 
findings, it seemed to lead to more people being involved, but lower levels of commitment to 
the actual purpose and aim of the organisation or network.  
 
Support from Plan also influences relationships with stakeholders, and this is linked to the 
relationship Plan has to the community. In communities where the trust in Plan is lower, often 
due to how the transition to a rights-based organisation was not being managed in a way they 
could understand or agree with, this seemed to reflect negatively on the local organisations 
and networks, as it led to confusion in the community. Further, a lack of commitment to and 
understanding of this transition from Plan staff led to challenges in the partnership between 
youth organisations and Plan.   
 
When it comes to how they view their respective roles as actors within civil society, most of 
the youth organisations saw themselves as an important part of local civil society. The local 
youth organisations and networks seem to see themselves as representing and speaking on 
behalf of the rest of their communities and youth within it, but they also see themselves as set 
apart from them. This is indicated by how they say they “reach out to” and “preach to” other 
youth and the community members. The youth organisations also recognized that local civil 
society was crowded by too many organisations, often competing against each other instead 
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of cooperating and coordinating, even when they work on the same issues. This lack of 
coordination and cooperation was seen as a result of competing for the same funding.  
      
Another important factor when it comes to understanding the role of youth organisations 
within civil society in Malawi was the general attitudes towards and views of youth. Youth 
tend to be viewed negatively, as lazy, promiscuous and potential troublemakers, often 
involved in violence. The manipulating of youth by political leaders, as has been the case 
throughout Malawi’s history, is important for understanding these perceptions. It was also 
found that according to traditional culture, the voices of youth are not recognized as worth 
listening to. Furthermore, youth’s relatively higher education level and familiarity with new 
technology compared to adults made them seen as a threat. Combined, these challenges were 
influencing the way in which youth organisations were perceived, their ability to carry out 
their activities and achieve their aims. The support from Plan is aiming to contribute to 
changing this situation, by showing how youth can contribute positively to their communities.  
 
INGOs, including Plan, were perceived as aiming to build the capacity of local organisations 
and let them address issues at local and national levels. There were disagreements as to 
whether or not they succeed at this. Most youth organisations claimed that the INGOs, 
including Plan, were still playing a dual role, both supporting local organisations and at times 
behaving like local organisations themselves. They also claimed that the communities had 
more faith in INGOs when it came to resource management and doing things that benefit 
them, whereas the local organisations were viewed with some suspicion with regards to 
resource management, but with greater trust when it came to raising issues on behalf of the 
community. This is a perception based on interviews with organisations, youth networks and 
Plan, and confirmed by other key informants, but it would of course be necessary to interview 
also a sample of various community members to see whether this is a correct or misguided 
perception. Another important finding was related to the manipulation of youth. Throughout 
Malawi’s history, youth have been manipulated, often by being given access to resources. It 
was claimed that some INGOs, including Plan, could be seen as manipulating youth and 
“using” them for their own advantage.  
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7.  Analysis of findings 
The findings presented in chapter 6 are here analysed through a theoretically informed 
thematic analysis, focusing on key themes and concepts identified in the literature review: 
How to understand civil society in Africa and Malawi, and civil society as an arena for 
participation, the promotion of accountability, and the creation and maintenance of social 
capital. This will be analysed whilst also taking into account the particular historical and 
political context in Malawi. Such a thematic analysis serves a dual purpose. A theoretical 
analysis of the empirical findings enables a deeper understanding of the particular case in 
question, the cooperation between Plan and youth associations in Malawi. It also allows us to 
suggest some analytical generalizations regarding how aid might influence the development 
of civil society in Malawi and in other developing countries. 
7.1 Civil society in Malawi - aid dependence, challenges of legitimacy and 
government restrictions. 
The empirical findings give us a better understanding of how civil society functions in 
Malawi. It provides greater insight into how aid funding strengthens particular types of civil 
society organisations, influences the choices they make, and what motivates people to join 
them and set them up. It also provides greater insight into the role of INGOs such as Plan in 
Malawi’s civil society, as well as the relationship between the government and various civil 
society actors.  
 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, civil society in African countries consists of a wide range of 
very different actors, including various traditional groups based on kinship and ethnicity, 
religious groups and more “modern” organisations addressing human rights and development 
issues, often supported by international actors such as INGOs or donors (Fukuyama, 2000, pp. 
4–5; Hyden, 2010, pp. 253–4). This case study focuses on the latter type of organisations and 
networks, as they were all set up with aid-support, and maintained through aid. The 
organisations supported by Plan Malawi have a lot in common; they aim to address similar 
issues to each other as well to Plan. Naturally, Plan Malawi are selecting organisations to 
cooperate with based on whether they agree with their aims and strategies, and invest 
considerable amount of funding and resources into strengthening their capacity, as discussed 
in section 6.1.2.  Selection is however based not only on the aims and strategies of 
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organisations, but also on their capacity to implement and meet the demands from donors 
when it comes to reporting and accounting. This selection is done through the “due diligence” 
process, which is used to identify which organisations to engage in larger-scale partnerships 
with, so it does not apply to the youth networks, who receive only small amounts of activity-
based funding. The partnership between Plan Malawi and local youth associations thus 
contributes to building and strengthening a specific type of actors within civil society in 
Malawi. This is important, because a lot of INGOs and donors including Plan Malawi aim to 
contribute to “strengthening civil society” (Plan Malawi, 2012, pp. 18, 24–25), but overlook 
the fact that they are not attempting to strengthen civil society as such, but to strengthen 
particular elements within it. In the case of Plan Malawi and the youth associations in this 
study, it contributes to strengthening actors who work on particular issues, such as child right 
and youth empowerment, but also to strengthen a specific type of organisations who meet the 
criteria of the “due diligence” process. This leads to a bias towards supporting rather large 
organisations based in urban areas, as opposed to smaller organisations in rural areas that may 
be more representative, but have less capacity to meet donor requirements. This is in line with 
Fukuyama’s claim that aid may support mainly the local elites who are good at proposal-
writing (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 18). 
 
The organisations and networks in this case study all have aims related to youth 
empowerment, both in terms of political participation, participation in their communities, the 
improvement of livelihood opportunities and skills development. Which particular aims they 
focus on, and how and where they do it, is however highly influenced by the cooperation with 
Plan. Although Plan staff recognized that their role is supposed to be to support the youth in 
what they aim to do, Plan is restricted in terms of what they can support and where, based on 
where their funding comes from. Grants from donors tend to be geographically and 
thematically restricted, sponsorship funds are only geographically restricted. Plan seemed to 
use the opportunity provided by sponsorship funds to support the youth networks to carry out 
activities of their own choice.  
 
The literature suggests that civil society organisations in Africa often are highly aid-
dependent (Bratton, 1994, pp. 7–8; Hyden, 2010, p. 253). This was also found in this case 
study. The organisations and networks are not only influenced by Plan in their choices, they 
are highly dependent on aid – from Plan or other donors and INGOs - to carry out any 
activities at all. They are dependent in terms of funding for staff (for the organisations, the 
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networks do not have staff), buildings, materials and transport. They also see themselves as 
dependent in terms of enhancing the capacity of their own staff, particularly to meet the 
reporting and accounting requirements of donors, despite the fact that Plan selects partners 
who already have quite a high level of capacity in this regard. The youth networks were 
completely dependent on Plan (although Plan aimed for them to become independent), 
whereas the youth organisations were dependent on a set of INGOs and donors. Even when 
Plan engaged in capacity-building efforts to make them more independent of Plan, it seemed 
to reinforce aid-dependence overall. Supporting them to apply for funding from others 
reduces dependence on Plan, but reinforces aid-dependence in general, as there was little 
focus on the local generation of funds. As also mentioned within the literature on civil society 
in Malawi (Booth et al., 2006, p. 16), providing training to staff make them more likely to be 
“poached” by INGOs and donors, leaving the organisations behind with a continued need for 
skilled staff. The theory on civil society brings out a number of challenges related to aid-
dependence, many of which are relevant in this study, as will be discussed below. 
 
Aid-dependence of the organisations and networks implies a lack of autonomy of 
organisations and networks, and can limit their credibility, local support and legitimacy 
(Bratton, 1994, pp. 7–8; Edwards & Hulme, 1996, p. 966). This is compounded by the well-
known case of the “briefcase NGOs” who are only set up in order to access funds 
(Mkandawire, 2010, pp. 1162–63). Although I did not see any indications of the associations 
in this case study being “briefcase NGOs”, it was clear that the opportunity to access funds, 
gaining employment and improving livelihood were important motivating factors. This is only 
natural in a context where most people struggle to make ends meet, and does not imply that 
the youth involved in the organisations and networks are not also committed to the “cause”. 
Combined, the aid dependence of organisations, the livelihood-based motivations for people 
to become involved and the existence of “briefcase NGOs” can lead to people viewing local 
civil society actors with suspicion.  As discussed in section 6.2.1, the findings revealed that 
youth organisations and Plan both thought the communities were sceptical to local NGOs, 
believing they were set up with the purpose of accessing funds, and spending money on 
themselves.  
 
Another challenge related to aid dependence is the lack of domestic “rooted-ness” of foreign 
funded NGOs (Hyden, 1997, p. 19). When it comes to the youth organisations and networks 
in this case study, one could argue that they are not “rooted” in Malawian society, because as 
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described in chapter 5, they are all relatively new, set up in the mid-to-late 90’s, and with the 
support of aid. However, considering that independent organisations were not allowed until 
multi-party democracy in 1994 (Anders, 2002, p. 44; Eidhammer, 2005, pp. 38, 79), and that 
the transition to multi-party democracy coincided with an increased interest from donors in 
democracy, human rights and civil society organisations in Malawi (Booth et al., 2006, p. 16), 
most civil society organisations are set up with the support of aid, simply because aid was 
available at the time it was allowed to set up organisations. In this sense, the organisations 
lack “rooted-ness” because they are relatively new and set up with support from abroad, but 
that does not necessarily imply that they are not legitimate representatives of people in 
Malawi. In order to assess that, it is necessary to take a closer look at their activities, and 
explore the views within the communities they are supposed to represent. A deeper 
exploration of the legitimacy and credibility of local organisations in the eyes of the 
communities in which they work, and how this is influenced by aid, is one recommendation 
for further research.  
 
Although it seemed that local civil society actors were viewed with suspicion when it comes 
to resources management, and were in that regard seen as less credible than INGOs, it was 
also claimed that communities had more faith in the local actors when it comes to raising 
issues of their concern (see section 6.2.4).  Further, the local actors were also viewed as more 
credible when it came to influencing the Malawian government, who was seen as unwilling to 
“give in” to demands from INGOs and donors, irrespective of the issue itself. Plan as well as 
the youth organisations and networks were not quite in agreement regarding to the 
relationship with government. Whereas all saw the government as an important partner as 
well as someone to influence and hold to account, as discussed in section 6.2.2, there were 
different views on whether the government was restricting the space within which civil 
society organisations operate. Some claimed there were no such restrictions; others claimed 
you had to be very careful both in terms of what issues you addressed as well as the approach 
taken. Human Rights organisations working in Malawi have suggested that the government 
has moved towards more restrictive policies towards civil society during the last few years 
(CIVICUS, 2012; Trócaire, 2012), which fits within a broader trend discussed within the 
academic literature, of more restrictions towards civil society organisations across Sub-
Saharan Africa (Bates, 2010). The events in 2011 discussed in chapter 2, with great popular 
unrest and violent demonstrations in Malawi which included arrests and about twenty deaths 
(Cammack, 2011, pp. 9–10), also indicates greater tension in the relationship between civil 
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society organisations and the government. In addition, organisations in Malawi as in most of 
Africa are required to register and get approval from the government in order to carry out any 
activities at all (Pinkney, 2003, pp. 211–12) Against this background, I was quite puzzled by 
how these issues were only briefly mentioned by the organisations in this case study, and that 
there overall did not seem to be great restrictions on their operations. That might be because 
their activities were less controversial and seen as less threatening by the government, but it 
might also be related to what Banik defines as a “self-regulating mechanism of self-
censorship”, resulting from a fear of the government (Banik, 2010, p. 46). To what extent 
such a culture of self-censorship, a fear of the government and restrictions related to particular 
themes or issues influences civil society in Malawi is another recommendation for further 
research.  
7.2 Youth participation – shaped by economic motivation, manipulation, 
and negative attitudes 
The empirical findings in this thesis show that all the partnerships between Plan and different 
youth organisations and networks in this case study aim to promote the participation of youth 
– in their communities, in politics and governance, and in the local economy (see section 
6.1.1). The aim of this part of the analysis is not to assess to what extent these efforts are 
successful in terms of achieving their aims, but rather to take a broader look at how the efforts 
to promote youth participation through the partnerships between Plan and youth associations 
play out, and what implications this has for our understanding of civil society in Malawi.  
 
The Plan-supported activities related to participation implemented by the youth organisations 
and networks take different forms, and have different aims. Some are related to political 
participation, such as engaging with local government officials to get information about and 
influence policies and budgets, or engaging with student councils or the youth parliament in 
order to raise issues and influence decision. Based on a pluralistic approach to citizenship, 
where citizenship is based on participation and agency (Gaventa, 2002), these efforts can be 
seen as aiming to promote youth citizenship. Importantly, as discussed in section 7.1 above, 
aid funding channelled through partnerships with INGOs such as Plan shape how these 
initiatives play out. It influences which actors initiate them and take the lead, as well as the 
choices they make about what issues to address and where to do so. This leads to challenges 
related to legitimacy and credibility of such initiatives to promote youth participation and 
citizenship, as it raises the questions of who participates, and why they choose to focus on 
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particular issues. This is yet another issue that would be worthwhile to explore in further 
research – how aid influences citizenship in highly aid-dependent countries. Does it lead to 
greater participation only for those already privileged, in terms of education and access to 
resources (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002), or does it, as suggested by Pinkney, give a voice to 
groups who are usually not heard (Pinkney, 2003, p. 98)? 
 
Although there was a lot of focus on how Plan supports youth associations to participate on 
their own terms within the interviews and focus group discussions, as discussed in section 
6.1.1, it also became clear that Plan staff are involving youth in activities to support the 
achievement of Plan’s aims. One example is the involvement of youth in sponsorship 
activities. These are purely practical activities such as the collection and distribution of letters 
related to Plan’s communication with sponsors and sponsored children; it is not related to the 
overall aims of the youth organisations and networks, beyond the fact that some of the youth 
networks are being funded from sponsorship funds. It could also be understood as a way to 
provide economic empowerment through livelihood support, as the youth receive some 
allowance for such activities. From the perspective of Plan staff, it was seen as a win-win 
situation, they are being useful to Plan and receive something they need in return. Also for 
other activities implemented in cooperation with Plan such as meetings and workshops, there 
was generally some kind of “allowance” from Plan involved, and this was a key motivating 
factor as discussed in section 6.1.4. This allowance could be seen as a way to compensate for 
the opportunity costs of participation, as participation always entails a cost of time, resources 
or risk (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002, pp. 61–62). However, in the context of Malawi, this 
seems to have rather perverse effects, because the compensation often outweighs the 
opportunity cost. My impression from the interviews was that youth could get more income 
from allowance given at meetings, than from actually working (if they are lucky enough to 
have a job). This becomes a challenge for participation initiatives, because the issues at stake 
become less important than the allowance provided. It is also highly problematic from a wider 
perspective of economic development, as it becomes more attractive to find a way to access 
aid than to actually have a job in the “real” economy – thereby reinforcing the aid dependence 
of Malawi overall.  
 
The involvement of youth in activities that are “useful” to Plan as well as the provision of 
allowances becomes more problematic when seen in the light of the history of manipulation 
of youth in Malawi, as discussed in chapter 2. Adults in positions of power officially 
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promoting youth engagement and participation, but in reality using youth for their own aims, 
have been an important part of Malawi’s history (Phiri, 2000). The Malawi Young Pioneers is 
a key example. Officially, they were started in order to empower youth and strengthen their 
ability to contribute to development; but in reality, youth were brainwashed into loyalty and 
obedience, and used as instruments of surveillance, oppression and violence (Eidhammer, 
2005; Mapanje, 2002). In the era of multiparty democracy, political leaders are “buying” 
youth with money and alcohol to speak out and support them, to carry out violent 
demonstrations, and to harass opponents (Englund, 2006). In a historical and political context 
where youth are so accustomed to being “used and abused”, the claim by youth organisations 
that manipulation is also being done by INGOs (discussed in section 6.2.4) is perhaps not so 
surprising. If the youth are used to their engagement and participation being “bought” by 
adults, why should they view INGOs differently?  
 
This needs to be understood not just within a historical and political context, but also within 
an economic context. It is not surprising that economic motivation was so important, 
considering that Malawi is an extremely poor country, with high levels of unemployment 
(Banik, 2010, p. 35). The lack of economic empowerment of youth make them more 
vulnerable to manipulation, from any actors who can provide access to resources. Hence, 
ironically, the efforts by Plan to promote their economic empowerment such as for example 
helping out with sponsorship activities and receiving an allowance, could also be seen as a 
way of “using” youth for their own purposes. The lesson here is not that these particular 
activities are big problems in themselves, but that youth are highly unlikely to decline 
involvement in activities that can provide access to resources, irrespectively of whether the 
activities have anything to do with addressing issues they have identified as important. 
Further, efforts by INGOs to promote economic empowerment such as providing small 
allowances in exchange for activities may enhance dependency rather than lead to long-term 
economic empowerment.   
 
Another important factor shaping the participation initiatives by Plan and the youth 
organisations and networks was the views and attitudes towards youth in Malawi. As 
discussed in section 6.2.3, the empirical findings clearly show that youth face negative 
attitudes in Malawi. They are seen as irresponsible, promiscuous, violent and lazy. Such 
cultivation of negative images of youth can become an important barrier to their participation 
(Youniss et al., 2003, p. 138). However, these negative attitudes did not seem to lead to 
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isolation of youth in the communities, as suggested by empirical research from the US (Jarrett 
et al., 2004, p. 42). Another barrier to the participation of youth was how they were not seen 
as worth listening to, according to traditional attitudes where they are not recognized as being 
able to make a contribution. The youth participation activities were seen as a way to challenge 
and change those attitudes. However, one problem here is that such traditional attitudes take a 
long time to change, and even seemed to persist amongst some Plan staff. Another interesting 
finding was how Plan was very focused on formalizing youth networks, aiming for them to 
“graduate” into proper, registered NGOs. On the one hand, this could be seen as a way of 
strengthening arenas for youth participation. On the other hand, it can be seen as an indication 
of seeing them as “citizens of the future” (Roche, 1996, p. 479), where their participation in 
youth groups and networks is seen as important because the focus then is to train them to 
become part of civil society in the future, as opposed to participating now.  
 
This has implications beyond this particular case study. Any organisation or donor bringing in 
funds to support youth to exercise their right to participate in Malawi need to be aware of the 
history of manipulation of youth participation, and the economic context where access to 
resources is a primary motivation. Furthermore, it is important to be aware of the prevailing 
negative attitudes towards youth, as well as those of seeing youth as not worth listening to, or 
seeing youth as citizens of the future. Combined, these factors make youth easy targets for 
manipulation.  On the other hand, it might be misleading to portray the youth as passive 
victims being manipulated. The way in which they shift the focus of their organisations and 
networks in order to access resources could itself be seen as a form of empowerment – they 
are using the power at their disposal to gain access to the resources they need. However, it is 
important to remember the imbalance of power between funders and recipients (Mercer, 2003, 
p. 748). At the end of the day, the youth organisations and networks are – or at least, see 
themselves as - dependent on the donors in order to promote the participation of youth.  
7.3 Accountability – influenced by politics, patronage, power and transition.   
As described in sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.4, one of the key roles of civil society organisations is 
to hold the government and others with power accountable, and in that sense be a part of the 
checks and balances in a democratic system. And as discussed in section 6.1.1, all the youth 
organisations interviewed saw it as an important part of their role to hold the government 
accountable, enhance transparency in decision-making and engaging in governance 
initiatives. The youth networks were less explicit about this aim, but did mention engagement 
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with local decision-makers in order to find out what they do and how they spend money. In 
other words, they initiate and engage in bottom-up strategies to enhance political 
accountability of decision-makers at various levels (Newell & Bellour, 2002), sometimes also 
referred to as “policy accountability” (Ackerman, 2007, pp. 31–32). Plan sees their role as one 
of supporting youth organisations and networks in these efforts.  
 
In order to gain better insight into how these attempts to enhance political accountability play 
out, it is important to see it within the context of Malawi’s history and politics. As discussed 
in chapter 2, the multi-party era has been characterised by political chaos and confusion, with 
political leaders changing allegiances and parties as they see fit. Also, political leaders have 
generally not been held accountable for acts of repression in the aftermath of the dictatorship 
as well as during more recent events such as the deaths during the demonstrations in 2011 
(Briggs, 2010, p. 19; Mapanje, 2002, pp. 178–79; Sharra, 2013). Further, it is important to 
note the role of traditional authorities such as chiefs. According to Eggen, in addition to their 
traditional role they have an institutionalised role within the state, and their power and 
importance have been enhanced vis-à-vis the state, but without having formal mechanisms of 
accountability such as elections (Eggen, 2011). Combined, these factors may lead to doubts as 
to whether the political system itself is conducive to the promotion of political accountability. 
 
Patronage is another important factor that influences how initiatives to promote accountability 
may play out. This is seen as an important part of Malawian politics and governance – 
resources are being controlled by “patrons”, powerful individuals within the state system who 
use their control over resources to provide for particular groups that serve their interests 
(Booth et al., 2006, p. 9). This may limit the effectiveness of initiatives aiming to promote 
accountability, as people might be more inclined to accept corruption from a patron who 
provides them with access to resources. However, it is also important because it may lead to 
any other actors with access to and control over resources, such as INGOs, become viewed as 
another patron – someone to engage with, and try and build relationships to, in order for them 
to provide access to resources. 
 
Accountability is also relevant when it comes to private and non-governmental actors (Newell 
& Bellour, 2002, pp. 19–23). This is particularly important considering the relative weakness 
of the state compared to actors within civil society (Whaites, 2000, pp. 130–34), as well as 
Malawi’s aid-dependence (Banik, 2010, p. 24). Accountability is therefore important in the 
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relationships between youth organisations and networks and the youth they supposedly 
represent, in the relationship between the organisations and networks and Plan, and when it 
comes to Plan and their donors. According to the literature, accountability in such 
relationships tend to be directed upwards, towards donors (Bano, 2008; Bratton, 1994; Vakil, 
1997). Further, efforts by donors aiming to enhance downward accountability tend to focus on 
more technical aspects such as accountancy, monitoring and evaluations (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996; Mkandawire, 2010; Newell & Bellour, 2002). This corresponds well to the findings of 
this study discussed in sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.4, where accountability seemed to be primarily 
directed upwards, towards Plan and ultimately towards donors. It was found that this leads to 
a heavy focus on meeting donor requirements and satisfying formal criteria, on reporting and 
accountancy as opposed to accountability. This also implies less focus on the concerns and 
priorities of youth and their organisations and networks; they are less accountable to their 
members and interest groups in terms of raising issues they think are important. This may 
influence the credibility of the youth organisations in the eyes of the decision-makers and 
thereby limit their ability to influence them and hold them accountable, as they are seen as 
representing the concerns of donors and INGOs as opposed to that of young people in 
Malawi. In this regard, the findings support the arguments in the literature about the dubious 
accountability of INGOs and donor-funded NGOs (Mercer, 2003, p. 755). Irrespective of 
whether the organisations are genuinely attempting to be accountable also to their 
constituencies; they face challenges of different directions of accountability, as donors control 
resources, and therefore donor requirements often takes precedence over local concerns 
(Newell & Bellour, 2002, p. 11).  
 
The findings indicate that Plan Malawi has a rather uncomfortable role as a middleman, being 
squeezed between the requirements of donors on the one hand, and the requests from the 
youth organisations and networks they work with on the other. As power is central to the 
demands for as well as the response to calls for accountability (Newell & Bellour, 2002),  this 
“squeeze” can be understood in terms of power. Plan Malawi has power over resources vis-à-
vis the youth organisations and networks they support, but the donors have power over 
resources vis-à-vis Plan. So, although several Plan staff expressed a wish to be able to support 
the youth organisations and networks to focus on their own priorities, there was a recognition 
that the main priority was to meet the donor requirements, make sure money gets spent, and 
that reports and accounts are received on time. The youth organisations and networks also 
raised the issue of Plan’s downwards accountability, that they would like greater transparency 
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from Plan in terms of their decision-making and budgets.  Plan Malawi’s ability to support 
youth organisations and networks in their efforts to enhance accountability is therefore limited 
by the way in which this support is administered, as well as by the accountability of their own 
processes.  
 
It also seems as if the transition to a rights-based approach in 2003  (see section 5.1 and 6.1.5) 
has led to Plan and the organisations they work with being seen as less accountable by the 
communities, because the communities see less visible benefits from their efforts. This is 
somewhat ironic, considering how accountability is a key element of the rights-based 
approach to development (Uvin, 2007, p. 2007). The findings do however suggest that this is 
primarily due to the way this process of transition was administered as well as a lack of 
commitment to this new approach from some staff, as opposed to a result of the rights-based 
approach itself. As such a transition of approach was common amongst a wide range of 
development actors in the early 2000’s (Banik, 2010, p. 34; Uvin, 2007, pp. 601–02), it would 
be interesting to explore further how such a transition is viewed from the communities in 
which the work takes place, and what implications this has for how the accountability of the 
organisations is perceived. 
 
This analysis is relevant beyond the organisations and networks being the focus for this 
analysis. When organisations are more accountable towards donors than towards citizens, it 
limits their credibility in terms of promoting the accountability of government.  Further, in an 
environment such as Malawi, where the resources of INGOs are relatively high compared to 
the resources of government, working to enhance the downwards accountability of these 
INGOs towards the communities in which they work may be equally relevant as promoting 
government accountability. Also, when development organisations change the way they work 
in a community in a way that is not well-communicated or agreed with, this has implications 
for how they are viewed by the community, which may undermine the very purpose of 
changing the approach.  
 
7.4 Social capital – how aid influence cooperation and trust.  
In this thesis, social capital is defined according to Putnam’s definition, consisting of ”the 
features of social organisations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 167). The 
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empirical findings shed more light on how these features play out in Malawi’s civil society, 
and how they are influenced by the cooperation between Plan and youth associations, as well 
as by aid more broadly. An overall finding was that being a part of groups and organisations 
was seen as a good thing in itself by the youth, as they could share, discuss, cooperate and 
learn from each other – in other words, develop networks for and norms of cooperation.  
 
Some of the findings were related to trust between different actors in civil society, as well as 
between civil society groups and the communities they work with or represent. As has been 
discussed previously in this analysis, it was claimed by the local organisations as well as Plan 
that the communities had more trust in Plan and other INGOs with regards to resource 
management and service delivery (see section 6.2.4). When it came to local organisations, 
they were viewed with suspicion when it came to managing resources, seen as potentially 
corrupt and set up for self-enrichment, but still communities had more trust in them than in 
INGOs if it came to speaking on their behalf and raising issues of their concern.  Levels of 
trust between Plan and the youth organisations and networks are also relevant here. As 
discussed in section 6.1.5, the youth organisations expressed that they did not feel trusted by 
some Plan staff, they felt micro-managed and as if they were told what to do. This was not a 
problem with all Plan staff, and seemed to be a problem particularly in some Programme Area 
Offices where the staff were not fully convinced of the transition to work in partnerships and 
cooperate with local NGOs. When the partnerships are characterized by lack of trust, this has 
implications for how these organisations influence trust in the communities where they work 
– if the youth organisations are micro-managed by Plan, they are also less able to be 
responsive to demands and suggestions from the community in which they work. This 
contributes to our understanding of trust as a component of social capital (Putnam et al., 1993, 
p. 167), because it shows that involvement with civil society organisations in itself do not 
necessarily lead to enhanced trust, that there might be different levels of trust associated with 
the same actors depending on the issue at stake; and that the level of trust between civil 
society actors has an impact on trust between the community members and these actors.  
 
People’s motivations to join and set up organisations are also important for understanding 
how this may influence levels of trust. As discussed in section 6.1.4, one important finding in 
this research was that gaining access to resources was a primary motivation of youth when it 
came to being members of as well as starting organisations and groups. When this is the key 
motivation, what impact does this have on trust, and therefore social capital? Can competition 
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for access to aid within and between networks and organisation erode those bonds of 
cooperation and trust that they are supposed to create? To respond to these questions, one 
could argue that irrespectively of what motivation brings youth together, the fact that they do 
meet and work together in a group might open their eyes to the importance of cooperation and 
build trust, and therefore still contribute in some way to enhance social capital. And indeed, 
the youth did explain that they found it a good experience to be a member of a group, to learn 
from each other and to cooperate. Furthermore, Hyden rightly states that mobilizing resources 
often is one of the purposes and functions of civil society organisations (Hyden, 1997, p. 12). 
However, when the primary motivation to be involved with and set up organisations and 
networks is to gain access to resources, this also influences how networks (in Putnam’s 
terminology – as features of social organisations) operate. It is recognized within the literature 
on Malawi that many organisations are set up purely for fundraising purposes (Eggen, 2011, 
p. 106), and there is a lack of capacity to build horizontal networks, as well as a high level of 
competition amongst organisations (Banik, 2010, pp. 45–46). This is also supported by the 
findings of this thesis – as explained in section 6.2.1, the youth organisations as well as Plan 
explained that local civil society organisations often had difficulties cooperating, because they 
saw each other as competitors for the same resources.  
 
These findings contribute further to our understanding of how aid may influence social 
capital. In one of the few empirical studies on the topic, Bano’s study in Pakistan, it is 
concluded that that organisations receiving aid funds had a lower support base, fewer 
members and less credibility; hence aid may contribute to the erosion of social capital rather 
than its creation (Bano, 2008, p. 2310).  Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to draw 
any strong conclusion regarding this, the analysis so far indicates some support of Bano’s 
conclusions. Competition for resources between civil society organisations makes cooperation 
and coordination difficult, and maybe not even desirable as it could reduce chance of getting 
funding. Networks and groups seem to not only aim to facilitate action and cooperation for 
mutual benefit, as is key within the theory on social capital, but also to facilitate access to 
resources for individual benefit, or at least the benefit of this specific group. Further, 
community members seem to have little trust in local organisations, seeing them as set up for 
the enrichment of its own founders and staff.  
 
According to Putnam, lack of cooperation between civil society actors is problematic because 
the “weak ties” connecting people accross different groups in society and thereby contributing 
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to social capital are not developing (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 175). High levels of competition 
may lead to stronger ties connecting members of a particular group, but it may also lead to 
greater hostility towards those outside of the group, because trust only extends to those in the 
same group (Fukuyama, 2000, pp. 4–5). Putnam’s contrast between horizontal and vertical 
networks is important for understanding how the cooperation between Plan and youth 
associations may influence social capital. The key argument is that horizontal networks are 
crucial for the creation of social capital, but vertical networks may not have such a positive 
effect (Putnam et al., 1993, pp. 173–75). This is highly relevant, because one of the findings 
described in section 6.1.2 was that Plan supported the more informal youth networks by 
helping them to become formalized, aiming for them to become professionalised and 
registered as NGOs. Such formalization tends to imply more vertical structures, such as 
boards, chairpersons, and so on. Hence, the support from Plan aiming to strengthen the 
networks may simultaneously lead to them having less of a positive effect on social capital, 
because greater distance is created between those who make decisions, members and the 
community overall. This is another recommendation for further research – an exploration of 
how organisations with different degrees of being horizontal or vertical have different effects 
on social capital in a developing country context.  
 
As discussed in section 7.3, patronage is an important factor in Malawian politics (Booth et 
al., 2006, p. 9), and therefore also within civil society. Patron-client relationships are vertical 
relationships that are seen as not conducive to the creation of social capital, because client-
client relationships are characterized by competition, where as the patron-client relationship 
may be characterized by exploitation and shirking (Putnam, 1993, pp. 173–75). In a society 
where patronage is widespread such as in Malawi, any actors with control over resources, 
such as Plan, INGOs and donors, may become viewed as patrons. This is in line with the 
findings related to the competition for resources amongst local civil society organisations 
discussed in section 6.2.1, and the challenges in the partnerships between Plan and youth 
organisations related to lack of trust discussed in section 6.1.5. Civil society organisations in 
Malawi can thus be seen as competing clients in competition with each other, and in 
relationships with patrons (donors, INGOs) which are not characterized by trust and thereby 
not contributing positively to the creation of social capital.   
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8. Conclusions 
So, what conclusion can we draw from this case study regarding how cooperation between 
INGOs and youth associations influence the development of civil society in Malawi? The 
overarching conclusion is that efforts to strengthen local civil society through aid may be 
limited or even undermined by aid itself. This is because of mechanisms inherent in the aid 
system, as well as how aid influences the motivations of actors within civil society. The way 
in which aid may undermine its own of aims of strengthening civil society can in this study be 
seen in four distinct ways.  
 
Firstly, aid shapes civil society in terms of what types of actors are strengthened within it, 
what they do and where, and what motivates people to join and set up organisations. The 
cooperation between Plan and local youth associations in this case study seems to lead to the 
strengthening of particular types of actors within civil society, working on issues that are 
similar to those of Plan, based in urban areas and having quite a high level of capacity and 
professionalization. It also to a certain extent shapes what these actors work on and where, 
depending on how dependent they are on Plan compared to other funders. This leads to 
challenges in terms of representativeness and legitimacy.  These challenges are enhanced by 
the fact that access to economic resources is such a crucial motivating factor for the 
establishment of as well as involvement in civil society organisations in general. Also for 
those organisations with genuine and legitimate aims, as seems to be the case in this study, 
access to resources and improvement of livelihood opportunities is an important motivating 
factor. This is not surprising in a country with such levels high of poverty and unemployment; 
but it leads suspicion towards local civil society actors, as people think they are set up purely 
in order to access funds. Further, the support they receive reinforces their dependence on aid. 
The associations are not able to access funds outside of the aid-system, and trained staff are 
quickly recruited to the international aid industry. So although cooperating with INGOs in the 
short run leads to enhanced capacity in terms of the ability to do more, it also reinforced 
dependence on aid. This contributes to the theory of civil society in developing countries, as it 
shows how efforts to strengthen civil society through aid may reinforce dependence. 
 
Secondly, this study contributes to our understanding of youth participation within civil 
society, as it shows how efforts to facilitate youth participation may risk becoming ways of 
using or manipulating youth. In this particular case study, this is due to cultural, political, 
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historical and economic factors. Culturally, negative attitudes towards youth is a limiting 
factor in terms of their ability to participate within civil society, and this also seems to be the 
case amongst some Plan staff, leading to youth organisations and networks not feeling trusted 
to implement activities or contribute with their own ideas and initiatives. Historically and 
politically, youth have been manipulated by different powerful actors for political purposes. 
Economically, lack of access to resources and employment makes youth vulnerable to being 
used by actors with power and resources, whether these are politicians or INGOs. In this 
study, it was found that Plan was involving youth in activities that were purely useful to Plan, 
in exchange for some economic compensation. This is not to say that Plan was on purpose 
manipulating youth, it seemed to be done with the best intentions, aiming to contribute to 
improving their livelihood. Also, it is misleading to see the youth purely as passive victims – 
rather, they could be seen as clever agents in terms of utilizing opportunities to access 
resources. However, irrespective of motives on either side, the power imbalance between 
funder and recipient is not to be ignored, and such initiatives are unlikely to lead to the long-
term empowerment of youth, as they become even more dependent on aid.  
 
Thirdly, this study shows how aid channelled to civil society with the aim of enhancing 
accountability may be undermined by the mechanisms of aid itself. Within the relationships 
between Plan Malawi and the youth associations, it was clear that the main direction of 
accountability was upwards, towards Plan and ultimately towards donors. Despite calls for 
and efforts to be more accountable towards the communities where they work, meeting donor 
requirements becomes the dominant concern for Plan as well as the youth organisations, as 
they otherwise risk losing access to resources. In line with the aid-related accountability 
challenges mentioned in the literature, the ability of Plan to promote accountability through 
the activities with youth associations thus becomes limited by the focus on donor 
requirements as well as by the lack of accountability of Plan’s own systems. In addition, this 
study adds to the existing theory on accountability and civil society, by showing how changes 
in approach within organisations may be important for how their accountability is perceived. 
Ironically, Plan’s transition towards becoming a rights-based organisation (and with it, aiming 
to become more accountable) seemed to lead to them being viewed as less accountable by 
some of the communities they work in as well as by the youth organisations. Clearly, other 
factors than aid are also important constraints on the ability of youth organisations to promote 
accountability, in particular the political realities of leaders not being held accountable, and 
how patronage is entrenched throughout Malawi’s political system. But the key point coming 
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out of this thesis with regards to accountability, is that actors who are primarily accountable to 
donors lack credibility in terms of promoting the accountability of decision-makers, as their 
own processes are not characterized by the same transparency and accountability they 
encourage local organisations to demand from government.  
 
Fourthly, this study contributes to a greater understanding of how aid-funded efforts to 
enhance social capital become limited by the way in which aid support in itself leads to 
competition for resources and suspicion towards those who access them. Clearly, the 
cooperation between Plan and youth associations did result in bringing youth together, 
learning from each other, cooperating for common aims and finding solutions to challenges 
they faced. However, as economic motivation is an important reason for why youth (and 
anyone else) in Malawi join or set up organisations, the prospect of aid funding leads to 
competition amongst local civil society actors including youth associations, which may 
undermine the bonds of trust and networks of cooperation which are components of social 
capital itself. The creation of social capital may be further undermined by the attempts to 
formalize youth networks as well as by the prominence of patronage also within Malawi’s 
civil society.  
 
These conclusions give rise to recommendations for researchers as well as those working 
within the aid industry or being engaged in civil society organisations. There is a great need 
for further research into how aid shapes civil society in developing countries, and in 
particular, ways to support civil society in developing countries without ultimately leading to 
a weaker and more aid-dependent civil society with dubious credibility and legitimacy. When 
it comes to those working in the aid industry, I hope these conclusions will not simply lead to 
disillusionment, but encourage greater reflection. In particular, I hope this thesis can inspire 
aid professionals to look beyond the tunnel-vision of impact evaluations, and take a broader 
look at how a particular cultural, historical, political and economic context shapes how 
development interventions play out in practice, as well as how what aid aims to achieve may 
be undermined by how aid works. For the civil society activists in developing countries, I 
hope to contribute to an increased awareness of the risks inherent in aid-dependence, and 
inspire them to focus less on “capacity” as something coming from INGOs or donors in the 
form of material resources or training workshops, but as something they can build up and 
strengthen themselves, based on support from the people they work with, and thereby make 
them stronger and more independent in the long run.  
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